Inequality of educational opportunities and the role of learning intensity : evidence from a quasi-experiment in Germany by Camarero Garcia, Sebastian
Dis cus si on Paper No. 18-021
Inequality of Educational Opportunities  
and the Role of Learning Intensity:  
Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment  
in Germany
Sebastian Camarero Garcia
Dis cus si on Paper No. 18-021
Inequality of Educational Opportunities  
and the Role of Learning Intensity:  
Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment  
in Germany
Sebastian Camarero Garcia
Download this ZEW Discussion Paper from our ftp server:
http://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp18021.pdf
Die Dis cus si on Pape rs die nen einer mög lichst schnel len Ver brei tung von  
neue ren For schungs arbei ten des ZEW. Die Bei trä ge lie gen in allei ni ger Ver ant wor tung  
der Auto ren und stel len nicht not wen di ger wei se die Mei nung des ZEW dar.
Dis cus si on Papers are inten ded to make results of ZEW  research prompt ly avai la ble to other  
eco no mists in order to encou ra ge dis cus si on and sug gesti ons for revi si ons. The aut hors are sole ly  
respon si ble for the con tents which do not neces sa ri ly repre sent the opi ni on of the ZEW.
Inequality of Educational Opportunities
and the Role of Learning Intensity:
Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment in Germany∗
Sebastian Camarero Garcia†
ZEW Mannheim‡, University of Mannheim§ and CEP at LSE¶
May 2018
Abstract
Over the 2000s, many federal states in Germany shortened the duration of secondary school
by one year while keeping the curriculum unchanged. Exploiting quasi-experimental variation
due to the staggered introduction of this reform allows me to identify the causal effect of
increased learning intensity on Inequality of Educational Opportunity (IEOp), the share in
educational outcome variance explained by predetermined circumstances beyond a student’s
control. The reform-induced increase in learning intensity had no short-term effect on IEOp. In
the medium term, however, IEOp increased as differences in parental resources gained importance
through support opportunities like private tuition adapting to the intensified educational process.
The effect is stronger for mathematics/science than for reading, implying the existence of
subject-dependent curricular flexibilities. My findings point to the importance of accounting
for distributional consequences when evaluating reforms aimed at increasing the efficiency of
educational systems and to the role of learning intensity for explaining changes in educational
opportunities influencing social mobility.
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1 Introduction
In modern societies, the general belief that by working and studying hard everyone has a fair chance
at climbing the social ladder has been central to maintaining social cohesion and political stability.
However, in an era of relatively high income and wealth inequality compared to the post-war decades
in most developed countries (Piketty & Zucman, 2014) an increase in the number of both citizens
who fear that their children may be worse off in the future (fear of downward mobility) and groups
in society who believe that the “game is rigged” (fear of a lack of upward mobility) may be crucial
for explaining rising political polarization. For these reasons, the reduction in social mobility1 is
becoming an increasingly important issue when it comes to understanding recent trends of inequality
within society. As education tends to be the main vehicle for upward mobility, thus, it is of key
policy interest to analyze educational systems in terms of equality, in particular to detect drivers of
inequality of opportunity (as Chetty, Friedman, Saez, Turner, and Yagan (2017) for US colleges).
Yet in times of public spending constraints, accelerating growth of scientific knowledge and economic
competition within OECD countries, educational policies have still shifted their attention onto how
to make a country’s educational system more efficient (Machin, 2014). In fact, recent reforms have
started to focus on compressing educational processes, that is, increasing learning intensity.2
This paper contributes to the issue of how the trend in intensification of education may explain
decreased social mobility by analyzing the question of how increasing learning intensity affects
Inequality of Educational Opportunity (IEOp). Thus, I shift focus onto the distributional concerns
and the potential unintended consequences of compressing educational processes for social mobility.
As if, for instance, higher intensity made it harder to learn the curriculum through schooling alone,
educational opportunities could become more dependent on a student’s parental support resources.
In this context, I will adopt the concept as illustrated by Roemer and Trannoy (2015) stating that
society has achieved equality of opportunity if what individuals achieve with respect to a desirable
objective is determined by their efforts (e.g. how hard they study), instead of by circumstances
that are beyond an individual’s control (e.g. gender). IEOp3 is hence defined as inequality in the
distribution of educational outcomes that can only be attributed to circumstances through either
their direct or indirect (via changing efforts) impact. It is a relative measure of educational mobility.
1For instance, Chetty, Grusky, et al. (2017) provide evidence for falling absolute income mobility. OECD
(Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development) data from 2012 confirm low absolute educational mobility,
in particular Germany reaches only below average upward and downward mobility rates (Figure A.1 in Appendix A.5.).
2With respect to schooling, learning intensity can be defined as the ratio of curricular content that is covered in a
given amount of instructional time. This can also be denoted as schooling intensity and would correspond to the
intensive margin if the curricular content fixed for a given school track was regarded to be the extensive margin. But
research on the role of this factor has been limited as it goes beyond issues of participation in education or duration.
3Inequality of Opportunity (IOp) and Equality of Opportunity (EOp) refer to the same concept, placing emphasis
on either the unfair or fair part within the distribution of opportunities. Thus, if opportunities depend less on factors
beyond an individual’s control but more on their efforts, EOp will increase and IOp will decrease. In line with Brunori,
Peragine, and Serlenga (2012), instead of IOp in education I use the expression IEOp and instead of EOp in education,
Equality of Educational Opportunity (EEOp). In the following, I will only use IOp or IEOp for ease of interpretation.
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To identify the causal effect of (increased) learning intensity on IEOp, I analyze an educational
reform in Germany. During the last decade, Germany’s federal states shortened secondary school
for the academic track (Gymnasium) from nine to eight years at staggered time points between
2001 and 2008. The so called Gymnasium-8 reform (G-8 reform) reduced school duration by one
year, but kept the curriculum unchanged for the affected (treated) student cohorts. Due to the
implementation of the reform, there were two cohorts who would finish school together in the same
year in which they received their university access diploma. However, one cohort entered one year
earlier than the other, leading to differences in years of schooling (9 vs. 8 years). As both cohorts
had to take the same final exams in the same year, treated students had less time to learn the same
material, thus experiencing higher learning intensity. For that reason, the staggered introduction of
the reform across federal states generates quasi-experimental variation that allows the application
of a Difference-in-Differences estimation approach (DiD) to derive the causal effect of the increase
in learning intensity on IEOp by comparing the respective treatment and control group over time.
For the purpose of measuring IEOp, I use Program for International Student Assessment (PISA)
data which provides a representative sample of students in the ninth grade with standardized test
scores in reading, mathematics and science comparable across time and federal states, as well as a
rich set of family background variables that allow me to define relevant circumstances. Then, IEOp
reflects the coefficient of determination when regressing test scores on these circumstances variables.
The analysis yields three main findings. First, the estimated size of IEOp reaching 20-30% of the
variance in cognitive test scores that can be only attributed to circumstances corresponds to the
levels of common estimates for inequality of opportunity in income. Second, the reform-induced
increase in learning intensity did not affect IEOp in the short term. However, in the medium term,
after an adjustment period of about three years, IEOp significantly increased by up to 10% in terms
of explained test score variance for the fourth affected cohort onwards. Given the initial size of IEOp
and the fact that this paper’s IEOp measures are lower bound estimates, this corresponds to relative
increases in IEOp of at least 25%. Third, the results provide some evidence in favor of the existence
of subject-dependent curricular flexibilities. General skills in mathematics and science tend to be
more inflexible and thus more responsive to changes in curricular intensity than reading competency,
which is in general less dependent on schooling as it is more often trained through its usage in
everyday life. Finally, the results can be rationalized by differential compensation possibilities for
higher learning intensity depending on parental resources in terms of both the capacity to pay for
additional tuition and to invest time in supporting students with school work. This shows that there
are important adverse distributional concerns with respect to providing equal opportunities that
must be taken into account when designing reforms altering the intensity of educational processes.
This paper is among the first to provide an analysis of IEOp in a quasi-experimental setting going
beyond its pure measurement. As Ramos and Van de gaer (2016) point out, the understanding of
how institutions influence IEOp is still limited. My aim is to contribute to this issue by providing
evidence on the role of learning intensity as a relevant policy dimension that causally affects IEOp.
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From a social welfare perspective, it is interesting to reveal the effects of increasing learning intensity
on both academic achievement and IEOp. Pareto-improvements may be realized if intense curricula
proved to be an instrument to overcome the trade-off between educational spending and output.
This paper offers several contributions to the existing literature. First, I contribute to the still
limited strand of research on measuring IOp with respect to educational outcomes by adding
empirical evidence on how IEOp changed over time in a developed country. So far, papers dealing
with IOp have focused on measurement issues, using income as the main outcome variable (e.g.
Almås, Cappelen, Lind, Sørensen, and Tungodden (2011)). Concerning IOp in educational outcomes,
most studies focus on measuring IEOp for developing countries (e.g. Gamboa and Waltenberg
(2012)). The few papers on developed countries follow mostly a cross-country comparison approach
using PISA data to achieve comparability of educational achievement measures over time and
across countries (e.g. Raitano and Vona (2016); Oppedisano and Turati (2015); Ferreira and
Gignoux (2013)). Instead, my study estimates IEOp for Germany exploiting quasi-experimental
within-country variation. Such settings allow going beyond measuring IEOp to actually estimate the
causal effects of specific policies on IEOp. For instance, some studies analyze IEOp in the context
of reforms that changed tertiary education systems (e.g. Bratti, Checchi, and de Blasio (2008) and
Brunori et al. (2012) on Italy). They find that both expanding higher education through opening
more sites and reducing the length to get a first-level degree to have a positive effect on equality
of educational opportunity. However, only a few studies investigate the impact of school reforms
on IEOp (e.g. Edmark, Frölich, and Wondratschek (2014) for Sweden). Specifically for Germany,
Riphahn and Trübswetter (2013) confirm the role of intergenerational persistence in educational
achievement and that the school system did not improve in response to reunification regarding
IEOp.4 In this paper, I add evidence on how IEOp changed over time in Germany, but focus on
causal estimates of educational intensity for the academic track in the secondary education system.
Second, this work contributes to a strand of the literature analyzing educational policy reforms to
identify the underlying role of different input factors in the human capital accumulation process.
Even though the G-8 reform shows that changing school intensity is an important consideration
in educational policy-making, research on such reforms is still limited. To begin with, empirical
work has analyzed the effects of variations in pure schooling quantity without considering learning
intensity. In that context, most studies focus on reforms that increase educational participation,
such as policies raising compulsory minimum duration of schooling. They usually find the returns
of additional schooling on earnings to be positive (e.g. Angrist and Krueger (1991); Grenet (2013)).
Furthermore, the impact of differences in instructional time on academic performance has been
investigated. Relying on either cross-national or within-country variation in instructional time, most
studies find a positive impact of additional time on standardized test scores (e.g. Aksoy and Link
(2000), Marcotte (2007), Lavy (2015)). However, only a few studies have analyzed the impact of
variations in instructional time when curricular content can be assumed to remain constant.5
4Only 19% of 25-34 year-old Germans achieve higher degrees than their parents (OECD Education at Glance 2014).
5There have been a few studies exploiting quasi-random assignments of instructional time (e.g. due to timing of
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In this context, reforms that shortened schooling while keeping curricular content unchanged, allow
for the evaluation of the impact of increasing learning intensity. For instance, analyzing a similar
school reform in parts of Canada, Krashinsky (2014) finds only low long-term effects on wages,
which suggests that increased learning intensity might not affect earnings permanently.6 The results
are in line with Pischke (2007), who exploits a German reform in the 1960s that changed the start
of the school year to the autumn by implementing two short school years. The reform led to a
significant increase in the number of students repeating a grade, but only small effects on earnings
persisted. Despite the resulting public controversy that has even led some federal states to reverse
it, only a few studies have evaluated the G-8 reform and its effects on educational outcomes (e.g.
Büttner and Thomsen (2015); Andrietti (2016); Huebener, Kuger, and Marcus (2017)). Those
studies tend to find non-significant positive effects of the reform on a student’s average cognitive
skills and educational outcomes, such as final marks for the university access diploma.7 Instead,
my analysis shifts focus in the evaluation of the G-8 reform onto distributional concerns. This is
relevant in the debate surrounding reforms to the secondary school system, because it provides
policy suggestions for how to design curricula in terms of learning intensity taking into account
both the effects on cognitive skill formation and on IEOp. For instance, implementing a whole-day
school system may limit the role of parents for students to deal with compressed schooling.
Thirdly, my paper relates to the emerging literature aimed at explaining drivers of inequality in
educational outcomes as one key determinant of recent trends in decreased social mobility (e.g.
Philippis and Rossi (2017); Boneva and Rauh (2017a); Chetty, Friedman, et al. (2017); Rothstein
(2018)). I contribute to this strand of research by providing evidence that the so far neglected factor
of learning intensity may be a relevant policy channel for both the effectiveness of (non-)cognitive
skill formation and the importance of circumstances for educational outcomes. Whereas my analysis
mainly focuses on exploiting a school reform to derive estimates on how intensified instruction affects
IEOp in Germany, the interpretation of these empirical results in terms of potential mechanisms
complements explanations delivered by this most recent strand of literature. Although a complete
model of learning intensity, IEOp and its connection to social mobility is beyond the scope of this
study, I provide evidence on which future research tackling this big picture question can base itself
and which supports the integration of intensity as a key factor into the human capital literature.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrates the institutional background
and the G-8 reform on which the identification strategy relies. Section 3 explains how IEOp is
measured given the data in this study. In Section 4, the empirical strategy is illustrated. Section 5
provides the results with robustness checks and a discussion on the implications. Section 6 concludes.
school year, absence of teachers) that usually find similar positive effects of additional time on test scores. Marcotte
(2007) is an example of a study exploiting quasi-experimental variation in time available to prepare for state-wide
tests (due to differences in snow-related school closure) and finds positive effects of more school days on performance.
6Whether this is true due to schooling working primarily as a signal or whether increased intensity may compensate
human capital accumulation in response to less schooling, is unclear. The fact that students could choose to complete
high school in four or five years, however, raises doubts over whether the effect captures schooling intensity.
7For related literature which evaluates other outcomes of the G-8 reform, please refer to Appendix A.1.2.
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2 Institutional Setting: the “G-8 reform”
Explaining the institutional background and implementation of the G-8 reform illustrates how it
can be exploited as a quasi-experiment to analyze the effect of increased learning intensity on IEOp.
2.1 Institutional Background: the German School System and Reform Debate
Like the United States, Germany has a federal structure. Education policy strictly falls under the
remit of the 16 federal states (Länder). That being said, most features are comparable across states.
School starts usually at the age of six, when students enter primary school for a period of four
years. Afterwards, students enter a tripartite secondary school system, where the choice of track is
determined by their previous academic performance.8
Both the shortest track of secondary school, Hauptschule, and the intermediary track, Realschule,
allow graduates to pursue apprenticeship programs after a total of nine or ten years of schooling.
The academic track, Gymnasium, which this paper focuses on, leads to a diploma (Abitur) granting
access to university. Traditionally, the academic track used to last for nine years (for a total of
13 years including primary school) in West Germany. However, the former German Democratic
Republic (GDR) had a different school system: All students were taught together for ten years, after
which they could either follow vocational training or complete two additional years of Gymnasium
to obtain the Abitur. Following reunification, most East German federal states adjusted to the West
German standard, the Gymnasium-9 model (G-9 model), but two states, Saxony and Thuringia,
maintained the Gymnasium-8 model (G-8 model).9
Then, in the early 2000s, the nine years were perceived as a competitive disadvantage for the economy,
because they contributed to the relatively advanced age at which Germans entered the labor market
after school and/or university. Moreover, the long duration of the academic track was criticized for
hindering the creation of a more comparable, harmonized framework for tertiary education in the
European Higher Education Area (EHEA). Thus, in order to adjust school duration to the average
among OECD countries of twelve years, federal states decided to shorten the Gymnasium to eight
years without reducing the curriculum, also known as the Gymnasium-8 reform (G-8 reform).10
8Primary schools issue recommendations for each student regarding which secondary school track the student should
enter (Dustmann, Puhani, & Schönberg, 2017). Based on a student’s performance in primary school, recommendations
were binding in federal states for the time period considered in this study. An overview of the regulations on the
transition from primary to secondary education for the period studied here is available on https://www.kmk.org/
fileadmin/Dateien/veroeffentlichungen_beschluesse/2006/2006_03_01-Uebergang-Grundschule-Sek1.pdf .
9In addition to the three different school tracks, federal states have recently started to provide a comprehensive
school (Integrierte Gesamtschule). In comprehensive schools, students are not channeled into specific academic paths
after primary school, but can graduate after 9, 10 or 13 years. However, this option played a negligible role for the
considered time period (2000-2012), because during this time the vast majority of students achieving Abitur still
attended Gymnasium. See Figure A.2 in Appendix A.5 for further details on the German education system.
10For further arguments discussed during the reform debate, please refer to Appendix A.1.1 in Appendix A.1.
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2.2 Implementation of the Reform: Increasing Learning Intensity
After 2001, all 14 federal states with a G-9 model shortened their academic secondary school track
from nine to eight years. With the graduation of a double cohort consisting of both the first G-8
model and the last G-9 model student cohort that together had to pass the same final exams (Abitur)
in the same year, the reform process took eight years to transform all grades of Gymnasium. For
the purpose of this paper, two features of the reform are particularly important. First, as shown in
Figure 1 not all federal states started the reform process at the same time. Some of them began in
school year 2001/2002, whereas others waited until 2008/2009, implying that the resulting double
cohorts graduated between 2006/2007 and 2015/2016.11
Second, although the academic track was reduced by one school year, the curricular content remained
at the original level. In fact, education ministers decided that standards for the university access
diploma (Abitur) were not to be lowered in response to the reform. Therefore, the minimum number
of 265 instruction hours per week and school year across all grades was maintained and students still
had to pass the same number of lessons in total before they could graduate from the Gymnasium
(Education Ministers, 2016). This should ensure comparable nationwide standards for university
access diplomas, despite the differences in school duration. Adding more content to the last two
years of the Gymnasium was perceived to be difficult, because the first G-8 and the last G-9 model
cohort had to complete those grades together. Only marks during the final two years and marks in
the Abitur exam count towards the university access GPA. Thus, school authorities chose to focus
the compression on the first years instead, squeezing the material originally taught in the seven
years between grades 5 and 11 into the six years between grades 5 and 10. In other words, students
in the G-8 model were supposed to enter the final two years of Gymnasium as if they had completed
the original 11th grade. To keep the required total minimum weekly lessons unchanged for the new
G-8 model, instructional time increased by about two hours a week per grade during grades 5-9 for
G-8 model students compared to previous cohorts in the G-9 model.12
However, the total loss in time of one school year was not fully compensated by additional instruc-
tional time per week: in order to limit the amount of afternoon schooling in 5th and 6th grade,
hours originally planned for revision (beyond the minimum required) were dropped and instead
used to teach already new curricular content at an earlier point in time compared to the G-9 model.
Therefore, it is plausible to assume that total curricular content was not reduced for the first student
cohorts affected by the G-8 reform, on which this study focuses on, in any of the federal states.
11For related literature which evaluates other outcomes of the G-8 reform, please refer to Appendix A.1.2.
12 Andrietti (2016) provides a calculation based on the regulations set by the Ministry of Education on weekly hours:
“By the end of grade 9, G8 students have covered the curriculum corresponding to 6,460 (265/8 per week over 39 weeks
for five grades) of the 10,335 instructional hours required for graduation. This means that they have accumulated on
average 720 more instructional hours [...] than G9 students at the end of grade 9 (265/9 per week over 39 weeks for
five grades, i.e. 5,740 hours) [...].” However, this is only an approximation for an average student; the exact changes
depend on the federal state. Huebener et al. (2017) have collected binding timetable regulations for each federal state
and show the changes in the distribution of average weekly instruction hours. This confirms the interpretation of G-8
reform: on average hours per grade increased by about 2 hours, i.e. about 8-10% per grade and school year.
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Figure 1: Implementation of the G-8 reform across federal states
2000
PISA
2001 2002 2003
PISA
2004 2005 2006
PISA
2007 2008 2009
PISA
2010 2011 2012
PISA
2013 2014 2015 2016
Schleswig-Holstein(c)
Rhineland-Palatinate(c)
Hesse(d)
North Rhine-Westphalia
Brandenburg(b)
Berlin(b)
Bremen
Baden-Württemberg
Lower Saxony(a)
Bavaria(a)
Hamburg
Saarland
Meckl.-West Pomerania(e)
Saxony-Anhalt(e)
Thuringia
Saxony
G9 Reform-Start G8/G9 parallel Double Cohort G8
Notes: This figure illustrates for each federal state whether the graduating cohort in each school year of the Gymnasium
was in a G-8 model, G-9 model, consisted of the double cohort or whether due to the reform implementation process both
models existed parallel with younger grades already in a G-8 and older ones still in a G-9 model. Notes on some states:
a In Bavaria and Lower Saxony, the 5th and 6th grades were allocated into the G-8 model in the same school
year. However, the 9th graders in 2009 were affected by the reform from the 5th grade onwards.
b Berlin and Brandenburg, where primary school lasts six years, introduced the reform for 7th grade onwards.
c Rhineland-Palatinate and Schleswig-Holstein planned to introduce the G-8 reform for school year 2008/09 to be
completed by 2015/16. At the end, both kept the G-9 model for all grades and over all PISA waves considered.
d Hesse introduced the reform over 3 years: the “main” double cohort covering 60% of schools is shown.
e Mecklenburg-West Pomerania and Saxony-Anhalt introduced the reform directly for 9th grade onwards.
Source: Based on facts as shown in Table 2 and the regulations explained in Table A.4. This figure corresponds to the
geographical maps illustrating the implementation of the reform across time and space in Figure A.3 in Appendix A.5.
The G-8 reform exogenously led to a considerable increase in learning intensity over the first few
years of the Gymnasium, that is, the amount of material covered per week increased for each grade.13
13As curricular content in the G-8 model began to change in the years after 2012 (cf. Table A.4 in Appendix A.4),
this assumption would not necessarily hold for later G-8 cohorts. But by using data including ninth graders tested in
2012 or before, I focus on the very first cohorts affected by the reform, so these later changes do not affect the analysis.
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3 Data andMeasuring Inequality of Educational Opportunity (IEOp)
In this section, I first focus on which specific PISA data14 are used for my analysis. Then, I will
explain how one can measure IEOp, the main outcome variable, based on the related literature
and the educational data available for the main test domains in mathematics, reading and science.
Finally, I provide some basic descriptives on the circumstances variables defined for this paper.
3.1 PISA data
For Germany, two types of PISA test data are available, the version conducted for international
comparisons (PISA-I) and a national extension (PISA-E). The PISA-I data result from students
taking the same test on the same day selected in a two-stage sampling procedure. In the first stage,
schools from the 16 federal states of Germany are randomly selected. In the second stage, for each
school, on the one hand, about 25 students of age 15 are randomly taken to be tested (age-based
sample); on the other hand, within selected schools, two classes of ninth graders with a minimum of
25 students are randomly chosen (grade-based sample). In total, the grade-based PISA-I sample
consists of about 10,000 students from about 225 schools.15 Thus, its sample size is about twice as
large as that of the age-based sample. While comparisons across countries are best carried out at a
given age, a comparison among ninth graders is more appropriate for the strategy pursued in this
paper because the G-8 reform affected students based on their grade in a certain school year.
Moreover, national PISA extensions were conducted for the years 2000, 2003 and 2006. Each of them
consists of about 50,000 students. By oversampling less populated federal states, these extensions
allow for more robust comparisons of educational performance between German federal states.16
However, PISA-E was discontinued in 2009 and replaced by the IQB federal state comparison test.17
Since then each extension covers only a particular domain (reading in 2009, mathematics and science
in 2012), which prohibits their use for analyzing the entire period considered in this study.
Nevertheless, Andrietti (2016) or Huebener et al. (2017) use data from the national PISA extensions
for the years 2000, 2003, and 2006. They complement them with single waves of PISA-I, in the case
of Andrietti (2016) only for the year 2009 and in the case of Huebener et al. (2017) additionally for
2012. Only grade-based PISA-I samples have all domains consistently available for each test year.
14Some background information on the OECD’s PISA data, its advantages and disadvantages to measure educational
outcomes as well as on the representativeness of these data across states and over time is provided in Appendix A.2.1.
15See Table A.1 in Appendix A.4 for an overview of available grade-based PISA-I datasets.
16For this purpose, one day after the tests taken for the PISA-I samples, in each federal state additional students
were randomly selected to undergo the same testing procedures answering an additional national questionnaire.
Combined with the original PISA-I samples (Table A.1), enlarged grade-based PISA-E samples emerged (Table A.2).
However, the PISA-E 2006 data is based only on age and not on the grade (cf. Table A.2). Thus, one would need to
focus on the subset of 15-year-olds who are in ninth grade. But this results in a smaller sample size and constitutes a
departure from the grade-based sampling on which data for the other waves rely.
17From 2009 onwards, this comparison test aims to assess national educational standards determined by the Standing
Conference of Ministers of Education (SC) of all federal states instead of by the OECD.
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Therefore, to have more consistent comparability across the studies used, this paper avoids mixing
PISA-E and PISA-I datasets. For these reasons, the main results will be based on grade-based
PISA-I samples for all available waves (2003, 2006, 2009, 2012). The PISA-E data will only be used
when the time period is extended as part of robustness checks, and their use will be restricted to
the 2000 PISA-E wave (see Appendix A.2.2 for data sources used).18
As this paper focuses on the academic track (Gymnasium), only schools of this type are included in
the sample. They make up about one third of the grade-based PISA-I sample which corresponds
to the real share of secondary school students in Gymnasium. Finally, the analysis is restricted to
variables derived from the questionnaire for students and their parents (the student-dataset).19
To sum up, this paper relies on the grade-based PISA-I samples to construct a representative repeated
cross-section of German students in grade nine of the Gymnasium that allows me to analyze IEOp in
response to the G-8 reform by using variables based on test scores and background characteristics.
Descriptive Statistics Regarding the main outcome variables, PISA test scores in the domains
of reading, mathematics and science, by focusing on students in the academic track of secondary
school, mean PISA test scores are above the German average. As expected, a typical ninth grader
in a Gymnasium consistently achieves results that are about 60 points higher than for the average
German ninth grader, which corresponds to about an entire proficiency level, that is, the value-added
of two school years. Regarding the three testing areas, students perform worst in reading literacy.
Moreover, they appear to stagnate or even slightly deteriorate in their reading skills between 2000
and 2012. This observation is in line with reports on German PISA test results for the years
2000-2009 illustrating that students perform better in mathematics compared to reading skills (cf.
Klime et al., 2010; Bilanz nach einem Jahrzehnt), with average scores in mathematics (about 580)
exceeding scores in reading (about 570). Students perform best in science, reaching up to 590 points.
Furthermore, in all three domains the median exceeds mean test scores. This indicates that
there appears to be more variation at the lower end of the performance scale, with more students
performing relatively badly, thus pushing the median down. The mean/median comparison and its
development may be regarded as first sign for whether IEOp changes over time. The data show that
median and mean deviate only slightly more after than before the reform. The same applies to the
variance of student test scores which do not change significantly over time. Finally, the dataset in
this paper contains more than 60 schools per test year across all federal states and on average the
number of students increases with each test cycle. (See Table A.3 in Appendix A.4 for an overview).
18In 2000, there was no specific grade-sample based PISA-I sample available from the Institut zur Qualitätsentwicklung
im Bildungswesen (IQB). However, PISA-2000 being the PISA-2000-E dataset is ninth grade-based (Baumert, 2002;
PISA 2000 - Die Länder der Bundesrepublik Deutschland im Vergleich). But instead of the usual 80 replication
weights, one then has about 768 replication weights. One also needs to pay closer attention regarding weighting as
in the larger samples (PISA-E or IQB-LV) student observations per test domain may vary and thus different final
weights may be required for each test domain.
19The IQB does not provide access to all teacher-datasets (as for 2006). Thus, I refrain from using data based purely
on teacher questionnaires (teacher-dataset in Table A.1). However, variables derived from questions reappearing for
cross-checking purposes in student, teacher and school principal questionnaires (e.g. gender) are taken into account.
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3.2 Outcome Measure: Inequality of Educational Opportunity (IEOp)
The idea that societies should distribute opportunities equally has a long tradition within political
philosophy. Following Rawls (1971) seminal contribution and its discussion (e.g. Sen (1980)), the
idea established that a prerequisite for measuring Inequality of Opportunity (IOp) is distinguishing
whether a form of inequality is acceptable or not within a society.20 However, these ideas only
started to capture the more widespread attention of economists when scholars such as Roemer
(1998) translated these philosophical concepts into a more formal theoretical framework. Since then,
an empirical literature has emerged, proposing several methods on how to estimate IOp as shown in
recent survey articles by Ramos and Van de gaer (2016) and Roemer and Trannoy (2015).
In the following, I formulate a model regarding how to measure IEOp in line with Ferreira and
Gignoux (2011, 2013). To begin with, it is useful to define a set of conceptual notions:
• An advantage denotes an individual achievement. Studies typically focus on income; in this
paper the achievement corresponds to educational outcomes as measured by PISA-test scores.
• The vector of efforts, E, denotes the set of variables that influence the outcome variable
(advantage) and over which the student has control (e.g. choice of time for studying).
• The vector of circumstances, C, denotes the set of individual characteristics which are beyond
the student’s control, for which one cannot be held responsible, e.g. your family household’s
socio-economic status (SES), parental education, gender, ethnicity or innate ability/talents.
Consider a sample of N students indexed by i ∈ {1, ..., N}. Each student i can be described by a
set of attributes {y, Cn, Em}, where y denotes an advantage (here test scores), Cn is a vector of n
discrete circumstances and Em denotes the vector of m discrete efforts.21
Thus, we can represent the population by a (n×m) matrix [Ynm] with a typical element (cell)
ynm = g(Cn, Em)|C ∈ Ω, E ∈ Θ, g : Ω×Θ =⇒ R
being the advantage that is a function of both circumstances and efforts. After selecting the appro-
priate set of variables capturing circumstances characteristics relevant to educational achievement
that constitute the n different vectors Ci for each student i, the sample can be split into n distinct
groups of students sharing the same circumstances (they are of the same type). Similarly, the sample
can be split into m distinct groups of students exerting the same level of efforts, but having different
circumstances (they belong to the same tranche). Together types and tranches form the cells.
Thus, the concept of Inequality of Educational Opportunity (IEOp) can be translated as follows:
Assuming talents to be distributed normally across the whole population, students who work harder,
20There is strong experimental evidence that people distinguish acceptable (fair) and unacceptable (unfair) income
inequality (Cappelen, Sørensen, & Tungodden, 2010; Almås et al., 2011). It tends to be acceptable if differences are
due to individual responsibilities (efforts), but not acceptable if these are due to luck (circumstances). Lefranc and
Trannoy (2017) show how luck can be incorporated as an intermediary category between circumstances and efforts.
21This model could be extended to the case of having continuous elements in the vectors of circumstances/efforts.
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that is, putting in greater efforts, should be rewarded by achieving good educational results regardless
of their specific circumstances characteristics. Hence unfair IEOp corresponds to differences in
educational achievement between students who put in the same efforts but only differ in terms of
their circumstances (compensation principle). In contrast, disparities in educational achievement
due to variations in individual efforts are acceptable (reward principle). Thus, IEOp resembles
differences between students that can only be attributed to circumstances beyond their control.
Deriving a measure of IEOp involves two steps: an Estimation Phase to transform the original
distribution [Ynm] into a smoothed one [Y˜nm] reflecting only the unfair inequality in [Ynm] and the
Measurement Phase, which thereon applies a measure of inequality.
Following the literature, I conduct an ex-ante22, between-types inequality measurement approach of
IOp which is in line with the indirect23 approach, because it is based solely on the observed marginal
distribution of advantages (test scores) given by the vector y = {y1, . . . , yN} and on the joint
distribution of advantages and circumstances over the sample population {y, Cn}. Consequently,
I follow the measurement approach of Ferreira and Gignoux (2013), because it requires fewer
assumptions (e.g. on how to form tranches without directly observing effort). Moreover, given
the high requirements for data availability, applying a non-parametric approach to conduct a
within-tranche inequality decomposition (Checchi & Peragine, 2010)24 may bias the measure of
IEOp, because the more precisely one tries to design the partition, the smaller cells become.
Consequently, this paper adopts a parametric, ex-ante estimation approach to derive IEOp measures.
I will model test scores (y) as a function of circumstances (C) and efforts (E), as y = f(C,E).
Efforts can also depend on circumstances, i.e. E = E(C) which implies y = f(C,E(C)). Thus, for
instance, it should be noted that unobserved innate ability is taken into account in this framework
and is considered to be an unobserved circumstance factor that may influence test scores directly
through cognitive skills, but also indirectly via its impact on work ethic and other characteristics
associated with efforts. However, efforts cannot vice versa change other relevant circumstances, such
as gender or parental education.25 In the PISA-data evaluating students in the ninth grade, the
individuals involved are on average about 15 years old. Hufe, Peichl, Roemer, and Ungerer (2017)
argue that choices made before an age of consent (16) are likely beyond an individual’s control.
22One distinguishes between an ex-ante and ex-post approach. This refers to how one evaluates IOp, thus to which
normative welfare criterion is chosen. Before effort is realized (ex-ante), following van de Gaer’s "mins of means"
criterion, EOp is achieved equalizing mean outcomes across types. IOp is measured as between-type inequality satisfying
ex-ante compensation/reward principle. After effort is realized (ex-post), following Roemer’s "means of min" criterion,
EOp is achieved eliminating inequality within tranches satisfying ex-post compensation. Fleurbaey and Peragine
(2013) show that ex-post and ex-ante compensation are incompatible. However, if effort is distributed independently
from circumstances, ex-post will be equivalent to ex-ante EOp (Ramos & Van de gaer, 2016, proposition II).
23One distinguishes between direct and indirect measurement approaches. As the direct approaches aim to model the
opportunity sets explicitly, their implementation has been difficult because opportunities are not directly observable.
Instead, indirect approaches measure IOp based on the observed joint distributions of outcomes and circumstances.
24Their approach essentially involves four steps. First, one defines the advantage variable. Second, one has to choose
circumstances-variables to form type and tranche, and thus the respective cells. Assuming that ideally the within-type
distribution should be the same, thirdly, one removes the within-cell score inequality to obtain a smoothed distribution.
Fourth, total inequality in the smoothed scores distribution is decomposed into fair and unfair.
25See Appendix A.3.5 in the Appendix for further discussions of ability in the the context of measuring IEOp.
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Therefore, it is plausible to assume that these tested students are (if at all) only partially responsible
for their choices. My model of measuring IEOp considers the role of circumstances, efforts and their
interplay. Following Ferreira and Gignoux (2013) a linear functional form is used:
yi = C ′iβ + E′iγ + ei (1)
with Ei = C ′iδ + ui (2)
Ci is a vector capturing circumstances variables and Ei is the unobserved vector of m efforts per
student i. However, the aim being to estimate the full effect of circumstances on scores, i.e. both the
direct and indirect effect on scores (via their impact on efforts), I estimate the reduced form model:
yi = C ′i(β + γδ) + (ei + u′iγ) (3)
i.e. : yi = C ′iρ+ zi , where ρ = (β + γδ) and zi = (ei + γui) (4)
The residual, zi, includes both unobserved efforts and unobserved circumstances. The aim at this
point being to estimate the mean score outcome of each type conditional on circumstances, one
proceeds with:
ŷi = C ′iρ̂ (5)
This will create a new, simulated distribution of scores, ŷ = {ŷ1, . . . , ŷN}. Thus, every student is
assigned the value of her opportunity set (which in a linear regression corresponds to the expected
score conditional on circumstances). This linear model can be estimated using an Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) regression providing the vector of predicted test scores (the smoothed distribution).
Having assigned each individual the value of their opportunity set, the second step, the Measurement
Phase, then involves calculating inequality in this new distribution, using a particular inequality
index, I(.). To estimate IEOp, one would estimate the following ratio:
θ̂IEOp =
I(ŷi)
I(yi)
= I(C
′
iρ̂)
I(yi)
(6)
i.e. the ratio between inequality in circumstances (the simulated distribution) and total inequality
(actual distribution of scores). Thus, instead of using an absolute measure, I use a relative measure
of IEOp. Now, the remaining issue is what inequality index I(.) to use. The literature on IOp in
income has used the Mean Log Deviation (MLD) index due to its desirable properties (e.g. path
independence). However, as outlined in Ferreira and Gignoux (2013), the MLD is not appropriate
for measuring inequality in PISA test score data. The reason for this is that it is not ordinally
invariant to the standardization of PISA test scores. In this case, the authors instead show that
the most appropriate measure for IEOp consists of the variance. Being an absolute measure of
inequality itself, it is ordinally invariant in the test score standardization and it satisfies the most
important axioms to be qualified as meaningful inequality measure, i.e. it satisfies (i) symmetry, (ii)
continuity and (iii) the transfer principle.
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Thus overall, the variance satisfies requirements for the proposed Inequality of Educational Oppor-
tunity (IEOp) measure and can be calculated as:
θ̂IEOp =
variance(ŷ)
variance(y) (7)
This measure is attractive for various reasons. First, it is the coefficient of determination (R2) of an
OLS regression of test scores on circumstances C variables which eases measurement procedures.26
Second, as shown in Ferreira and Gignoux (2011), the R2 results in a meaningful summary statistic,
the lower bound of the true IEOp. As the subject of concern is the total joint effect of all circumstances
on educational outcomes as measured by test scores, the object of interest is to understand what
percentage of the variation in scores y is causally explained by the overall effect of circumstances
(directly and indirectly via efforts). With efforts being treated as generally unobserved, omitted
circumstances variables, if we observed them, would only lead to a finer partitioning of [Y inm], which
would further increase the IEOp measure. Therefore, the R2 measure, θ̂IEOp in Equation (7), is
a valid lower bound estimate of the joint effect of all circumstances on educational achievement.
In other words, it is the lower bound of the share of overall inequality in educational achievement
that can be explained by predetermined circumstances (a lower-bound estimate of ex-ante IEOp).27
Third, θ̂IEOp is a relative measure of IEOp that is cardinally invariant to the standardization of test
scores. Moreover, one can decompose the IEOp measure into components for each variable in the
circumstances vector which corresponds to a Shapely-Shorrocks decomposition.
3.3 Control Variables: Measuring Circumstances
Regarding the selection of relevant control variables, this study follows the most common approaches
used in the literature (e.g. Ferreira and Gignoux (2013)). One needs to include as control those
variables that represent circumstances, factors which a student cannot influence, but which can
determine the dependent variable of interest, cognitive skills as measured by test scores.28 They can
be divided into two main groups, student-level circumstances, such as personal characteristics, and
socio-economic family background variables, such as parental household characteristics. Table 1
provides an overview of the main control variables in the base model specification.
Concerning student-level controls, students are on average 15.42 years old. The share of female
students is slightly greater than that of male ones. This reflects the fact that in recent years female
participation in Gymnasium has been steadily higher compared to that of male students (Prenzel et
al., 2013; PISA 2012 - Fortschritte und Herausforderungen in Deutschland).
26The only caveat is that this model cannot estimate the effect of individual circumstances. Elements of ρˆ may be
biased due to omitted variables bias, one cannot interpret them as causal effect of certain circumstances on scores.
27Niehues and Peichl (2014) outline how an upper-bound can be estimated in order to find boundaries for IOp
estimates, though this method has not yet been widely applied because of data requirements (e.g. need of panel data).
28Obviously, it is never possible to observe all of these circumstances variables, which is the reason that the IEOp
measure will be a lower bound estimate as discussed in Section 3.2 (Niehues & Peichl, 2014).
13
The variable migration background indicates that about 17% of students have at least one foreign-
born parent. But the variable language spoken at home improves the extent to which one controls
for the student’s migration background. As depending on the level of parental integration, one can
expect that not all students with migration traits speak a language other than German at home.
Less than half of the number of students with foreign traits said they spoke a different language at
home. I classify all individual characteristics (gender, age, migration background) as circumstances.
Another set of control variables involves socio-economic family background variables. An important
circumstance is a student’s parental education background, i.e. the highest educational qualification
achieved by one or both of a student’s parents. This seems to be an indicator for potential support
opportunities available to the student. To measure parental education, I rely on the International
Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) index. It serves to identify whether at least one
parent has achieved an academic degree, ISCED level 5 or 6, in which case they would constitute an
academic household. Table 1 shows that about 60% of students live in such academic households. A
medium category comprises students whose highest level of parental education is post-secondary, non-
tertiary education (ISCED level 3/4). Finally, students whose parents do not have any qualification
beyond lower-secondary school (ISCED level 1/2) form the low parental education category.
In order to take the socio-economic status (SES) of a student’s family background into account, I
exploit, first, the number of books at home as a variable indicating the SES environment in which a
student grows up. This variable is generated in all PISA studies and has been shown to be a good
alternative proxy for the family SES, as household income is highly correlated with the amount of
books in a household. It is plausible to assume that at the age of 15 students are still financially
dependent on their parents. Moreover, access to culture is mostly influenced by the opportunities
offered in the household in which a child grows up. Thus, it is generally accepted that for students
aged 15 the number of books variable represents circumstances controlling for family SES. I take the
range of 101-500 books as a base category for this variable, as about 50% of students in the sample
live in such a household. Similarly, the International Socio-Economic Index of Occupational Status
(ISEI) index can be taken into account as a further control variable for socio-economic background.
Higher ISEI scores correspond to higher levels of occupational status.29
I also control for family structure characteristics. First, I take into account whether a student lives
in a single parent household. About 14% of all students are raised under such circumstances. It
is important to control for them because they may indicate whether a student has grown up in a
more stressful environment. Second, I also consider employment status dummies for both mother
and father. By determining the time availability and family structure, aspects that influence the
environment in which a student can study are taken into account. In the sample, the vast majority
of fathers work full-time (FT), whereas most mothers are part-time employed (PT) (about 44%).
29The International Standard Classification of Occupation (ISCO) can serve as an alternative for describing parental
SES. This involved obtaining parents’ occupational data by asking open-ended questions, the responses to which were
coded into ISCO codes. But this is not available for all PISA datasets, in contrast to the mapping of ISCO into ISEI
indexes. See Ganzeboom, De Graaf, and Treiman (1992) for further details on this methodology.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics: Control Variables for Circumstances
Base-MT (2003-2012) Mean SD Min-Max Missings (SD)
Individual Characteristics
Female 0.5289 0.4989 [0-1] -
Age in years 15.43 0.49 [13,75-17,25] -
Language spoken at home (Base cat. German) 0.0552 0.2285 [0-1] 0.0060 (0.0774)Migration background (Base cat. German) 0.1679 0.3738 [0-1]
Parental characteristics
Parental Education: (highest ISCED level)
# ISCED-level (5-6): 0.6285 0.4832 [0-1]
0.0371(0.1890)# ISCED-level (3-4) (Base cat.): 0.2812 0.4495 [0-1]
# ISCED-level (1-2): 0.0532 0.2244 [0-1]
Socio-Economic Status
Number of books in a household:
# more than 500: 0.2029 0.4022 [0-1]
0.0497 (0.2174)# 101-500 (Base cat.): 0.4703 0.4991 [0-1]# 11-100: 0.2579 0.4375 [0-1]
# max. 10: 0.0193 0.1375 [0-1]
Highest-ISEI-level of a job in the family 57.1536 17.2042 [0-90] 0.0177 (0.1317)
Family Characteristics
Single parent households: (Base cat.: No) 0.1317 0.3382 [0-1] 0.0808 (0.2726)
Father - employment status
# full-time (FT) (Base cat.): 0.8120 0.3907 [0-1]
0.0728(0.2598)# part-time (PT) : 0.0584 0.2345 [0-1]# unemployed (UE) : 0.0251 0.1564 [0-1]
# out-of-labor force (OLF) : 0.0318 0.1753 [0-1]
Mother - employment status
# full-time (FT) (Base cat.): 0.2972 0.4570 [0-1]
0.0603 (0.2381)# part-time (PT) : 0.4379 0.4961 [0-1]# unemployed (UE) : 0.0452 0.2078 [0-1]
# out-of-labor force (OLF) : 0.1593 0.3660 [0-1]
Number of students 13,756 G-8 reform dummy: 0.4573 (0.4982)
Notes: This table reports summary statistics for the sample of ninth graders in Gymnasium pooling the data for main
period studied (PISA-I-2003/2006/2009/2012) and is weighted by the sampling weights provided in the PISA dataset
(compare Appendix A.2.1). In the comments column, the amount of missing observations is provided and standard
deviations are reported in parentheses. For categorical control variables, the base category is indicated by italics. Finally,
the number of observations and the G-8 reform dummy share is provided.
This is consistent with the predominant family model in Germany during the 2000s consisting of the
father as the main bread-winner and a part-time working mother mainly in charge of child care.30
30In fact, with a school system based mostly on half-day schooling and working parents faced with only a limited
number of institutions to take care of children after school, this family structure with a FT working father and mostly
PT working mother prevailing in the data has been predominant in West Germany for many decades. However, a
slow extension of all-day schools has been underway since the late 2000s, which may change the situation of student
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4 Empirical Strategy
Estimation proceeds in two steps. First, appropriate measures of IEOp need to be estimated given the
available outcome and control variables in the data. The second step exploits the quasi-experimental
variation of the G-8 reform to identify the effect of increased learning intensity on IEOp, using a
difference-in-differences strategy based on forming reasonable treatment and control groups.
4.1 Estimating IEOp
Following the explanation in Section 3.2 as a first step, IEOp will be measured using θ̂IOP , as
defined in Equation (7). This measure requires estimating the coefficient of determination (R2)
from an OLS regression of PISA test scores on the different circumstances variables listed in the
previous section. Thus, the following regression model is estimated separately by federal states
forming the respective treatment or control groups, and by PISA test wave:
Yist = β0 + β1(Individual Characteristics)ist + β2(Parental Characteristics)ist
+ β3(Socio−Economic Status)ist + β4(Family Character)ist + FE(state/school)s + ist (8)
where Yist = {stdpvreadist; stdpvmathist; stdpvscieist} are test scores of student i in state s at time
t in one of three PISA domains.31 To ease the interpretation of β coefficients, I standardize scores
for the effects to be measured as percentages of an international standard deviation in the PISA
test (see Appendix A.2.1 for details on the test metric).
This baseline regression model needs to be adjusted to take the following two issues into account.
First, to allow for the extrapolation of findings to Germany’s entire high school student population,
the notion of external validity has to be considered (B. D. Meyer, 1995; Bertrand, Duflo, &
Mullainathan, 2004). This requires the data sample to be as representative as possible with
respect to the population of German ninth graders attending a Gymnasium in the time period
under investigation (mainly 2003 to 2012). Thus, the model is estimated using a Weighted Least
Squares (WLS) regression with the population weights provided in the data.32 Second, given the
sampling strategy there may be correlation among observations in the error term. Therefore, I
adjust regressions by calculating standard errors based on available replication weights in the PISA
data and allow for clustering at the level of federal states. Following the OECD guidelines I explain
in detail how to estimate standard errors for the PISA data used in this study, in Appendix A.3.1.
cohorts born during the 2000s - a group of students that is not part of this paper’s analysis period (2003-2012).
31 Note that until Section 5.2, I focus in notation on the main specification, the Base-MT models covering the time
period (2003-2012) with the general reform time set to take effect between 2006 and 2009, as also defined in Section 4.2
(for an overview see Appendix A.3.3). Then, the regression model can also be estimated separately by treatment and
control groups only twice for the pooled pre-reform ((2000)-2003-2006) and post-reform (2009-(2012)) samples.
32Baumert and Prenzel (2008) discuss the PISA sampling strategy and the generation of the population weights.
They argue for the 2006 wave of the PISA-E data that certain student groups might have been over/underrepresented,
and that weights should be used to correct for this. These arguments also apply to the PISA-I data used in my paper.
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As noted in Section 3.3, the control variables measuring circumstances in Equation (8) fall into four
categories: Individual Characteristics (IC), Parental Characteristics (PC), Socio-Economic Status
(SES) and Family Characteristics (FC) (cf. overview in Appendix A.3.2). Individual Characteristics
include the circumstances variables: age, gender and migration background. As students were
sampled based on being in the ninth grade, by controlling for age, differences in school entrance
age and grade repetition potentially due to ability are taken into account. Controlling for gender
considers the existence of any subject-specific differences in academic test score performance between
male and female students (Niederle & Vesterlund, 2010). Migration background has also been shown
to be important in explaining the academic achievements of students in Germany (Klime et al.,
2010; PISA 2009 - Bilanz nach einem Jahrzehnt). On average, having a migration background is
negatively correlated with performance due to, for instance, its implications on non-cognitive skills
such as self-esteem.
Socio-economic family background control variables include Parental Characteristics such as parental
education levels, SES indicators such as the number of books in the household, and Family Charac-
teristics such as family structure. A more academically stimulating environment tends to have a
positive impact on cognitive skill formation and in that regard parental education can be assumed to
constitute circumstances capturing investments into a student’s early childhood. Similarly, favorable
SES as measured by higher ISEI index values and/or more books available in a household should
be expected to have a positive impact on a student’s test scores. Higher SES of the family in
which a student grows up may be indicative of better and easier access to support for dealing with
school-related work. Otherwise, growing up with a single parent or with unemployed parents might
have a negative effect on test scores, because such family conditions are more likely to be associated
with adverse factors for skills formation or limited access to out-of-school support opportunities.
Moreover, in addition to these controls at the level of student i, the model in Equation (8) includes
federal fixed effects (FEs) at the state level, the school level, or both. State fixed effects take
into account time-invariant differences in the outcome variables between federal states due to, for
instance, distinct political preferences for school policies. Moreover, the federal state in which a
student goes to secondary school represents a circumstance variable, because it is beyond a student’s
control where parents decide to reside. Finally, adding school fixed effects allows me to capture
quality differences among schools that can also exist within a federal state and to control for other
school-level circumstances.33
33Unlike for the federal state where the decision of residence is made by the parents, students may have some
influence over which school they attend, though this influence is likely very limited at age 10. However, the estimation
results do not change much using different combinations of FEs, so this is probably not a major concern. By applying
school-FEs without state-FEs, one still controls for characteristics both on school and state level (states are in charge of
school policy). As the PISA test is not conducted in the same schools over the years, the school-FEs are wave-specific.
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4.2 Definition of Treatment and Control Groups
The G-8 reform and its implementation at different points in time at the federal state level can be
exploited as a quasi-experiment to identify the effect of increased learning intensity on a measure of
IEOp. This requires categorizing the 16 federal states into treatment and control groups for each
PISA test wave. Table 2 shows how, based on the implementation of the reform and the timing of
this process across federal states, useful treatment and control groups can be formed.
Table 2: "G-8 reform" Treatment/Control Group allocation of PISA cohorts per state
Federal State ReformEnaction
Double
Cohort
Treated
grade
PISA cohorts affected (if) Treatment cohort/grade affected
2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2006 2009 2012
Bavaria (BV)
2004/2005 2010/2011 6 first cohort treated in 6th grade was not in 9th grade in a PISA test year
2004/2005 2011/2012 5 C C C T T - 1st cohort 4th cohort
Lower Saxony (LS) 2004/2005 2010/2012 6 first cohort treated in 6
th grade was not in 9th grade in a PISA test year
2004/2005 2011/2013 5 C C C T T - 1st cohort 4th cohort
Baden-Württemberg
(BW) 2004/2005 2011/2012 5 C C C T T - 1
st cohort 4th cohort
Rhineland-Palatinate
(RP) 2008/2009 2015/2016 5 C C C C C - - -
Schleswig-Holstein
(SH) 2008/2009 2015/2016 5 C C C C C - - -
North Rhine-
Westphalia (NRW) 2005/2006 2012/2013 5 C1 C1 C1 C1 T - - 3
rd cohort
Hamburg (HB) 2002/2003 2009/2010 5 C C C T1 T1 - 3rd cohort 6th cohort
Bremen (BR) 2004/2005 2011/2012 5 C C C T1 T1 - 1st cohort 4th cohort
Berlin (BE) 2006/2007 2011/2012 7 C C C T2 T2 - 1st cohort 4th cohort
Brandenburg (BB) 2006/2007 2011/2012 7 C C C T2 T2 - 1st cohort 4th cohort
Saxony-Anhalt (ST) 2003/2004
2006/2007 9
2007/2008 8 1st cohort
2008/2009 7 C C T T T 7th graders
2009/2010 6 2nd cohort 5th cohort
2010/2011 5 C C C T T 5th graders 5th graders
Mecklenburg-West
Pomerania (MWP) 2004/2005
2007/2008 9
2008/2009 8 C C T T T 1st cohort
2009/2010 7 8th graders
2010/2011 6 1st cohort 4th cohort
2011/2012 5 C C C T T 5th graders 5th graders
Saxony (SN) since 1949 5 Ch Ch Ch Ch Ch hypothetical control group: always in treatment
Thuringia (TH) since 1949 5 Ch Ch Ch Ch Ch hypothetical control group: always in treatment
Saarland (SL) 2001/2002 2009/2010 5 C C T T T 1st cohort 4th cohort 7th cohort
Hesse (H)a
2004/05 2011/2012 5 C C C T T - (less than 10%) 2nd/3rd/4th
2005/06 2012/2013 5 C2 C2 C2 C2 T - 1st cohort 2nd/3rd/4th
2006/07 2013/2014 5 C C C C T - - 2nd/3rd/4th
a Hesse (H) only introduced the reform gradually across 3 school years (Table A.4 and Figure 1 as well as for regression specifications Figure A.4).
Notes: In this table, the Treatment/Control Groups are highlighted by rectangular boxes in the following way: For the Base/Ext-ST/MT Models:
Treatment T ≡ red rectangle, T1 ≡ red + magenta rectangle and T2 ≡ red + magenta + violet rectangle. For the Base/Ext-MT Models: Control
Group (C) ≡ blue rectangle; Control Group (C1) ≡ blue + green rectangle. Adding H to C1 would form Control Group (C2). Finally, TH and S
form a hypothetical Control Group (Ch) (always G-8 model). For an overview of treatment and control groups, please refer to Appendix A.3.3.
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For seven out of fourteen federal states in which a reform took place, the introduction of the G-8
reform occurs between 2006 and 2009. PISA 2009 is thus the first post-treatment wave for the tested
ninth graders in these states. The effect visible in 2009 will be denoted the “short-term” effect of
the reform, while models including the 2012 wave capture the “medium-term” effect. Therefore, I
define as Baseline Model: the medium-term perspective (Base-MT) model covering the time period
(2003-2012) and the short-term perspective (Base-ST) model covering the time period (2003-2009).34
Medium-Term Model For the medium term, the reform takes effect in between 2006 and 2009.
According to Table 2 seven federal states can be classified as the treatment group, because tested
ninth graders were only in the G-8 model from 2009 onwards. Treatment Group T2 includes
Baden-Württemberg (BW), Bavaria (BV), Lower Saxony (LS), Bremen (BR), Hamburg (HB),
Berlin (BE), and Brandenburg (BB). However, the East German federal states are still likely to
be different from the West German states, for instance, since many of the teachers working there
were educated in the former German Democratic Republic (GDR). Focusing on West Germany
only, the Treatment Group T1 consists of BW, BV, LS, BR and HB. Finally, the most conservative
set excludes the city states of HB and BR, because they may exhibit some inherently different
characteristics from higher populated larger states. The Treatment Group T, that I focus on in the
main specification, consists of just the three territorial West German states: BW, BV and LS.
The control group in the main specification, Control Group C, consists of two other territorial states
in West Germany: Rhineland-Palatinate (RP) and Schleswig-Holstein (SH). These two states did
not move to a G-8 model over the time period considered here, that is, they always maintained
a G-9 model. A second control group is made up of the two East German states of Saxony (SN)
and Thuringia (TH). These two states had been following a G-8 model since 1949, when the former
GDR was founded, and chose to maintain their secondary school system after reunification. They
form a hypothetical Control Group Ch to estimate the reform effect relative to the counter-factual
of a permanent G-8 model. Finally, one can form a Never-Takers Control Group C-NT consisting
of the four states that never changed the length of Gymnasium: RP, SH, SN and TH.
Focusing on a treatment taking effect for students in grade nine from 2009 onwards, five federal
states cannot be classified into either treatment or control group and are therefore excluded from
the estimation. In Saarland (SL), the first West German state that implemented the reform, ninth
graders were already being taught in a G-8 model by 2006. The same is true for the two East
German states of Saxony-Anhalt (ST) and Mecklenburg-West Pomerania (MWP). Moreover, in both
states the reform affected students from ninth grade onwards, while in most other states students
were affected starting in the fifth grade. In Hesse (H)35 and North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW), ninth
graders were only taught in a G-8 model from 2012 onwards, hence, after the 2006-2009 window.
34The Extended Model (Full-MT/ST) will additionally include the year 2000. For an overview, see Appendix A.3.3.
35Despite being the only federal state that did not implement the reform uniformly for Gymnasium at the start of
one school year, but successively over three years, one could still classify Hesse as a control state in 2009 when only
10% of students tested had been already treated. Then the reform only occurred by 2012 and it is control state both
in 2006 and 2009, whereas it can be classified as treatment state in 2012, when all ninth graders were in a G-8 model.
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Short-Term Model For the short-term models, the reform time is set between 2006 and 2009.
The treatment groups remain identical to those in the medium-term models (T/T1/T2), because
only the year 2012 will be dropped in the short-term models with the reform time still set between
2006 and 2009. This also applies to the Control Group C consisting of RP and SH and to the
hypothetical Control Group Ch made up of SN and TH. Now, North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW) as
the federal state with the largest population in Germany can be added to the Control Group C,
as in the (Full)/Base-ST model, ninth graders were taught in a G-9 model across the whole time
period (2000)/2003 until 2009. This creates Control Group C1 consisting of RP, SH, and NRW.
One can add Hesse (H) to consider another territorial, West German state. For this purpose, one
has to assume that Hesse is still part of control groups in 2009, as by then only ten percent of ninth
graders had been treated (Table 2). Thus, Control Group C2 is formed of RP, SH, NRW and H.
In summary, Table 2 already indicates that the most comparable setting for the medium-term
models consists of the Treatment Group T and Control Group C, because it focuses on territorial,
West German federal states that are very comparable in their relevant characteristics. Thereby,
this setting still accounts for 37.6 out of 80.6 million people and thus about 50% of the German
population and hence, will serve as the main specification for the Base-MT model.36 The most
comparable setting for the short-term models consists of the Treatment Group T and Control
Groups C or C1. With the later group I account for 55.2 out of 80.6 million people and thus about
68% of the German population. Hence, there are two main control groups for the Base-ST model.37
4.3 Difference-in-Differences Estimation Strategy
The second step of the empirical strategy in this paper is a difference-in-differences (DiD) estima-
tion. The gradual implementation of the G-8 reform across federal states allows estimating the
reform-induced effect of increased learning intensity on IEOp by exploiting the differences between
comparable treatment and control groups. For example, in the main specification of the basic
medium-term model, there are three states in the treatment group (Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria,
and Lower Saxony) and two states in the control group (Rhineland-Palatinate, Schleswig-Holstein).
Moreover, the pre-reform years are 2003 and 2006 (before), and 2009 and 2012 are the post-reform
years (after). Then, the DiD strategy is implemented via the following regression model:
R2st = δ0 + δ1(TreatG8st = aftert × Treats) + γt × aftert + ξs × Treats + αXst + st (9)
where R2st = {R2(read)st;R2(maths)st;R2(science)st} is the estimated coefficient of determination
(R2) from Equation (8) associated with state s in test year t that measures IEOp in the three
PISA domains. Treat captures the Treatment Group-specific effect and after the time trend. δ1
is the interaction term, being 1 if a student attends a Gymnasium in a treatment state after the
36However, in Section 5.3, I also conduct robustness checks using T1, T2 and Ch (Figure A.4 in Appendix A.5).
37However, robustness checks will be conducted using T1, T2 and C, Ch, C2 (Figure A.4 in Appendix A.5; for an
overview see Appendix A.3.3).
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implementation of the new G-8 model. Consequently, δ1 is the coefficient of interest, that is, the
causal reform effect of increased learning intensity on IEOp. Xst is a vector of potential state-level
variables, including federal state and year fixed effects. In that way, one can take into account
concerns whether there might have been differential “implementation” effects on the level of the
federal states imposing the reform. For instance, certain school-system characteristics could have
heterogeneously influenced the impact of the reform across federal states. Thus, I adjust the
regression by including federal state fixed effects capturing any specific effects at the highest level of
variation that is not captured by the DiD group specific means in Equation (9).
4.4 Selecting Appropriate Treatment/Control Group Settings
Internal Validity To begin with, German federal states share a similar legislative, cultural and
economic framework and common qualification standards are coordinated by the Standing Conference
of the Ministers of Education and Cultural Affairs (SC). Thus, exploiting variation in the reform
implementation process across federal states can be considered more effective than relying on
cross-national variation as in many existing studies (Wössmann, 2010).
Moreover, one should consider whether the reform effect is driven not only by the explanatory
variable of interest (increased learning intensity), but by other non-random factors in response to the
reform. One concern with the DiD strategy might be that potentially affected students move with
their families to a state that has not yet implemented the G-8 reform. If such reactions had occurred
in a treatment group before the reform had been implemented, the population’s composition across
treatment and control groups might have changed in a way that would bias estimation results.
However, such anticipatory behavior is very unlikely. First, options for moving between federal
states to avoid the G-8 reform were limited. The implementation across all federal states was
fast. For instance, half of all reform states started the transition into shortened school duration
for the Gymnasium within three school years (2003/2004 until 2005/2006). There is no systematic
pattern regarding the timing and implementation of the G-8 reform and the geographical location
of reforming federal states.38 Second, direct and indirect moving costs, including bureaucratic
hurdles, appear to be reasons why few families with children move to another federal state in
Germany. Third, strategic issues concerning competition for access to study programs also support
the assumption that selection bias due to movement between states is unlikely. As a result of the
reform several double cohorts graduating in between 2009 and 2016 temporarily increase the number
of applicants for university studies in Germany. As this would inversely affect the probability
of students immediately entering a study program of their choice, by completing the G-8 model
students could at least insure themselves against the risk of having to take a gap year as their 14th
year of education.39
38The geographical maps in Figure A.3 in Appendix A.5 reveal the quick spread of the treatment across states.
39Instead of spending 13 years in school and having to wait 1 additional year before entering the study program of
their choice, having 12 years of schooling before enrolling at a university even after 1 gap year would “save” 1 year.
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By limiting the focus to a setting in which treatment states implemented the reform in school
year 2004/2005, the quasi-experimental design is unlikely to suffer from estimation bias due to
non-random reasons for introducing the G-8 reform slightly earlier or later among federal states.40
Finally, for the internal validity of a DiD estimation to hold, the common time trend assumption
requires that in the absence of the reform, both treatment and control group would have shown a
parallel time trend. Therefore, I conduct Placebo Tests (Bertrand et al., 2004) and show pre-reform
time trend graphs as robustness checks for the internal validity of my strategy in Section 5.3.
Treatment/Control Group Comparison Based on the quality of the quasi-experimental design
of the G-8 reform, estimating the effect of the reform on IEOp should not be biased by any selection
of students based on pre-reform characteristics. As the identification strategy relies on comparing
the change in IEOp for ninth graders attending Gymnasium across treatment and control groups
before and after the reform, significant observable pre-reform differences in the control variable
sets might call the empirical strategy into question by suggesting the existence of unobserved
compositional pre-reform differences. Following Imbens and Wooldridge (2009), Table 3 shows
standardized means comparison tests for the control variable sets (Table 1) in the main treatment
and control group settings to be considered when deriving the results. For the main time period
models, Model Base-MT/-ST , the G-8 reform takes effect between 2006 and 2009. Hence, PISA
waves 2003 and 2006 constitute the pre-treatment period. Table 3 shows that treatment and control
groups have very similar characteristics in terms of the main circumstances variables used for the
analysis. In particular, the main treatment group T and the main control group C appear to be
very similar with no significant differences. There only is a small difference with respect to the ISEI
index measure for SES - though the number of books measure of SES shows no significant difference
between both groups (columns 1-3 in Table 3). This supports the internal validity of the strategy,
because the main treatment and control groups consisting of West German states that are not city
states turn out to be indeed comparable. Similarly, for Model Base-ST, when we extend the control
group C by including additional large West German states, with North-Rhine Westphalia to form
C1 and in addition to Hesse to form C2, the control group not only gets larger in sample size, but
remains comparable for nearly all circumstances variables. Finally, using enlarged treatment groups
the results are still relatively robust in combination with standard control group (C; C1/C2).41
In summary, the pre-reform simple means comparison test for the main control variable set (Table 3)
suggests that the DiD estimation approach outlined in Section 4.3 might be valid, at least for the
following designs: for both Model Base-MT/-ST to compare Treatment Group T versus Control
Group C; and for Model Base-ST to compare Treatment Group T versus Control Group C1 or C2.
40Appendix A.3.4 shows that the treatment/control groups in Base-ST/MT are not different regarding the stability
of the government that enforced the G-8 reform. Political preferences appear to stay similar across groups over the
whole analysis period. Furthermore, systematic changes in the transitions flows between different tracks within the
secondary school system appear to be neither of considerable concern (Huebener & Marcus, 2017).
41See Table A.5 for pre-reform tests of circumstances variables with enlarged treatment groups. Due to space
constraints, pre-reform means comparisons between treatment and control groups for each point in time are not
provided. But, they confirm that there have been no relevant differential changes across groups before the reform,
thus supporting the validity of the estimation strategy. See also pre-trend DiD graph in Figure A.6 in Appendix A.5.
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The comparability of pre-reform characteristics supports the assumption of internal validity that
justifies exploiting the quasi-experimental design of the G-8 reform to estimate how the associated
increase in learning intensity affected IEOp.
Table 3: Pre-Reform Treatment/Control Group Comparison of Control Variable Sets
Base-MT (2003-2012) Base-ST (2003-2009)
T C T-C T C1 T-C1 C2 T-C2
Individual characteristics
Female 0.537 0.501 0.036 0.537 0.549 -0.011 0.543 -0.006
Age in years 15.488 15.468 0.020 15.488 15.464 0.025 15.474 0.015
Language at home not German 0.054 0.043 0.011 0.054 0.055 -0.002 0.054 -0.001
Migration background 0.183 0.144 0.039* 0.183 0.175 0.008 0.184 -0.000
Parental characteristics
Parental Education (highest ISCED level):
# ISCED-level (5-6): 0.662 0.637 0.025 0.662 0.648 0.014 0.642 0.019
# ISCED-level (3-4): [Base] 0.288 0.326 -0.037 0.288 0.288 0.000 0.291 -0.003
# ISCED-level (1-2): 0.044 0.026 0.018 0.044 0.036 0.008 0.037 0.007
Socio-Economic Status
Number of books in household:
# + 500: 0.226 0.233 -0.008 0.226 0.246 -0.020 0.243 -0.017
# 101-500: [Base category] 0.509 0.516 -0.007 0.509 0.481 0.028* 0.489 0.020
# 11-100: 0.246 0.228 0.019 0.246 0.228 0.018 0.222 0.025*
# max. 10: 0.010 0.014 -0.004 -0.001 0.010 0.015 0.016 -0.006*
Highest ISEI of parental job 59.103 57.072 2.031** 59.103 58.471 0.633 58.698 0.406
Family Characteristics
Single Parent (Base cat.: No) 0.137 0.141 -0.004 0.137 0.150 -0.013 0.156 -0.019*
Father employment status
# full-time (FT): [Base cat.] 0.854 0.841 0.013 0.854 0.843 0.012 0.845 0.009
# part-time (PT): 0.065 0.063 0.001 0.065 0.058 0.007 0.054 0.010
# unemployed (UE): 0.024 0.032 -0.007 0.024 0.026 -0.001 0.026 -0.001
# out-of-labor force (OLF) : 0.033 0.035 0.033 0.033 0.000 -0.005 0.034 -0.001
Mother employment status
# full-time (FT): [Base cat.] 0.217 0.213 0.004 0.217 0.232 -0.015 0.232 -0.014
# part-time (PT): 0.515 0.501 0.014 0.515 0.476 0.040** 0.476 0.039***
# unemployed (UE): 0.061 0.075 -0.014 0.061 0.063 -0.002 0.061 -0.001
# out-of-labor force (OLF): 0.194 0.187 0.194 0.194 0.202 -0.008 0.204 -0.009
Number of students 2,175 347 - 2,175 1,861 - 2,334 -
Notes: This table shows a two-sample t-test for comparing the main control variables in the pre-reform period of the main
specification to be considered in this paper between Treatment and Control Group (see Section 3.3 and 4.1). This is for both
T vs. C in Model Base-MT and for T vs. C/C1 in Model Base-ST the respective pooled average of control variables in
PISA-I-2003 and -2006. Stars denote the significance of the simple mean difference in pre-reform characteristics in the form of
p-values as follows: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1 ; Source: Author’s calculations based on PISA-I-data 2003, 2006, 2009,
2012. Table A.5 contains the table with additional Treatment Groups (T1/T2) and Control Groups (Ch).
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5 Results and Discussion
When presenting the results for the outcome variables, PISA test scores in each of the three domains,
the respective five plausible values are standardized based on the distribution of test scores across
the sample of students attending the ninth grade of Gymnasium - taken from the representative
grade-based PISA-I-dataset (Section 3.1).42 Section 5.1 explains the first-step and Section 5.2 the
second-step results for the main specifications (Base-ST/MT). Section 5.3 provides robustness
checks with extended treatment and control group settings, while Section 5.4 rationalizes the results.
5.1 Main Results: First Step
The first step of analyzing the distributional effects of increased learning intensity involves deriving
the main outcome variable, the measure of IEOp, as share in the standardized PISA test score
variance that can only be attributed to observed circumstances (Equation (8) in Section 4.1). All six
sets of control variables that capture circumstances are jointly used to derive this IEOp measure.43
Its standard errors are obtained by using replication weights and clustering on the highest level on
which the reform was implemented (Bertrand et al., 2004), the federal state level. Finally, population
weights take into account the stratified data structure and representativeness of each observation.
However, before measuring IEOp, it is also important to check how circumstances variables directly
affect cognitive skills as measured by test scores. Detailed regression output per test domain is only
provided for the main specification in the medium-term (Base-MT) model: T versus C (Table A.6,
A.7, A.8). As these output tables are sufficient to show the main patterns of how control variables
affect test scores, first-step results are only provided for mathematics in the short-term (Base-ST)
model: T versus C (columns (1-4) in Table A.9) or T versus C1/C2 (Table A.10).44
Medium-Term First-Step Results45 Starting with the Base-MT Model, the following patterns
can be observed concerning how circumstances affect cognitive skills as measured by test scores. The
only control variable changing the direction of its effect on achievement scores depending on the test
domain is gender. Being female decreases a student’s achievement in the PISA mathematics test
42That is, in the rest of this paper I restrict the presentation of first-step estimation results to test scores that are
standardized with respect to the pooled sample of all students in Gymnasium that are part of the rep. grade-based
PISA test cohort in any of the test years that form the sample (2003, 2006, 2009, 2012 in Base-MT) (stdpvsubject3 ):
This allows me to interpret the coefficients relative to the student performance across the sample period.
43In Section 5.3 for robustness check purposes, for all main specifications for each test domain, all results are shown
adding step-by-step control variables (covering circumstances): from (i) and (ii) constituting control set (I) until (VI)
encompassing controls (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii). See Appendix A.3.1 for details on computing standard errors.
44In the literature, it is common to focus on mathematics scores due to their comparability characteristics (Philippis
& Rossi, 2017). However, first-step regressions for science/reading scores for Model-ST are available upon request.
45Table A.6 shows the first-step results for reading test scores, Table A.7 for mathematics test scores and Table A.8
provides the corresponding output for science test scores. In each table, the columns (1) to (4) refer to Control Group
C, the last four to Treatment Group T. Within both Groups, the first two columns refer to the “Before” reform period
(2003-2006), the last two repeat regressions using only “After” reform (2009-2012) data. Each odd numbered column
only includes federal state fixed effects, while each even one additionally controls for school fixed effects.
24
by 45-65% and in the science test by 30-50% in terms of an international standard deviation (SD),
even though the effect size slightly declines in the post-reform period across both treatment and
control group. However, female students increase their reading performance by 30-40% in terms of
one international SD. This is consistent with the aforementioned evidence suggesting the existence
of gender-specific achievement differences in educational outcomes (Niederle & Vesterlund, 2010).
All the other control variable estimates are fairly robust in their signs independent of the test domain.
As expected, the age effect is negative. Those, for instance, that started school at an older age or
that had to repeat a grade before entering the ninth grade will be older compared to their peers due
to factors correlated with below-average performance in test scores. Similarly, having a migration
background is associated with performing lower in all three testing domains. Additionally controlling
for whether a foreign language is spoken at home, the negative effect shrinks as expected. This
suggests that the degree to which a migrant student’s family is integrated may be key for test scores,
in particular for the domain of reading. Looking at the socioeconomic-status (SES) of the household
in which a student grows up, a higher amount of books than the base category (101-500) proves to be
positively correlated with test score performance. Likewise, the higher the ISEI index of a job in the
family, the higher is the positive effect on educational outcomes.46 Thus, the SES control variables
tend to match the literature suggesting that higher family SES correlates with beneficial conditions
for early childhood development. Parental education should be also indicative for academic support
opportunities, and indeed a positive impact on test scores for both mathematics and science can be
found for the variable indicating that a student grew up in an academic household (at least one
parent with ISCED level 5-6). However, the effect for reading is insignificant. As mathematics and
science are subjects likely requiring more specific and targeted knowledge from parents for them to
be able to support their children, this may explain the difference.47 But Parental Characteristics
have less effect on scores once individual circumstances are taken into account. Finally, family
structure and employment status show no clear patterns.
Short-Term First-Step Results Repeating this exercise for the short term (Base-ST Model),
with the preferred specification being T/C1, first-step regressions for mathematics test scores
show that the same general patterns as described for the medium term can be observed. Female
students perform better in reading, but significantly worse in mathematics and science tests. Age
and migration background tend to be negatively correlated with educational achievement across all
domains. A more favorable SES family background, such as growing up in an academic household, has
a positive impact on cognitive skills as measured by test scores. (See Table A.10 in Appendix A.4).
In summary, first-step regressions demonstrate that for both the short and medium-term horizon
most of the circumstances variables affect the PISA test scores into the expected directions.
46With the average family’s highest job ISEI index being 45, an effect on test scores of 0.001 translates into 4.5% of
an international standard deviation. See also Appendix A.2.1 in Appendix A.4 for further explanations.
47Furthermore, more highly educated parents might be more aware of the greater importance of numeracy skills
for labor market outcomes. However, the effects of growing up in an academic household are rather insignificantly
positive, whereas those of growing up in less educated families are rather significantly negative for test scores.
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The fact that these patterns are consistent over varying time horizons and across different con-
trol group settings confirms that the chosen circumstances variables were appropriately selected.
Furthermore, the explanatory power of these first-step regressions remains in a range of about
15-35% across the different specifications. Consequently, the level of the IEOp measure found in
this paper can be categorized in a lower bound within the range of few available IEOp estimates for
European countries, such as Ferreira and Gignoux (2013), who find based on PISA-I-2006 data, that
about 35% of test score variation in Germany can be attributed to circumstances or Carneiro (2008)
finding about 40% IEOp for the case of Portugal. Moreover, using additionally school instead of
federal states fixed effects (FE) increases the observed IEOp measures across all first-step regression
specifications suggesting that school-level characteristics matter for educational outcome measures.
5.2 Main Results: The Effect of Increased Learning Intensity on IEOp
Now, we can switch our attention to the second-step of the estimation approach, the DiD framework.
The IEOp measure that we just derived by the first-step regressions is the share of total variance in
test scores which is accounted for by the student’s predetermined circumstances variables.
Medium-Term Results Starting with the main treatment/control group specification, the medium-
term (Base-MT Model) results are shown in the second column of Table 4. The top panel shows
DiD estimates for reading, the middle panel for mathematics and the bottom panel for science
test scores. IEOp is calculated with school fixed effects. The DiD table illustrates that the change
in IEOp as measured by the R2 in the first-step estimation exhibits a common pattern across all
three test domains - IEOp has considerably increased due to the G-8 reform. That is, the share of
inequality in test scores that can be attributed to circumstances has increased. With the estimate
being a lower bound of the true IEOp the results can be interpreted as follows. At least about 10%
of the variation in reading test scores can be additionally attributed to circumstances beyond the
control of a ninth grade student. For mathematics, at least about 14% and for science at least about
19% of educational outcomes can be additionally considered to constitute IEOp. These results
are statistically significant, with standard errors computed as explained in Appendix A.3.1. Thus,
given initial values of 20-30% in IEOp, DiD estimates would correspond to a relative increase in
IEOp of about 50% in response to increased learning intensity as induced by the G-8 reform, that
is, in the medium-term horizon this rise in IEOp is economically significant. Zooming in, one can
further note that for Control Group C IEOp seems to have considerably decreased in the time
period after the reform. In contrast, for the Treatment Group T the level of IEOp appears to
have remained practically unchanged across all three domains. Thus, in this setting, due to the
increase in learning intensity in treated states the role of circumstances remained constant, whereas
in absence of shortening school duration, IEOp tends to have decreased. The Base-MT Model takes
a medium-term perspective as not only the first affected cohorts are taken into account, but data up
to 2012 are considered, when the reform had already been fully enacted. By 2012, in most federal
states the double cohort had already graduated or was about to graduate (Table 2 & Figure 1).
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Table 4: Main Results: Short-Term (ST) vs. Medium-Term (MT) Reform Effect
Subject
Treatment Group (T) vs. Control Group (C) with School-FE
Base-ST (2003-2009) as in Figure A.4 Base-MT (2003-2012) as in Figure A.4
Reading C T ∆ (T - C) C T ∆ (T - C)
Before Reform 0.242 0.173 -0.068 0.242 0.173 -0.068
(0.057) (0.032) (0.065) (0.057) (0.032) (0.065)
After Reform 0.161 0.196 0.036 0.162 0.206 0.044
(0.060) (0.037) (0.071) (0.033) (0.023) (0.040)
Change in R2 -0.081 0.023 0.104 -0.079 0.033 0.112
(0.083) (0.048) (0.096) (0.066) (0.039) (0.077)
Mathematics C T ∆ (T - C) C T ∆ (T - C)
Before Reform 0.353 0.257 -0.097 0.353 0.257 -0.097
(0.060) (0.032) (0.068) (0.060) (0.032) (0.068)
After Reform 0.270 0.223 -0.047 0.190 0.232 0.042
(0.073) (0.041) (0.084) (0.039) (0.028) (0.048)
Change in R2 -0.084 -0.034 0.050 -0.163 -0.025 0.139
(0.094) (0.052) (0.108) (0.071) (0.043) (0.083)
Science C T ∆ (T - C) C T ∆ (T - C)
Before Reform 0.363 0.203 -0.160 0.363 0.203 -0.160
(0.052) (0.024) (0.058) (0.052) (0.024) (0.058)
After Reform 0.257 0.195 -0.062 0.173 0.202 0.028
(0.067) (0.033) (0.075) (0.047) (0.024) (0.053)
Change in R2 -0.106 -0.008 0.098 -0.189 -0.001 0.188
(0.085) (0.041) (0.095) (0.071) (0.034) (0.078)
Notes: Table entries are R2 measures of IEOp (Equation (7)). Robust standard errors are in parentheses and were
calculated using replication weights following the method as explained in Appendix A.3.1, clustering at the federal state
level. DiD results are estimated according to Equation (9) taking into account population weights and the indicated
fixed effects. Positive changes in R2 indicate increasing IEOp/decreasing EEOp and vice versa for negative changes.
Background variables used to derive R2:
(i) individual characteristics (IC) I: age and gender
(ii) individual characteristics (IC)II: language spoken at home and migration background (based on (parental) birth place)
(iii) parental characteristics (PC): highest parental education level (ISCED-level 1-2/ISCED-level 3-4/ISCED-level 5-6)
(iv) socio-economic status (SES) I: number of books in household (max. 11, 11-100, 101-500, more than 500)
(v) socio-economic status (SES) II : highest ISEI-level-index[0-90] of job in the family
(vi) family characteristics (FC) I: family structure - growing up in single parent household?
(vii) family characteristics (FC) II:
mother/father working part-time (PT) - mother/father unemployed (UE) - mother/father out of labor force (OLF)
Compare: First-step regressions are conducted according to Equation (8). The respective detailed results are only illustrated
for mathematics test scores. The derivation of IEOp measures in the second sub-panel (mathematics) are provided in
Table A.9. The first-step regression results for the other subjects are available upon request.
Source: Author’s calculations based on PISA-I-data 2003, 2006, 2009, 2012.
Short-Term Results To learn about the short-term effects, it is interesting to see how results
change for the main treatment/control group specification when conducting the same two-step
estimation procedure for the Base-ST Model covering only years 2003 until 2009. Therefore, the
left-hand panels in Table 4 show the short-term effects of increased learning intensity on IEOp
focusing mainly on the first student cohorts treated by the G-8 reform. The DiD estimates remain
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considerably positive across all test domains. Now, the increase in IEOp only reaches levels that rest
within a range of about 5-10% of the variance in educational test scores that can be additionally
attributed to circumstances. However, results are no longer statistically significant at the 5% level.
Thus, the relative deterioration in IEOp is considerably lower in the short term - if different from zero
at all - compared to its significant size in the medium term (right-hand panel in Table 4). Otherwise,
the underlying patterns of the reform effect also remain robust in the short term. Educational
acceleration tends to inhibit students in the treatment group from experiencing any improvements
in IEOp. Instead, ninth graders in the control group experience less IEOp as circumstances lose
explanatory power for academic achievement. In conclusion, the main treatment/control group
specification suggests that increased learning intensity aggravates IEOp, not in the short term for
the first treated student cohorts, but only after some time in the medium term, that is, for the
fourth or later treated cohorts. The effects are stronger for mathematics/science than for reading.
To understand how the G-8 reform changed educational opportunities in the Gymnasium, it is useful
to expand the short-term model analysis to consider treatment/control group specifications that
bear even more external validity for the German school system. For instance, with C1 about 68%
of the German high school student population can be considered in the short-term reform analysis.
DiD estimation results for this extended treatment/control group specification are presented in the
left panel of Table 5. Interestingly, the short-term effect of the reform vanishes across all three
test domains and for both fixed effects (FE) settings. Thus, there appears to be no effect on IEOp
in response to the G-8 reform. However, the IEOp measures still range between 15 to 25%, their
magnitude increasing from reading to science to mathematics. Students in both treatment and
control group experience similar increases in IEOp, such that in total the DiD effect is canceled
out. Furthermore, the DiD results reveal that changes in IEOp are very small. But as in the main
specification with Control Group C, these results are not statistically significant. Finally, extending
the control group to include both North-Rhine-Westphalia (NRW) and Hesse (H), thus covering 75%
of the German high school student population, results for this treatment/control group specification
(T/C2) are shown in the right-hand column of Table 5. The DiD estimation findings on the effect
of the G-8 reform are very similar across T/C1 and T/C2 specifications: there is no statistically
significant short-term effect of the reform-induced increase in learning intensity on IEOp.
In summary, the impact of the reform on IEOp depends on the time horizon. Focusing on the
short term (Model Base-ST (2003-2009)), increased learning intensity does not affect IEOp, that
is, unfair inequality in terms of how much in the cognitive test score variation can be explained
by circumstances beyond a student’s control (Table 5). Narrowing the control group to include
only federal states that did not plan to shorten the duration of their G-9 model Gymnasium, a
considerable increase in IEOp of about 5-10% in terms of additional explanatory power is observable
also in Model Base-ST setting, but results are barely statistically significant (Table 4). However,
taking a medium-term perspective on the G-8 reform (Model Base-MT (2003-2012)) shows that
increased learning intensity induced by the reform causally increases the IEOp measures.
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Table 5: Main Results: Treatment Group (T) vs. Control Group (C1) or Control Group (C2)
Subject
Short-Term (ST) (2003-2009) Model - T vs. C1/C2 — (Figure A.4)
T vs. C1: with School-FE T vs. C2: with School-FE
Reading C1 T ∆ (T - C1) C2 T ∆ (T - C2)
Before (2003-2006) 0.163 0.173 0.010 0.175 0.173 -0.002
(0.032) (0.032) (0.045) (0.029) (0.032) (0.043)
After (2009) 0.183 0.196 0.013 0.179 0.196 0.018
(0.030) (0.037) (0.047) (0.021) (0.037) (0.042)
Change in R2 0.020 0.023 0.003 0.004 0.023 0.019
(0.044) (0.048) (0.065) (0.035) (0.048) (0.060)
Mathematics C1 T ∆ (T - C1) C2 T ∆ (T - C2)
Before (2003-2006) 0.216 0.257 0.041 0.243 0.257 0.014
(0.029) (0.032) (0.043) (0.031) (0.032) (0.045)
After (2009) 0.233 0.223 -0.010 0.222 0.223 0.001
(0.033) (0.041) (0.053) (0.027) (0.041) (0.049)
Change in R2 0.017 -0.034 -0.051 -0.020 -0.034 -0.013
(0.044) (0.052) (0.068) (0.041) (0.052) (0.066)
Science C1 T ∆ (T - C1) C2 T ∆ (T - C2)
Before (2003-2006) 0.205 0.203 -0.002 0.214 0.203 -0.011
(0.024) (0.024) (0.034) (0.021) (0.024) (0.032)
After (2009) 0.215 0.195 -0.020 0.195 0.195 0.000
(0.039) (0.033) (0.051) (0.030) (0.033) (0.045)
Change in R2 0.010 -0.008 -0.018 -0.020 -0.008 0.011
(0.046) (0.041) (0.061) (0.037) (0.041) (0.055)
Notes: Table entries are R2 measures of IEOp (Equation (7)). Robust standard errors are in parentheses and were
calculated using replication weights following the method as explained in Appendix A.3.1, clustering at the federal
state level. DiD results are estimated according to Equation (9) taking into account population weights and school
fixed effects. Positive changes in R2 indicate increasing IEOp/decreasing EEOp and vice versa for negative changes.
Background variables used to derive R2:
(i) individual characteristics (IC) I: age and gender
(ii) individual characteristics (IC)II: language spoken at home; migration background (based on (parental) birth place)
(iii) parental characteristics (PC): highest parental education level (ISCED-level 1-2/ 3-4/ 5-6)
(iv) socio-economic status (SES) I: number of books in household (max. 11, 11-100, 101-500, more than 500)
(v) socio-economic status (SES) II : highest ISEI-level-index[0-90] of job in the family
(vi) family characteristics (FC) I: family structure - growing up in single parent household?
(vii) family characteristics (FC) II:
mother/father working part-time (PT) - mother/father unemployed (UE) - mother/father out of labor force (OLF)
Compare: First-step regressions are conducted according to Equation (8). Due to space constraints, the respective
detailed results are only illustrated for mathematics test scores. The derivation of IEOp measures in the second sub-panel
(mathematics) are provided in Table A.10. The first-step regression results for the other subjects are available upon
request from the author. Source: Author’s calculations based on PISA-I-data 2003, 2006, 2009.
The observed rise in inequality of opportunity is statistically significant and covers about half of the
general IEOp measure estimated for students attending German secondary schools. Results reveal
that for students at the Gymnasium the lower bound levels of IEOp correspond to about 17-35% of
the variance in educational outcomes that can be attributed to the role of circumstances only.48
48For a graphical illustration of main results, please refer to Figure A.8 in Appendix A.4. To investigate whether
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Figure 2: DiD Pre-Trend Graphs of IEOp measure for main Treatment/Control Groups
Notes: This figure shows the DiD graphs for IEOp measures based on mathematics test scores confirming that the
parallel trend assumption holds. Due to the data as discussed in Section 3, in the main regression settings I only
use the time frame 2003 to 2009 for the short-term or 2003 to 2012 for the medium-term analysis. Compare also
Figure A.5 and Figure A.6 for IEOp measures based on the other test domains and Figure A.7 in Appendix A.5.
5.3 Robustness Checks
Placebo Test To evaluate the plausibility of the quasi-experimental identification strategy that
allows a causal interpretation of the the effects of the increased learning intensity induced by the G-8
reform on IEOp, it is important to conduct Placebo Tests (Bertrand et al., 2004). Setting the reform
to artificially take effect between 2003 and 2006, no statistically significant effects can be detected
for any of the main treatment and control group specifications (T/C/(C1/C2) in Table A.12 in
Appendix A.4). In addition to the pre-reform comparison test (Section 4.4), this finding supports
the internal validity of the estimation strategy, in particular that the common time trend assumption
holds. This can also be seen from examining the pre-reform trends in terms of the estimated IEOp
measure for the main treatment and control groups in Figure 2. Thus, Placebo Tests confirm the
plausibility for interpreting the main estimation results as causal effects of the reform on IEOp.
To investigate the robustness of the previous section’s main results, I focus on three margins of
interest. First, I analyze how findings change depending on which of the available six control variable
sets are included in the first-step regression for deriving the IEOp measure. Second, I focus on how
DiD results change when extending the treatment group. Third, I show how results change based
on enlarged control groups consisting of states that never changed their academic track.49
this increase in IEOp is long-lasting, one would ideally need to consider longer time periods, that are not yet available.
However, once shifting attention to student cohorts that are far away from the first treated ones, potential curricular
additional reforms undertaken in response to the initial G-8 reform (Table A.4) should be taken into account. Instead,
it is plausible to assume that medium-term effects on IEOp as defined in this paper are long-lasting given the literature
on the persistence of education on lifetime outcomes (Deming, 2009).
49The main output tables for robustness checks are shown in Appendix A.4: Table A.13 to A.19. All of these tables
are structured in the same way to provide an overview of DiD estimation results of increased learning intensity as
induced by the G-8 reform on IEOp. First, each table shows results only with respect to one time period (e.g. Model
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Varying the Control Set of Circumstances Variables To understand how robust DiD results
remain when changing the amount of control variables chosen to cover predetermined circumstances,
I analyze how in particular adjusted R2 measures of IEOp behave.The adjusted R2 can help to
detect which Control set combination appears to have most explanatory power among the available
circumstances variables (Table 1). Looking across the DiD result tables, including as circumstances
variables Individual Characteristics (IC), Parental Characteristics (PC) and Socio-Economic Status
(SES) may be optimal among the six control variable sets. However, the analysis across different sets
reveals that for each test domain the final reform estimate of increased learning intensity on IEOp
does not change much across Control sets 3 to 6 (Table A.13, A.14, A.15, A.16). This supports
the empirical strategy taken for the main results based on using always all six variable sets in the
first-step regression, as it is not rendering estimates that differ much from the highest adjusted R2
generating Control set combination. Moreover, regression patterns stay robust in size and direction
independent of which set is used to derive IEOp. This is evidence for the quasi-experimental design
assumption that assignment to treatment occurred without selection on observables, but randomly.
Finally, multi-level regressions confirm that school level circumstances are indeed already considered
by school fixed effects. Moreover, using school fixed effects or only federal state effects to measure
IEOp does not change DiD results. This indicates that sorting based on schools appears to be not a
concern, which also supports the internal validity of the empirical strategy taken (see Figure A.8).
Extending Treatment Groups Next, it is useful to repeat the estimations with extended treat-
ment groups to investigate the potential external validity of this paper’s main results. Therefore, all
main regressions discussed in Section 5.2 are rerun with Treatment Group T1 including the two
West German city states Hamburg and Bremen, and for Treatment Group T2, which is T1 plus
Berlin and Brandenburg. Increasing the treatment group, on average DiD reform effects become
smaller, for instance, in the regression settings with Control Group C (Table A.13, A.14) both in
Model Base-MT and -ST, the increasing effect on IEOp declines as we move from T to T1 to T2
consistently within each test domain and across all Control sets. However, the general direction of
the reform effect as found in Section 5.2 remains (right panel in Figure 2). Moreover, Model Base-ST
regressions with respect to C1 (Table A.15) or C2 (Table A.16) confirm the zero reform effect on
IEOp across the enlarged treatment groups. In summary, despite their increasingly heterogeneous
composition, the main results in terms of direction and size are reconfirmed. This supports the
potential external validity of the results based on the carefully chosen T/C Group specification
in the previous section. Thus, focusing on the Treatment Group T does not mean that results no
longer carry implications that are likely to be valid for the entire German secondary school system.
Base-MT (2003-2012)) and one control group. Second, in each overview table, results are provided for all three testing
domains. Third, for each combination of treatment/control group and test domain, six rows of results are provided as
indicated by column (5), the Control set. Control set 1 provides results based on deriving the IEOp measure including
only Individual Characteristics (IC) as control variables (that is (i) and (ii) in Appendix A.3.2). Then, subsequently
additional control variables are added, until in set 6 all available circumstances are applied together in the first-step
regression. Finally, four DiD estimates are presented in each row: Column (6) provides the standard R2 measure based
DiD estimate that only takes into account federal states fixed effects (FE); Column (8) presents the same estimate but
taking additionally school FE into account.Column (7/9) provide the IEOp estimates relying on adjusted R2 measures.
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Extending Control Groups As mentioned in Section 4.2, one could also compare treatment
groups with federal states that always maintained the same length for the Gymnasium. When using
hypothetical Control Group Ch, the DiD results change and in all specifications a decrease in IEOp
can be found. This effect is strongest in the short term (Model Base-ST ), but rather vanishes in the
medium term (Model Base-MT ). In that regard, the pattern is consistent with the normal control
groups because when taking the hypothetical Control Group into account, in relative terms, the
reform effect tends to shift towards more IEOp in the medium term compared to the short term.50
Extending Time Period Studied Taking also PISA-E-2000 data into account, I rerun the main
estimation framework. It is reassuring that the results are similar to the DiD estimation for Model
Base-MT. Focusing on the main specification with Control Group C, a slightly increasing or likely
zero impact of increased learning intensity induced by the G-8 reform on IEOp can be found as
we extend Model Base-MT by including an additional pre-reform period, that is, for the full time
period Model Full-MT (2000-2012). In conclusion, results based on Model Base-MT and the most
convincing treatment/control group specifications carry on their validity also for a slightly broader
time period setting. This in turn supports the external validity of the main estimation findings.51
5.4 Discussion and Interpretation of Results - Potential Mechanisms
To begin with, the key concept of IEOp in this paper is closely related to the issue of social mobility.
Estimating θ̂IEOp can be regarded as isomorphic to measuring intergenerational persistence of IEOp.
For the latter, following Galton, one usually regresses a child’s (yit) on parental outcomes (yi,t−1):
yit = βyi,t−1 + it, (10)
with β as measure of persistence. If one used family background variables instead of parental
outcome variables for (yi,t−1), then the R2 measure of immobility (Equation (10)) would be similar
to θ̂IOP (Equation (7) in Section 3.2) as long as the circumstances vector contains mostly family
background variables. In this regard, θ̂IEOp can be connected to measures of intergenerational
educational immobility, which can be used to measure social (im)mobility (such as β Equation (10)).
In analogy, this is also related to the findings that childhood wealth can serve as a proxy for
circumstances explaining future wealth inequality (Boserup, Kopczuk, & Kreiner, 2016). Moreover,
intergenerational income elasticity and the Gini coefficient of incomes have been shown to be highly
correlated (Great Gatsby Curve) which points to a link between IEOp and intergenerational social
mobility (Black & Devereux, 2011). The connection between both concepts can be characterized by
two adjoint forces, upward and downward social mobility.
50For completeness, the DiD estimation results are provided in Table A.17 for Model Base-MT and Table A.18 for
Base-ST. For the hypothetical Control Group the DiD estimate is negative in the short term and gets less negative in
the medium term, whereas for control group C the effect is positive in the short term and rises in the medium term.
However, pre-reform tests for Ch (Table A.5) indicate that any results based on it should be interpreted cautiously.
51For Control Group C, please refer to Table A.19 and for completeness for Ch tables can be provided upon request.
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A decrease in IEOp would be indicative for improved upward mobility, as it means that circumstances,
such as the SES of the family in which one grows up, became less important for a student’s
academic performance. Therefore, if lower IEOp translates into providing more equalizing learning
conditions such that ability, but in particular efforts are rewarded, extending equality of educational
opportunities would be welfare enhancing in a society with meritocratic preferences. However, while
decreasing IEOp may lead to social upward mobility for high-performing students from disadvantaged
backgrounds, it may also lead to social downward mobility for students with beneficial circumstances
who lack talent and/or efforts to maintain their position as soon as the importance of circumstances
for the determination of a student’s educational outcome decreases.
Returning to the G-8 reform, we can provide the following explanation for the observed findings.
First, the fact that increased learning intensity had only a limited impact on IEOp in the short
run may be indicative for the reform heterogeneously promoting both downward mobility among
students with advantageous circumstances and upward mobility among those with disadvantaged
circumstances who having managed to enter the Gymnasium may have already undergone a harder
selection process.52 As the implementation process of the reform suggests, the reform-induced
increase in learning intensity surprised affected students and their parents in a manner that they
could not adapt to immediately. For instance, being the first one confronted with the newly
intensified system, it is harder to adapt as one can not easily rely on the experiences of older
students as was the case for later cohorts in the new G-8 model. This may explain why IEOp
increased only moderately or not at all in the short term. Thus, in the initial reform period, the
lag with which favorable circumstances adapt to help a student implies that downward rather than
upward mobility forces may have been more relevant for the first affected student cohorts.
Second, in the medium term, after favorable circumstances had time to adapt and provide support to
the associated students, upward mobility would be lessened in conjunction with downward mobility.
For instance, parents are more likely to be aware and prepared to deal with the increased requirements
of a G-8 model and new forms of additional professional tuition services may become available
in response to the reform based on the experiences of the first affected cohorts. Consequently,
favorable circumstances may then allow students quicker, easier and better access to a support
system helping them to deal with the higher learning intensity. Then, increased IEOp associated
with lower upward rather than higher downward mobility may be expected in the medium term after
the G-8 reform was enacted. Descriptive evidence on the evolution of additional, paid tuition for
students attending a Gymnasium available from PISA questionnaires supports the explanation given
abov (cf. Figure A.9). There has been a rise in extra tuition following the reform, with this effect
being stronger in the treatment compared to the control group federal states. Moreover, the increase
in extra tuition has been more pronounced for students from more privileged family environments
(circumstances), such as those living in academic households. A further potential mechanism involves
the time investment made by mothers depending on their educational background into their children.
52The high correlation of parental education and a student’s probability of entering the Gymnasium has been shown
(e.g. Klime et al. (2010; PISA 2009 ) to be persistent in the German school system at least over the last two decades.
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More highly educated women were more likely to work part-time in order to support their children
in treatment states after the reform compared to the situation in control group states (Figure A.10).
Moreover, looking across the medium-term effect evidence (Table 4) DiD estimates of the effect
of increased learning intensity on IEOp reveal some subject-related patterns. The level of IEOp
is consistently higher for both mathematics and science compared to reading across all treatment
and control group specifications. This observation can be interpreted as evidence in favor of the
existence of heterogeneous subject-dependent curricular flexibilities. In fact, reading skills comprise
more general competencies that are not only learnt in language-related courses at school, but
also indirectly in other school courses as well as in everyday life - reading being often a necessary
prerequisite to simply comprehend, learn or interact with other people. Consequently, variations in
learning intensity might have less influence on reading skills. In contrast, mathematics/science can
be regarded as requiring more specific skills which are mainly accumulated through taught courses
at school and less likely to be learnt indirectly through other courses at school or in everyday life.
Thus, for the complementary skills set required by mathematics/science, it seems to be plausible
that positive circumstances such as growing up in an academic household are relatively more
important than for reading. Beneficial resources improving the accumulation of skills relevant for
mathematics/science tend to be more exclusive than those important for reading. In that context,
the fact that the impact of the reform with respect to reading skills is less pronounced, could be
interesting for another reason. It might raise the question of whether in order to improve reading
skills, current curricula and teaching methods need to be adjusted. But, it could also only indicate
that the reading practice from additional teaching only balances out the negative impact of increased
intensity on the actual learning process - which would be another potential part of the explanation
for why IEOp levels for the domain of reading may be less pronounced than in the other domains.
However, given the broad definition of learning intensity this may still be compatible with findings
that the G-8 reform itself had small positive effects on mathematics/science test scores in contrast
to reading test scores (Camarero Garcia, 2012; Andrietti, 2016; Huebener et al., 2017; Büttner &
Thomsen, 2015). Furthermore, Dahmann (2017) shows that cognitive skills measured by IQ proxies
did not causally change due to the reform, but only gender-specific differences may be reinforced.
The fact, that there appear to be no SES-specific differences supports my findings: the observed
overall increase in IEOp seems to be mainly driven by heterogeneous parental support opportunities
to deal with the higher learning intensity and cannot be simply explained by potential differences in
ability. Finally, as the reform did not adjust teaching-related quality factors for the first affected
cohorts, the findings might be regarded to be merely a lower bound for the effects of increased
learning intensity on performance, in particular as the variance of test scores did not change much.
In summary, even though it is beyond the scope of this article to precisely detect all underlying
channels and mechanisms explaining how IEOp may be changed and all implications for its translation
into both upward and downward mobility, this paper does reveal one mechanism of how IEOp can
be causally changed through an educational reform, that is, by increasing learning intensity.
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6 Conclusion
The goal of this paper has been to shed light onto how Inequality of Educational Opportunity (IEOp)
may be shaped by the recent trend of accelerating and intensifying the educational process. This is
important to understand the role of learning intensity as one policy channel influencing educational
opportunities and thus social mobility. Beyond that, the understanding of how institutions affect
IEOp is still limited (Ramos & Van de gaer, 2016). To approach an answer to these questions, I
focus on the German secondary school system, in particular the academic track, the Gymnasium,
to exploit the shortening of school duration from nine to eight years as a quasi-experiment that
exogenously increased learning intensity. This paper is among the first to combine an evaluation of
the G-8 reform with PISA data that are comparable across federal states and over time to analyze
how increased learning intensity causally affects IEOp.
The first step of the analysis involves measuring IEOp as share in the variance of standardized
PISA test scores that can be only attributed to circumstances beyond an individual’s control. In
that regard, the paper contributes to the still limited literature on measuring IOp with respect
to educational outcomes by adding evidence on how IEOp has changed over time in Germany.
Interestingly, the estimated IEOp measures correspond to the levels of estimates for inequality of
opportunity in income pointing to the link between IEOp and (intergenerational) social immobility.
For the second step a DiD estimation strategy with treatment and control groups chosen according
to the implementation of the G-8 reform can be conducted to derive causal estimates. The results
reveal that the reform-induced increase in learning intensity did not affect IEOp in the short term.
Instead, in the medium term IEOp significantly increases for affected student cohorts. These findings
can be rationalized by differential compensation possibilities for higher learning intensity depending
on parental resources in terms of the capacity to pay for additional tuition, which may also explain
the increased use of private tutoring as documented by Hille, Spieß, and Staneva (2016). Moreover,
results point to the existence of subject-dependent curricular flexibilities, with mathematics/science
being more inflexible, that is, more responsive to changes in curricular intensity compared to reading.
This paper also contributes to the literature on evaluating this German school reform which is
still controversially debated until today. While there have been a few studies that tried to detect
the direct effect of the G-8 reform on PISA test scores, they do not focus on the question of how
the reform-induced increase in learning intensity may have changed the equality of educational
opportunities. Thus, the analysis in this paper shifts attention in the evaluation of the G-8 reform
onto distributional concerns. I show that the G-8 reform can be considered to be a selective reform
that at least maintains test results, but at the same time increases IEOp, and not to be an inclusive
reform that at least maintains test results while reducing IEOp (Checchi & van de Werfhorst, 2018).
This is of policy relevance in the debate about more intense schooling. To lower IEOp despite higher
learning intensity, whole-day schooling and methods reducing the dependence of educational support
on circumstances may be a solution (Deckers, Falk, Kosse, Pinger, & Schildberg-Hörisch, 2017).
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Alternatively, to maintain equality of opportunity, when reducing the length of school duration
without adjusting the support schemes at school, the curriculum may need to be reduced accordingly.
Beyond the narrow context of the G-8 reform, there are two broader issues this paper touches on.
First, the mechanism of how IEOp and social mobility interact is likely to be very important for
understanding phenomena such as the high persistence in the observed intergenerational transmission
of educational achievement. For that reason, it is relevant to investigate further what aspects of
increased learning intensity may have differential impact on mediocre but privileged students in
terms of their background variables (potentially pushing downward mobility) compared to students
with less advantageous circumstances. Moreover, it would be interesting to evaluate if in the long
term increased learning intensity tends to inhibit upward mobility by increasing dependence on
favorable circumstances. Generally, the fact that social mobility consists of both an upward and
downward component seems to be still neglected, in the sense that focus appears to have shifted
onto how to improve upward mobility, ignoring that this cannot be discussed independently from
removing rigidities that potentially limit downward mobility. Thus, it is important to understand
the effects of compressing education on IEOp, and its implications for social mobility.53
Second, the factor of time compression in the context of education appears to have been largely
neglected so far and more research on this topic is needed. Politicians consider changes on the
margin of educational intensity, but as the G-8 reform shows, this may involve unintended and
underestimated welfare costs. Learning intensity is a key factor for the design of an educational
process or system and has implications for both the effectiveness and efficiency of (non-)cognitive
skill formation. A better understanding of the relationship between schooling duration, in particular
intensity, and IEOp would also be important in the context of evaluating the conditions under which
Signaling or respectively Human Capital Theory may be more important in evaluating the welfare
benefits and cost of investments into the educational system. As the costs associated with the
misallocation of talents due to a lack of social (educational) mobility may be considerable (Philippis
& Rossi, 2017; Boneva & Rauh, 2017b), it is economically desirable to achieve more equality of
educational opportunities. Therefore, this paper shows that one so far neglected policy margin
involves implementing an appropriate level of educational intensity, taking into account not only
efficiency considerations, but also effects on equal access to resources.
Taking stock of this discussion, the paper shows that circumstances matter at school with an
emphasis on the relevance of variation in learning intensity on IEOp. Future research should
aim at understanding further potential mechanisms and channels shaping IEOp (Rothstein, 2018).
Furthermore, additional work is needed to establish how IEOp translates into social mobility. This
in turn may then allow us to assess the welfare effects of IEOp with respect to its impact on future
income and wealth inequality - allowing the evaluation of new policy recommendations aimed at
improving equality of opportunity in order to tackle challenges surrounding high levels of inequality.
53Figure A.1 in Appendix A.5 shows numbers on absolute educational mobility across OECD countries. Ideally, the
theory of how learning (duration and intensity) and IEOp as well as how IEOp and social mobility are linked together
would allow quantifying precisely the role of learning intensity for absolute educational mobility, thus social mobility.
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List of Abbreviations
EEOp Equality of Educational Opportunity.
EOp Equality of Opportunity.
G-8 model Gymnasium-8 model.
G-8 reform Gymnasium-8 reform.
G-9 model Gymnasium-9 model.
IEOp Inequality of Educational Opportunity.
IOp Inequality of Opportunity.
IQB Institut zur Qualitätsentwicklung im Bildungswesen.
ISCED International Standard Classification of Education.
ISCO International Standard Classification of Occupation.
ISEI International Socio-Economic Index of Occupational Status.
PISA Program for International Student Assessment.
SC Standing Conference of the Ministers of Education and Cultural Affairs.
SES socio-economic status.
Glossary
Gymnasium is the academic track of secondary school education in Germany covering both lower
and upper secondary level (grades 5–13 or 5–12) and providing an in-depth general education
aimed at the general higher education entrance qualification (Allgemeine Hochschulreife).
learning intensity is the ratio of curricular content covered in a given period of time. In particular,
the G-8 reform led to increased learning intensity in such a way that by the end of grade 9
post-reform, students have received about the same amount of instruction, and covered the
same curriculum as students that had completed two-thirds of grade 10 pre-reform. Learning
intensity, thus, corresponds to the intensive margin as it reflects the amount of content
(curriculum) to be studied in a constant amount of instruction time, whereas school duration
(e.g. number of years/days) refers to the extensive margin.
Plausible Value Following OECD (2009; PISA Data Analysis Manual) in chapter 6: Instead of
directly estimating a student’s ability θ, a probability distribution is estimated. Thus, instead
of obtaining a point estimate, a range of possible values with an associated probability for
each is estimated. Plausible Values are random draws from this (estimated) distribution.
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A Appendix
A.1 On the G-8 reform
A.1.1 The Reform Debate
The first PISA-study in 2000 received broad public attention in Germany, because it revealed
that German students achieved within the OECD only below average test scores (the so-called
“PISA-shock”). Debates over how to improve the German school system ensued (cf. Anderson,
Fruehauf, Pittau, and Zelli (2015)). Among the reform proposals, shortening the academic secondary
school track (Gymnasium) from nine to eight years, the G-8 reform, remains controversial to this
day. I refer to the last column in Table A.4 for an overview on the status quo of the reform as of
school year 2015/16.
Mainly three reasons were given to justify its introduction. First, it was intended to reduce the
relatively high age of university graduates in Germany. For one, this was said to increase their
competitiveness on the labor market compared to the (on average) younger graduates in other
OECD countries (OECD, 2005; Education at a Glance 2005 ). Furthermore, with students entering
the job market one year earlier, working lifetime would be extended, such that the reform was said
to contribute to stabilizing the social security system of a society facing demographic changes. For
instance, younger university graduates would start paying social security contributions earlier and
over a longer timespan. Second, as the most successful countries in the PISA-test ranking, such
as Finland, had a school system of twelve years, reduced schooling appeared to be both successful
and efficient. Third, the “G-8 reform” was seen as a necessary adjustment of secondary school
with regards to harmonizing tertiary education across Europe. As Büttner and Thomsen (2015)
illustrate, the reform of shortening secondary school duration was also enacted in the context of
the Bologna Process. This initiative aims to create a European Higher Education Area (EHEA)
providing a more comparable, flexible European framework for tertiary education. For this purpose,
adjusting secondary school duration towards the average among other European nations appeared to
be sensible. Moreover, it was thought that the reform would serve as an incentive for then younger
school graduates to strive for obtaining a university degree, thereby increasing Germany’s below
average rate of university graduates per birth cohort compared to other OECD countries.
Opponents, however, have argued that the reform may worsen the human capital skills formation
among students due to the intensified educational experience (cf. Section 2.2). Furthermore, parental
complaints about increased stress for students due to less free time emphasize the fear of negative
impacts on both academic performance and the development of non-cognitive skills typically formed
by non-academic recreational activities (Thiel, Thomsen, & Büttner, 2014). However, the majority
of East Germans support shortened duration of the academic track, whereas the opposite is true
across the West German federal states that only recently adopted the new system (Wössmann et
al., 2015).
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A.1.2 Related Literature on the Reform
Despite the public controversy over this reform that has even induced some federal states to reverse
it (last column in Table A.4 in Appendix A.4), few studies have evaluated the G-8 reform and its
effects on outcomes such as educational achievement. To begin with, studies have analyzed the
reform by comparing G-8 model and G-9 model cohorts within one federal state. In most federal
states the respective statistical offices have conducted studies comparing students’ results in central
exit examinations (Abitur) in the double cohort, that is the year when both the last G-9 model and
the first G-8 model cohorts graduated from the Gymnasium (Figure 1). Generally, these statistical
evaluations have found no systematic performance differences in central exit exams between students
with eight or nine years of schooling.54
Furthermore, for the federal state of Saxony-Anhalt (ST), a small series of papers have analyzed
different aspects of the G-8 reform (Thiel et al., 2014; Büttner & Thomsen, 2015; T. Meyer &
Thomsen, 2016). In summary, they analyze the reform’s effects on academic achievement in central
exit examinations 2007, when the double cohort graduated in ST. Findings show that - due to more
intense schooling - exam results deteriorated significantly for mathematics, but remained unaffected
for German literature suggesting that learning intensity ratios differ across subjects. Moreover,
no significant negative effects on student’s soft skills are detected, opposing claims that increased
learning intensity and associated reduced time for non-school related activities may have adversely
affected non-cognitive skills formation. In line with this result, Quis and Reif (2017) show that
the more intense schooling experience had only limited impacts students’ health. However, due to
reduced leisure time, G-8 model students were less able to relax and slightly more stressed compared
to their peers in the G-9 model. Finally, T. Meyer and Thomsen (2016) find no negative effects of
the G-8 reform on the ability, motivation and likelihood of students’ entering university education.55
Recently, a few papers have started to use more representative data that might be more independent
from school system related characteristics or relative performance measurement issues arising with
marks at school (e.g. PISA-data). Moreover, identifying the G-8 reform effect by exploiting the
variation in its implementation across states and over time, this approach allows overcoming the
shortcomings of previous studies, e.g. by applying methods taking into account variation across
states (e.g. DiD). For instance, two studies related to this paper exploit the reform setting using as
variables for educational outcome, the standardized PISA-test scores for academic-track students.56
54For instance, there are federal states with no observed difference (Saarland (SL), North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW)),
states where G-9 model students remained slightly better (Baden-Württemberg (BW)), states with the opposite
pattern (Hesse (HE), Berlin (BE)) and states where results differ depending on the subject (Bavaria (BV)).
55But the reform influenced post-secondary school decisions. For instance, they find significant delays in the starting
dates for a first university degree for female students who graduated from a G-8 model school, because they are now
more likely to first complete a type of vocational education. Moreover, T. Meyer and Thomsen (2016) reveal that
despite the G-8 reform, students continue to pursue their hobbies, However, they tend to work less outside of school.
56Back in 2012, Camarero Garcia (2012) appears to have been the first to combine the usage of PISA-test scores as
an outcome variable to analyze the effects of the G-8 reform on cognitive skills in a DiD-estimation framework, finding
a positive effect of about 0.15 standard deviations in test scores, with stronger effects for students with a migration
background similar to the later results by Andrietti (2016).
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Andrietti (2016) uses this representative data set in order to exploit the G-8 reform for conducting
a DiD-estimation of increased learning intensity on test scores. He finds that the average treatment
effect of the reform is significant and positive in all three educational outcomes.57
In contrast to Huebener and Marcus (2017), Andrietti (2016) finds no evidence for a significant
increase in general grade retention rates. Instead, his results suggest that grade repetition may only
have increased for boys and students with a migration background. This may indicate that the G-8
reform caused distributional changes in educational outcomes and thus may have affected IEOp,
however, Andrietti (2016) does not really address this issue. Huebener et al. (2017) show based on
state regulations of timetables for secondary school, that due to the G-8 reform weekly instruction
hours for the average treated student increased by about 6.5 percent over a period of almost five
years. They suggest that this increased instruction time improved student performance on average
in all three PISA test domains. However, the effect size is small, with about 6 percent of a standard
deviation in scores. Moreover, for low-performing students positive effects are insignificant, whereas
their high-performing peers experience significant, positive effects indicative of a widening of the
performance gap among students in the Gymnasium. In that regard, Huebener et al. (2017) focus on
the increased instruction time effect, whereas Andrietti (2016) puts more emphasis on the increased
learning intensity aspect of the reform.
In this paper, I use similar data as Huebener et al. (2017) with PISA-test scores from 2000 to
2012. However, my focus regarding the reform effect follows Andrietti (2016) with emphasis on the
effects of increased learning intensity. While these studies estimate the direct reform effect on test
scores, they do not tackle the question if and how increasing learning intensity may have changed
IEOp. In this paper, I shift focus in the analysis of the G-8 reform onto distributional concerns,
that is its consequences on IEOp. In other words, I answer the question of whether the G-8 reform
may be considered to be a selective, i.e. at least maintaining test score results and at the same
time increasing IEOp or an inclusive reform, i.e. that at least maintains test score results while
decreasing IEOp (Checchi & van de Werfhorst, 2018). In that regard, this paper is among the first
evaluating the G-8 reform based on German specific PISA data in order to analyze its impact on
IEOp.
57Treated students in a G-8 model experience an improvement of about 0.095-0.145 standard deviations in PISA-test
scores. Furthermore, the author tries to estimate the effects of the approximate pure instruction time increase on
scores and finds similar results: a twenty-hour increase distributed over grades 5-9 or a ten-hour increase distributed
over grades 8-9, correspond on average to an improvement of 0.08-0.15 standard deviations, depending on the subject.
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A.2 Data
A.2.1 Background Information on the PISA data
Since 2000, the OECD conducts every three years the PISA study in order to measure the performance
of 15 year-old students with respect to three basic competencies (Life skills) regarded to be of special
importance for a person’s future success when approaching the end of compulsory schooling age,
namely reading, mathematical and scientific literacy (cf. Klime et al. (2010; PISA 2009 - Bilanz
nach einem Jahrzehnt); OECD (2010, PISA 2009 Assessment Framework); OECD (2013a, PISA
2012 Assessment Framework)). Instead of testing if students master particular curricular contents,
the idea of PISA is to evaluate more general skills, such as the ability to apply knowledge in the
three tested domains for solving real-world problems, i.e. skills that students should learn before
leaving school as they are essential for participating in modern society (OECD, 2001; Knowledge and
Skills for Life).58 Apart from general cognitive skills, PISA also collects rich information on family
and school characteristics, based on the fact that students, their parents, teachers and school’s
principals are supposed to fill out questionnaires.
Concerning the PISA procedure, for each test cycle, the OECD chooses an international contractor
responsible for the test’s design and comparability across countries (e.g. that test questions are
robust to cultural bias) and over time (making trend analysis possible (OECD, 2009; PISA Data
Analysis Manual). On the national level, a PISA National Project Manager is chosen to be in
charge of the test implementation. The test procedure itself resembles a two-stage stratified
randomized survey test design. First, as a primary sample unit, schools with eligible students
are randomly selected (with a minimum of 150 schools in each country) to get a random sample
representative of all school types across all regions within a country. Then, as second-step sampling
units, eligible students (15-year-olds)59 are randomly selected within sampled schools to reach a
minimum of 4500 students in the sample. Each student within a school receives distinct combinations
of approved test questions on all three PISA domains.60
The level and scope of the test is identical for each student independent of the secondary school
type attended. The paper-based test takes two hours, with additional 30 minutes dedicated for
students to complete the questionnaire providing information concerning their family, school and
58The underlying question of PISA is “What is important for citizens to know and be able to do?”. More generally,
in PISA the concept of “literacy” refers to “students’ capacity to apply knowledge and skills in key subjects, and to
analyze, reason and communicate effectively as they identify, interpret and solve problems in a variety of situations”.
For specific definitions of each tested domain, I refer to OECD (2004; The PISA 2003 Assessment Framework) and in
particular to chapter 1 of OECD (2009; PISA Data Analysis Manual - SPSS, Second Edition).
59This includes students who were aged between 15 years and 3 months and 16 years and 2 months at the beginning
of the assessment period (plus/minus 1 month), who were enrolled in an educational institution (grade 7 or higher),
regardless of the type of institution and of whether they were in full-time or part-time education (OECD, 2013b; PISA
2012 Results: Excellence Through Equity: Giving Every Student the Chance to Succeed).
60For details on the international PISA test procedure, I refer to section 2 in Lavy (2015) and to publications on the
PISA Assessment Framework or to one of the Technical Reports on test, e.g. OECD (2013a, PISA 2012 Assessment
and Analytical Framework) and OECD (2012; PISA-2009 Technical Report).
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socio-economic background as well as on their attitudes, motivations or aspirations. After the test
has been evaluated on the national level (supervised by the international contractor), results are
published by the OECD in a cross-country comparison of official test scores.
To have comparable measures of latent ability in each PISA domain across and within countries, the
raw answers to test questions, items, undergo some processing (cf. OECD (PISA-2003 Technical
Report, PISA-2006 Technical Report, PISA-2009 Technical Report)). As illustrated by Ferreira
and Gignoux (2013), the so-called Item Response theory (IRT) is used to back out the distribution
of the latent variable, cognitive skills (measured as test scores per domain), from individual item
responses, taking into account the particular difficulty of an item. However, to address the issue of
small-sample measurement error, because, for instance, not all students answer all items, for each
student so called Plausible Values of test results are provided. First, the marginal distribution of
the latent variable conditional on the item responses and a set of observables is estimated, that
is, for each student a probability distribution of test scores based on their answers is estimated.
Second, M draws from this distribution are taken to become the Plausible Values of a student’s test
score. For PISA, in each test cycle, five Plausible Values are provided for each student in all three
test domains (M = 5).61
After this IRT-adjustment, the plausible test scores are standardized, as follows:
yij = µˆ+
σˆ
σ
(xij − µ) (A.1)
where, xij is the post-IRT, pre-standardized score for student i, in country j; µ (σ) are original
mean (standard deviation) across all countries in the sample of the respective test year, and µˆ (σˆ)
denote the estimated mean (standard deviation) for a country-specific sample based on the Plausible
Values. This generates the standardized distribution of test scores with values of 500 (100).62
The interpretation of test scores is eased when one compares them to a standard, such as proficiency
levels. For instance, in mathematics, a proficiency level is said to consist of about 70 points. This
corresponds to about two years of schooling in the average OECD country (OECD, 2013b).63
61Conducting estimations with PISA-test scores, the OECD (2010, PISA 2009 Assessment Framework - Key
Competencies in Reading, Mathematics and Science) suggests estimating any statistic s by using each of M (Plausible
Value) datasets separately (getting sˆm) and then averaging them over M to get a final estimate sˆ.
62This means that across all OECD countries, the typical student scored 500 points in mathematics and about
two-thirds of students in OECD countries between 400 and 600 points. Thus, 100 points constitute a huge difference
in skills. The PISA-test scores have neither maximum nor minimum values and there are no thresholds for passing the
test, as it is designed to provide a relative measure that allow us to compare skills in the three domains across students
and over time. To deal with difficulties in constructing meaningful measures of IEOp based on these standardized test
scores, the variance appears to be a useful index as explained by Ferreira and Gignoux (2013).
63For instance, in PISA-I-2012 the average difference in mathematics test scores between top and bottom quarters of
students in OECD countries is 128 score points. However, most differences related to socio-demographic characteristics
are smaller than an entire proficiency level. For instance, across all OECD members in PISA-I-2012, on average boys
outscore girls in mathematics by 11 points and native students score about 34 points higher than their peers with
a migration background. Socio-economically advantaged students (in the top quarter of SES) score an average of
90 points higher than their disadvantaged peers (bottom quarter) (see Table II.2.4a in OECD (2013b; PISA 2012
Results: Excellence Through Equity: Giving Every Student the Chance to Succeed)), and students in city schools score
about 31 points higher than those in rural ones, on average (see Table II.3.3a in OECD (2013b; PISA 2012 Results)).
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The advantage of using PISA test scores as measures for cognitive skills, in contrast to alternatives
like GPA, is that its representativeness makes it possible to compare student cohorts both over time
and across or within countries (federal states). However, three doubts on the validity of PISA-test
scores should be considered. First, if the student population from which the test participants are
selected is not complete, as some students are excluded, this would threaten representativeness
(Gamboa & Waltenberg, 2012). However, the sampling standards of PISA require that participating
countries not exclude more than 5% of students from the population eligible to be tested. Permissible
reasons include only special cases, such as serious illnesses or lack of language skills due to recent
immigration (e.g. asylum seekers). For Germany, with at least 97% of students in the eligible age
(or in the ninth grade, see Section 3.1) being part of the initial student population, exclusion is not
a serious concern for the representativeness of PISA test data (OECD, 2010; OECD, 2013a).
Second, one may be concerned that the actual participation rate of randomly selected students may
be low, such that systematic selection may affect representativeness. However, for most developed
countries the rate of compliers is above 80% for selected students and 85% for selected schools,
surpassing OECD quality thresholds for the sampling process. In Germany, the participation rate
of selected students is well above 80% (on average 92%), for schools, it has usually been even 100%
(Klime et al., 2010; PISA 2009 - Bilanz nach einem Jahrzehnt). Moreover, there is no evidence for
selection on observables for those selected who do actually not take the test.
Third, another concern is that schools or more specifically teachers may bias comparability of scores
across time and regions, if they systematically train or motivate students for the test. However,
based on student information about their motivations for the test and based on the information
about how teachers prepared students for the test as provided in the questionnaires of PISA test
studies 2000-2009, such concerns seem not to be relevant (Klime et al., 2010). The majority of
teachers report that they tried to make students familiar with general testing strategies, but did
not train them specifically for the test. Only half of teachers indicated that they had trained their
students for PISA at all and those who did started no earlier than one month before the test. Vice
versa, only 25% of participating students indicate having prepared for the reading part, only 13%
for mathematics, and only 8% for the science section in the test.64 As Klime et al. (2010) show,
it is plausible to assume that test results in Germany are not systematically influenced by any
preparation behaviour. Although questionnaires provide evidence on test motivation having slightly
increased between 2000 and 2009, the correlation between test motivation and scores remains very
low (on average 0.05). Thus, it is unlikely that test motivation biases results (Wössmann, 2010).
In conclusion, the advantages of using PISA data as measure of cognitive skills seem to dominate
potential caveats, which is the reason, I decided to use them - in line with the studies mentioned in
Appendix A.1.2. For the purpose of analyzing the effect of increased learning intensity due to the
G-8 reform on IEOp, I use the Germany-specific versions of the PISA as explained in Section 3.1.
64Note that as affected students and teachers are only informed about two months before the PISA test takes place,
and given the general limited probability of being selected for the test and as there are no particular incentives for
neither teachers nor students to prepare for the test, the effect of potential preparation on scores appears to be limited.
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A.2.2 Data Sources
For more information on the German specific PISA-data of each test cycle and availability of
these datasets, the reader is recommended to refer to the Institut zur Qualitätsentwicklung im
Bildungswesen (Institute for Educational Quality Improvement) (IQB).
• PISA-2000:
Artelt, C., Klieme, E., Neubrand, M., Prenzel, M., Schiefele, U., Schneider, W., Tillmann,
K.-J., & Weiß, M. (2009). Program for International Student Assessment 2000 (PISA 2000).
Version: 1. IQB – Institut zur Qualitätsentwicklung im Bildungswesen. Datensatz. http://
doi.org/10.5159/IQB_PISA_2000_v1
• PISA-2003:
Prenzel, M., Baumert, J., Blum, W., Lehmann, R., Leutner, D., Neubrand, M., Pekrun, R.,
Rolff, H.-G., Rost, J., & Schiefele, U. (2007): Program for International Student Assessment
2003 (PISA 2003). Version: 1. IQB – Institut zur Qualitätsentwicklung im Bildungswesen.
Datensatz. http://doi.org/10.5159/IQB_PISA_2003_v1
• PISA-2006:
Artelt, C., Baumert, J., Blum, W., Hammann, M., Klieme, E., & Pekrun, R. (2010): Program
for International Student Assessment 2006 (PISA 2006). Version: 1. IQB – Institut zur
Qualitätsentwicklung im Bildungswesen. http://doi.org/10.5159/IQB_PISA_2006_v1
• PISA-2009:
Artelt, C., Hartig, J., Jude, N., Köller, O., Prenzel, M., Schneider, W., & Stanat, P. (2013):
Program for International Student Assessment 2009 (PISA 2009). Version: 1. IQB – Institut
zur Qualitätsentwicklung im Bildungswesen. http://doi.org/10.5159/IQB_PISA_2009_v1
• PISA-2012:
Sälzer, C., Klieme, E., Köller, O., Mang, J., Heine, J.-H., Schiepe-Tiska, A., & Müller, K. (2015):
Program for International Student Assessment 2012 (PISA 2012). Version: 2. IQB – Institut
zur Qualitätsentwicklung im Bildungswesen. http://doi.org/10.5159/IQB_PISA_2012_v2
A.3 Empirical Strategy and Robustness - Appendix
A.3.1 On the computation of standard errors including replication weights
Throughout the paper, standard errors for both steps of the DiD regressions (Section 4) using PISA
data are constructed taking into account that student performance is reported through Plausible
Values. Even though the average of five plausible values as a measure of individual performance
guarantees that estimates of group level means and regression coefficients remain unbiased, measures
of dispersion must take into account the within-student variability in Plausible Values (PVs).
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As explained in the manuals provided by the OECD (2009; PISA Data Analysis Manual - SPSS,
Second Edition), one should compute standard errors by running regressions with individual test
scores as a dependent variable five times, thereby using all plausible values in turn. For each
regression I employ an estimator for the sampling variance clustered at the federal state level. The
final sampling variance, SV , is given by the average of sampling variances obtained with the five
plausible values. In addition, standard errors are inflated by the imputation variance (IV ) because
test scores measure the latent cognitive skills of students with error. The imputation variance, IV ,
is estimated as the average squared deviation between the estimates obtained with each Plausible
Value and the final estimate (obtained using the average of Plausible Values), with the appropriate
degree of freedom adjustment (IV = 14
(
θˆi − θˆ
)
where θˆi is the estimate for each of five Plausible
Values and is the final estimate).
Finally, as shown by OECD (2009; PISA Data Analysis Manual - SPSS, Second Edition), the final
error variance TV can be obtained by combining the sampling and imputation variance as follows:
TV = SV + (1 + 1
K
) ∗ IV = SV + 1.2 ∗ IV (A.2)
where K = 5 is the number of Plausible Values for each student. The final standard errors are given
by the squared roots of the final error variances. To estimate SV , one can apply Fay’s variant of
the Balanced Repeated Replication (BRR) method, which directly takes into account the two-stage
stratified sampling design of the PISA test. For this method, each regression is iterated over the
80 sets of replication weights provided in the PISA dataset. The SV estimate is then given by the
average squared deviation between the replicated estimates and the estimate obtained with final
weights, with a degree of freedom correction depending on the Fay coefficient (a parameter that
governs the variability between different sets of replication weights, set at 0.5 in the PISA study).
Standard errors in all first-step and in all second-step regressions are based on this method. For
computational convenience and similar to Philippis and Rossi (2017), I use the “unbiased shortcut”
procedure described in OECD (2009; PISA Data Analysis Manual - SPSS, Second Edition), which
relies on only one set of plausible values for estimating the sampling variance (whereas the imputation
is estimated using all five sets). One should note that for estimating effects of the reform on test
scores, Andrietti (2016) relies only on clustering standard errors on the state level and argues that
applying a wild t-bootstrap procedure produces rather similar results. Huebener et al. (2017) also
focus on clustering methods. However, given the arguments provided on the sampling strategy used
to generate the PISA scores, estimating standard errors taking into account both replication weights
and Plausible Values is more reliable.
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A.3.2 List of Circumstances Variables
1. Individual Characteristics (IC):
• (I) gender [Base: male] and age (in years)
• (II) migration background [Base: none] and language spoken at home [Base: German]
2. Parental Characteristics (PC)
• (III) education: highest ISCED-index level in 3 categories [Base: ISCED-level (3-4)]
3. Socio-Economic Status (SES)
• (IV) number of books in household [Base: 101-500]
• (V) highest ISEI-index level
4. Family Characteristics (FC)
• (VI) single parent household [Base: none]
• (VII) mother/father employment status [Base: FT]
A.3.3 Overview of Definitions and T-/C-Groups
1. Concerning the time periods possible, one can define the following models:
- Baseline Model: medium-term perspective (Base-MT): covers time period (2003-2012)
- Extended Model: medium-term perspective (Full-MT): covers time period (2000-2012)
- Baseline Model: short-term perspective (Base-ST): covers time period (2003-2009)
- Extended Model: short-term perspective (Full-ST): covers time period (2000-2009)
2. Concerning Treatment and Control Groups, the following groups can be formed (Table 2)
• Treatment Group (T): Baden-Württemberg (BW), Bavaria (BV), Lower Saxony (LS)
• Treatment Group (T1): BW, BV, LS, Bremen (BR), Hamburg (HB)
• Treatment Group (T2): BW, BV, LS, BR, HB, Berlin (BE), Brandenburg (BB)
• Control Group (C): Rhineland-Palatinate (RP), Schleswig-Holstein (SH)
• only for the short-term models ((Full)/Base-ST):
– Control Group (C1): RP, SH, North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW)
– Control Group (C2): RP, SH, NRW , Hesse (H)
One can add H to the Control Group C1 to consider another West German state.
One has to make the assumption that H can still be classified into the Control Group
in 2009, as by then only 10% of ninth graders may have been treated (Table 2).
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• hypothetical Control Group (Ch): Saxony (SN), Thuringia (TH)
• Never-Takers Control Group (C-NT): RP, SH, SN, TH
3. Neither Treatment nor Control Group:
• for the medium-term models: SL, ST, MWP, H, NRW
• for the short-term models: SL, ST, MWP
A.3.4 Further Aspects on the Internal Validity of Empirical Strategy
It should be noted that there were no specific changes in the political parties forming the government
of federal states that form my main treatment and control group settings in both the medium-
/short-term models, i.e. T/C in Base-MT (2003-2012) or T/C1 in Base-ST (2003-2009). In fact,
though it is true that federal states governed by conservative parties (CDU) tended to be the first
to introduce the G-8 reform, Table 2 shows that all states implemented the reform within a short
time frame and maintained the same government for the time period of my analysis. Therefore, for
the first affected cohorts considered in this paper, the whole reform period was usually dominated
by the same government. Moreover, by controlling for federal state fixed effects and conducting a
DiD, one takes into account general differences due to political parties governing the respective state
and in charge of implementing the reform. The fact that there have not been systematic changes in
federal state governments across treatment and control groups shortly before the respective reform
implementation is supportive evidence that for the period considered it is plausible to assume a
comparability in the stability of respective federal state educational policies.
• Treatment Groups (T/T1)
– BW: Conservatives (CDU) led the government for decades until 2011, followed by (2011-
2016) a coalition government of the Greens/SPD: thus in the analysis period, the reform
was implemented by the same government party and it is plausible to assume that, due
to the time lag for government policy to take effect, that school policy up until school
year 2012/2013 was conducted by the same party.
– BV: Conservative (CSU)-led government for decades until the present day and thus
plausible to assume that school policy was mainly conducted by the same political party.
– LS: Conservatives (CDU) led the government over the whole analysis period (2003-2013);
afterwards/beforehand the government was led by SPD. Thus, plausible to assume that
for the whole analysis period, school policy was influenced by the same political party.
– BR: Social-Democratic (SPD) government for decades until present day and thus plausible
to assume that school policy was mainly conducted by the same political party.
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– HB: Social-Democratic (SPD) government for decades until 2001 and again since 2011;
in between Conservatives led the government and thus it is plausible to assume that for
the analysis period (2003-2012) school policy was mainly conducted by the same party.
• Control Groups (C/C1/C2)
– RP: Social-Democratic (SPD) government for decades until present day and thus plausible
to assume that school policy was mainly conducted by the same political party.
– SH: Social-Democratic (SPD) government for decades (1988 - 2005) and in present day
(since 2012). From 2005 until 2012, the government was led by Conservatives, but from
2010-2012 in a grand coalition with the Social-Democrats. Due to the narrow majorities,
school policy for Gymnasium remained similar during the analysis period.
– NRW: Social-Democratic (SPD) government for decades until 2005 and again from 2010
to 2017. In between the government was led by Conservatives (CDU). However, the
reform had already been enacted under the Social-Democrat government, and despite the
intermediate change, school policy remained similar for the analysis period. In particular,
as I only take NRW into account for the Control Group in the short-term period model.
– H: Social Democrats led the government until 1999. From 1999 onwards, the Conservatives
led the government and, after some turmoil in 2009, they continued to govern from 2010
until the present day. They were thus in charge for the implementation of the reform.
Thus, as mentioned in the main text, focusing on the analysis period that covers only the first
affected cohorts, the main DiD assumption appears to be plausible. However, given the reversal
decisions in some federal states in recent years after the analysis period considered in this paper, a
similar evaluation may be less plausible over time due to recent policy changes. The reform has
become a topic on the political agenda in most federal states starting in 2010 until the present day
(cf. last column in Table A.4). But for the very first affected cohorts, there is no systematic change
in governments comparing treatment and control group states in the time period (2003-2012).
A.3.5 On ability in the context of measuring IEOp and within the DiD framework
Though, one may have concerns about differences in ability, one should take into account the
following. First, the measurement framework takes into account any unchangeable features of
cognitive skills as unobserved circumstances. Second, recent literature in the field of neuroscience
suggests that in the spirit of the Human Capital Theory, cognitive skills appear to be malleable, in
particular during early childhood, through epigenetic processes. This may explain, in the spirit of the
Human Capital Theory literature (Heckman), that, for instance, Boca, Piazzalunga, and Pronzato
(2017) find that attending childcare institutions can significantly improve children’s cognitive skills,
in particular those from disadvantaged SES. The measurement framework fully takes into account
the role of ability, both as unobserved circumstance and effort. Thus, it is a lower bound measure.
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Concerning the DiD, the only assumption that I need to make is the innocuous one that generally,
the distribution in cognitive abilities of students between 2003 and 2012 did not systematically
change between German federal states. Given the fact that moving behavior across federal states is
unlikely to have occurred, this means that we simply assume that cognitive skills did not suddenly
change across states in these years for any other reason than the reform. There is no way to provide
evidence on whether there are systematic differences in ability across federal states. However, even
if they existed, the DiD framework would take that into account. Therefore, there are not many
plausible reasons given the short time period and the controls enacted via the DiD to think that
there may have been some significant changes in cognitive skills differing among federal states that
may somehow bias any results. In any case, these thoughts should be of much less concern in this
quasi-experimental setting than in other settings of published journal articles that measure IEOp
across countries. Moreover, as the reform only affects students from age 10 onwards, and treatment
merely involves more intense instruction, but not different content, I claim that these concerns which
can neither be addressed by empirical methods nor available data, are negligible and comparable to
those in accepted published articles estimating returns to schooling.
A.4 Supplementary Tables
Table A.1: Available grade-sample based PISA-I datasets
before reform after reform
Dataset PISA-2000b PISA-2003-I PISA-2006-I PISA-2009-I PISA-2012-I
Student-dataset:
# of variables 914 1,292 1,095 1,231 1,215
# of studentsa 34,754 8,559 9,577 9,460 9,998
test scoresd reading mathematics science reading mathematics
School-dataset:
# of variables 470 572 565 534 502
# of schools 1,342 216 226 226 230
Teacher-dataset: c
# of variables - 653 - 639 257
# of teachers - 1939 - 2,201 2,084
a Number of observations for students as included in the PISA datasets (2000, 2003, 2006, 2009, 2012) as available from
the IQB based on the grade-based sample (see also Appendix A.2.2). Note, that here the student-dataset includes
both the original student questionnaire answers and their parental ones.
b Note that for the year 2000, there was no specific grade-based PISA-I-sample available from IQB. However, PISA-2000
being the PISA-2000-E dataset is ninth grade-based (Baumert, 2002; PISA 2000 - Die Länder der Bundesrepublik
Deutschland im Vergleich). Therefore, it has a lower number of variables, but a higher number of observations than
the other datasets.
c For 2000 and 2006, the teacher-dataset was not part of the Germany-specific PISA dataset provided by the IQB.
d These test score domains have been in focus for the respective PISA test cycle.
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Table A.2: Available grade-sample PISA-E datasets
Before reform After reform
Dataset PISA-2000-E b PISA-2003-E PISA-2006-E c IQB-LV-2008/2009 d IQB-LV-2012
Student-dataset:
# of variables 914 698 883 494 911
# of studentsa 34,754 46,185 39,573 39,663 44,584
test scoresd reading mathematics science reading mathematics
School-dataset:
# of variables 470 633 387 - 176
# of schools 1,342 1,411 1,496 - 1,048
Teacher-dataset:
# of variables - - 194 503 422
# of teachers - - 14,572 3,376 4,213
a Number of observations for students as included in the PISA-E-Datasets (2000, 2003, 2006) and IQB-
Ländervergleichsstudie(LV)-Sprachen-2009, IQB-Ländervergleichsstudie(LV)-2012 as available from the IQB based on the
grade-based sample (see also Appendix A.2.2). Note, that here the student-dataset includes only the original student
questionnaire answers as the parental ones are only provided for PISA-2006-E.
b For years 2000 and 2003, the teacher-dataset was not part of the Germany-specific PISA dataset provided by the IQB, as
in other years. Similarly, the school-dataset was not provided for the IQB-LV-Sprachen-2008/2009.
c Note that for PISA-2006-E, the IQB only provides an age-based sample.
d For years 2009, only readings scores were assessed, whereas in 2012 only the mathematics and science test scores can be
compared with previous PISA-E results.
e These test score domains have been in focus for the respective PISA test cycle.
Table A.3: Descriptive Statistics: Outcome Variables and Sample Size
Before reform After reform
Student Test Scores PISA-2000 PISA-2003-I PISA-2006-I PISA-2009-I PISA-2012-Iin Gymnasium
Reading Mean 577.92 570.77 568.20 562.65 565.42
Reading SD 55.86 51.98 56.97 55.25 52.81
Reading Median 578.83 572.14 571.50 566.23 567.06
Mathematics Mean 573.65 583.66 571.39 578.53 575.73
Mathematics SD 62.18 57.85 58.48 56.59 58.52
Mathematics Median 572.6754 584.7017 571.1871 580.472 576.1879
Science Mean 575.14 591.15 585.01 590.48 580.44
Science SD 67.43 60.20 61.47 58.88 58.61
Science Median 576.35 594.80 587.12 594.68 581.07
Number of federal states 16 16 16 16 16
Number of schools 409 62 67 68 78
Number of students 10,276 3,017 3,356 3,473 3,910
Notes: This table reports summary statistics for the sample of ninth graders attending a Gymnasium and is weighted by
the sample weights provided in the PISA dataset from the IQB. Note that the average across plausible values can be taken
as a metric of individual-level performance (further information on test scores and the weighting procedure is provided in
Appendix A.2.1 and OECD (2012; PISA-2009 Technical Report)). Mean, standard deviations and median of the test scores
across all federal states and for all academic track schools that are in the German PISA dataset are provided for each test cycle
(2000 (Table A.1), 2003, 2006, 2009, 2012).
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Table A.4: Overview of the "G-8 reform" across federal states, sorted by year of double cohort
Federal state Type of Federal State Reform Timeline Gymnasium Reform reversal
c
West/East City/Terr. Populationa Begins Ends Type Grade yes/no
Saxony (SN) East territorial 4,0 mio - - 5-12 - nod
Thuringia (TH) East territorial 2,2 mio - - 5-12 - nod
Saxony-Anhalt (ST) East territorial 2,3 mio 2003/2004 2006/2007 5-12 9th no
Mecklenburg-West East territorial 1,6 mio 2004/2005 2007/2008 7-12 9th noPomerania (MWP)
Saarland (SL) West territorial 1,0 mio 2001/2002 2008/2009 5-12 5th noe
Hamburg (HB) West city state 1,7 mio 2002/2003 2009/2010 5-12 5th nof
Bavaria (BV)b West territorial 12,5 mio 2004/2005 2010/2011 5-12 5th,6th yesg
Lower Saxony (LS)b West territorial 7,8 mio 2004/2005 2010/2011 5-12 5th,6th yesh
Baden- West territorial 10,5 mio 2004/2005 2011/2012 5-12 5th noiWürttemberg (BW)
Bremen (BR) West city state 0,7 mio 2004/2005 2011/2012 5-12 5th noj
Berlin (BE) West city state 3,4 mio 2006/2007 2011/2012 7-12 7th nok
Brandenburg (BB) East territorial 2,5 mio 2006/2007 2011/2012 7-12 7th nok
North Rhine- West territorial 17,6 mio 2005/2006 2012/2013 5-12 5th nolWestphalia (NRW)
Hesse (H) West territorial 6,0 mio variesm variesm 5-12 5th yesn
Rhineland- West territorial 4,0 mio 2008/2009 2015/2016 5-13 5th oPalatinate (RP)
Schleswig- West territorial 2,8 mio 2008/2009 2015/2016 5-13 5th pHolstein (SH)
a Numbers taken from the most recent census in 2011 are valid for the considered time period from 2003 to 2012 (German
Federal Statistical Office, 2014, Area and population).
b In Bavaria (BV) and Lower Saxony (LS), the 6th and 5th grade were allocated into the G-8 model in the same school
year, suggesting that educational intensity might be slightly stronger for the then 6th graders that had to compensate the
shortened school duration over 7 instead of 8 years, as the then 5th grade students. However, the 9th graders in 2009 in
BV and LS were affected by the reform right from the 5th grade.
c See Secretariat of Standing Conference of Ministers of Education: https://www.kmk.org/themen/allgemeinbildende
-schulen/bildungswege-und-abschluesse/sekundarstufe-ii-gymnasiale-oberstufe-und-abitur.html
d Since 1949, these states have implemented a G-8 model in the GDR and never had a G-9 model.
e Gymnasium remains in G-8 model, but in a comprehensive school G-13 model is possible.
f Gymnasium remains in G-8 model, whereas the so-called Stadtschule as a comprehensive school offers a G-13 model.
g General revision to G-9 model starting with school year 2019/2020 as announced in April 2017.
h General revision to G-9 model starting with school year 2015/16, but with a voluntary option for the G-8 model.
i But: since 2012/2013 a state-wide pilot project allows 44 model schools to offer a G-9 model.
j But: the so-called Oberschule as comprehensive school offers a G-13 model.
k But: integrated comprehensive schools are allowed to offer G-9 (G-13) model.
l But: in 2011/2012 there was a pilot project with 13/630 Gymnasien offering a G-9 model.
m Successive intro. in # % of all Normal Gymnasium (5-12) 2004/2005: 10%; 2005/2006: 60%; 2006/2007: 30% double
cohorts: 2011/2012, 2012/2013 and 2013/2014
n since 2013/2014: students allowed to choose between G-12 or G-13 model from 5th grade onwards
o Always maintained schools with G-9 model (G-13 model), but since 2008/2009 G-8 model offered at 19 Gymnasien
p Since 2011/2012 schools are allowed by state law to offer a G-9 model (11/ 99 schools), G-8 model or both (4/99 schools).
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Table A.5: Pre-Reform Treatment/Control Group Comparison of Variables for additional Groups
Base-MT (2003-2012) Model Base-ST (2003-2009)
T Ch T-Ch T1 C1 T1-C1 T2 T2-C1
Individual characteristics
Female 0.537 0.560 -0.023 0.533 0.549 -0.016 0.535 -0.014
Age in years 15.488 15.514 -0.026 15.492 15.464 0.028* 15.474 0.010
Lang. at home not German 0.054 0.018 0.036*** 0.056 0.055 0.000 0.056 0.001
Migration background 0.183 0.059 0.124*** 0.188 0.175 0.013 0.184 0.009
Parental characteristics
Parental Education (highest ISCED level):
# ISCED-level (5-6): 0.662 0.641 0.021 0.654 0.648 0.006 0.658 0.011
# ISCED-level (3-4): [Base] 0.288 0.310 -0.021 0.285 0.288 -0.003 0.280 -0.008
# ISCED-level (1-2): 0.044 0.012 0.033*** 0.046 0.036 0.010 0.045 0.009
Socio-Economic Status
Number of books in household:
# + 500: 0.226 0.153 0.073*** 0.229 0.246 -0.017 0.220 -0.026**
# 101-500: [Base cat.] 0.509 0.448 0.061*** 0.501 0.481 0.019 0.496 0.015
# 11-100: 0.246 0.341 -0.095*** 0.244 0.228 0.015 0.257 0.029**
# max. 10: 0.010 0.023 -0.013** 0.010 0.015 -0.005 0.011 -0.004
highest ISEI-level of job in the family
# Highest ISEI-level: 59.103 55.590 3.514*** 58.975 58.471 0.504 58.656 0.185
Family Characteristics
Single Parent (Base: No): 0.137 0.176 -0.039** 0.140 0.150 -0.010 0.168 0.018
Father: employment status
# full-time (FT): [Base cat.] 0.854 0.841 0.013 0.847 0.843 0.004 0.832 -0.011
# part-time (PT): 0.065 0.036 0.029*** 0.065 0.058 0.007 0.065 0.007
# unemployed (UE): 0.024 0.058 -0.033*** 0.025 0.026 -0.001 0.034 0.009*
# out-of-labor force (OLF): 0.033 0.026 0.007 0.031 0.033 -0.001 0.031 -0.001
Mother: employment status
# full-time (FT): [Base cat.] 0.217 0.614 -0.397*** 0.216 0.232 -0.016 0.297 0.065***
# part-time (PT): 0.515 0.198 0.318*** 0.511 0.476 0.036** 0.448 -0.027*
# unemployed (UE): 0.061 0.096 -0.035*** 0.060 0.063 -0.003 0.067 0.004
# out-of-labor force (OLF): 0.194 0.063 0.132*** 0.195 0.202 -0.008 0.169 -0.033***
Number of students 2,175 607 - 2,365 1,861 - 2,999 -
Notes: This table shows a two-sample t-test for comparing the main control variables of the additional specification between the
Treatment and Control Group in the pre-reform period apart from Table 3.
This is for both T vs. Ch in Model Base-MT and for T1/T2 vs. C1 in Model Base-ST the respective pooled average of
control variables in PISA-I-2003 and -2006. Stars denote significance of the simple mean difference in pre-reform characteristics
in the form of p-values as follows: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1; Source: Author’s calculation based on PISA-I-data 2003,
2006, 2009, 2012.
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Table A.6: Main Results for Model Base-MT : 1st step to derive IEOp measure for reading scores
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: Control Group (C) Treatment Group (T)
READING Test Scores in PISA Before (2003-2006) After (2009-2012) Before (2003-2006) After (2009-2012)
(STDPVREAD3) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
CONTROL: Individual Characteristics (IC)
i)
female -0.035 0.066 0.384*** 0.395*** 0.268*** 0.294*** 0.385*** 0.399***
(0.115) (0.105) (0.081) (0.084) (0.040) (0.041) (0.038) (0.040)
age in years -0.047 -0.059 -0.251** -0.250** -0.199*** -0.163** -0.169*** -0.179***
(0.159) (0.183) (0.099) (0.114) (0.060) (0.068) (0.037) (0.039)
ii)
migration background -0.252 -0.234 -0.158* -0.170* -0.102 -0.061 -0.102* -0.078
(0.266) (0.241) (0.095) (0.090) (0.080) (0.077) (0.059) (0.058)
NO German spoken at home -0.511 -0.494 -0.065 -0.168 -0.308*** -0.339*** -0.139 -0.155**
(0.581) (0.530) (0.199) (0.195) (0.118) (0.113) (0.086) (0.073)
CONTROL: Parental Characteristics (PC)
iii)
Parental Education: [Base: ISCED-level (3-4)]
# at most lower sec. educ. (ISCED-level (1-2)) -0.512** -0.486** 0.087 0.105 -0.274** -0.285** -0.028 0.003
(0.216) (0.225) (0.196) (0.192) (0.129) (0.112) (0.060) (0.058)
# tertiary educ. (ISCED-level (5-6)) -0.144 -0.159 0.159* 0.147 -0.002 -0.011 -0.022 -0.036
(0.177) (0.156) (0.093) (0.106) (0.058) (0.061) (0.048) (0.049)
CONTROL: Socio-Economic Status (SES)
iv)
No. of books in household [Base: 101-500 ]
# max 10 books 0.132 0.169 -0.556** -0.459* -0.458* -0.489** -0.509*** -0.441***
(0.410) (0.395) (0.267) (0.273) (0.266) (0.228) (0.142) (0.127)
# 11-100 books -0.162 -0.126 -0.132 -0.084 -0.305*** -0.307*** -0.172*** -0.141***
(0.195) (0.214) (0.113) (0.122) (0.056) (0.054) (0.048) (0.043)
# more than 500 books 0.195 0.204* 0.093 0.081 0.099 0.082 0.079 0.084
(0.121) (0.117) (0.068) (0.067) (0.066) (0.064) (0.048) (0.053)
v) highest ISEI-level of parental jobs 0.007 0.007 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.004** 0.003***(0.006) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
CONTROL: Family Characteristics (FC)
vi)
family structure [Base: No]
single parent household -0.032 0.079 0.319*** 0.272** 0.092 0.09 0.109* 0.122*
(0.294) (0.261) (0.117) (0.120) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.065)
vii)
father: employment [Base: full-time (FT)]
# part-time (PT) -0.352* -0.3 -0.228 -0.241 -0.095 -0.091 -0.130* -0.104
(0.194) (0.208) (0.266) (0.280) (0.103) (0.096) (0.074) (0.078)
# unemployed (UE) 0.397 0.382 0.252 0.315 0.018 -0.031 0.02 0.068
(0.449) (0.441) (0.372) (0.366) (0.205) (0.188) (0.190) (0.191)
#out-of-labor force (OLF) 0.046 0.014 -0.045 -0.085 0.106 0.093 0.119 0.116
(0.259) (0.271) (0.174) (0.184) (0.139) (0.152) (0.117) (0.099)
mother: employment [Base: full-time (FT)]
# part-time (PT) -0.019 -0.013 -0.073 -0.062 0.053 0.006 -0.001 0.013
(0.137) (0.120) (0.099) (0.104) (0.059) (0.060) (0.041) (0.039)
# unemployed (UE) 0.167 0.267 0.139 0.252 -0.052 -0.065 0.174* 0.154
(0.292) (0.240) (0.482) (0.487) (0.132) (0.136) (0.105) (0.103)
# out-of-labor force (OLF) -0.158 -0.165 0.026 0.097 0.024 -0.032 -0.033 -0.021
(0.122) (0.150) (0.122) (0.116) (0.072) (0.080) (0.071) (0.060)
Constant 0.655 0.754 3.434** 3.435* 3.114*** 2.575** 2.320*** 2.472***
(2.604) (2.969) (1.538) (1.785) (0.996) (1.097) (0.619) (0.626)
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Federal States FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
School FE no yes no yes no yes no yes
Observations 346 346 608 608 2168 2168 3093 3093
R2 0.180*** 0.242*** 0.131*** 0.162*** 0.113*** 0.174*** 0.129*** 0.206***
(0.054) (0.057) (0.033) (0.033) (0.025) (0.032) (0.022) (0.023)
R2-adjusted 0.121** 0.172*** 0.097*** 0.114*** 0.103*** 0.147*** 0.122*** 0.184***
(0.058) (0.062) (0.034) (0.035) (0.025) (0.032) (0.022) (0.023)
Notes: This table shows the first stage OLS regressions to derive the R2 as IEOp measure for conducting the DiD estimation approach, with the results shown in the first
sub-panel in Appendix A.4. The dependent variable is stdpvread3, i.e. standardized PISA reading test scores for each test year with respect to students in Gymnasium
that are part of the representative grade-based German PISA test cohort across the respective Model Base-MT period (2003-2012) (Footnote 42).
Columns (1) to (4) showing the results for Control Group (C) provide first-step regressions for the Before-reform period (2003-2006) in columns (1-2) and After-reform period
(2009-2012) in columns (3-4). Columns (5) to (8) provide first-step regression results for Treatment Group (T) with Before-reform period (2003-2006) results in columns (5-6)
and After-reform period (2009-2012) results in columns (7-8). Even columns in addition to their odd predecessors additionally take into account school fixed effects (SFE).
Background variables used to derive R2 are explained in Section 3.3 and listed in four groups with a total of seven subgroups (compare Appendix A.3.2). Observations are
weighted according to the provided population weights. Standard errors are clustered at the federal state level, and inflated by the estimated measurement error in test
scores (compare Appendix A.3.1 on their computation) and provided in parentheses with ∗ ∗ ∗ denoting significance at the 1%, ∗∗ at the 5%, ∗ at the 10% and + at the 15%
level. Source: Author’s calculations base on PISA-I-data 2003, 2006, 2009, 2012.
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Table A.7: Main Results for Model Base-MT : 1st step to derive IEOp measure for mathematics
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: Control Group (C) Treatment Group (T)
MATHEMATICS Test Scores in PISA Before (2003-2006) After (2009-2012) Before (2003-2006) After (2009-2012)
(STDPVMATH3) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
CONTROL: Individual Characteristics (IC)
i)
female -0.744*** -0.662*** -0.553*** -0.536*** -0.509*** -0.461*** -0.498*** -0.458***
(0.132) (0.116) (0.066) (0.065) (0.046) (0.049) (0.051) (0.050)
age in years -0.064 -0.11 -0.289*** -0.318*** -0.207*** -0.210*** -0.214*** -0.237***
(0.093) (0.112) (0.067) (0.071) (0.061) (0.045) (0.033) (0.037)
ii)
migration background -0.111 -0.084 -0.107 -0.135 -0.186** -0.114 -0.152** -0.141**
(0.206) (0.185) (0.132) (0.135) (0.084) (0.076) (0.062) (0.058)
NO German spoken at home -0.46 -0.373 -0.166 -0.189 -0.088 -0.091 -0.183** -0.199**
(0.397) (0.337) (0.167) (0.171) (0.116) (0.110) (0.088) (0.082)
CONTROL: Parental Characteristics (PC)
iii)
Parental Education: [Base: ISCED-level (3-4)]
# at most lower sec. educ. (ISCED-level (1-2)) -0.486* -0.454* 0.018 0.126 -0.241*** -0.170** -0.173** -0.107
(0.270) (0.275) (0.159) (0.147) (0.090) (0.078) (0.072) (0.068)
# tertiary educ. (ISCED-level (5-6)) -0.186 -0.023 0.061 0.067 0.045 0.014 0.021 0.017
(0.121) (0.101) (0.133) (0.139) (0.052) (0.047) (0.038) (0.040)
CONTROL: Socio-Economic Status (SES)
iv)
No. of books in household [Base: 101-500 ]
# max 10 books 0.318 0.342 -0.511 -0.435 -0.433** -0.387** -0.335*** -0.295***
(0.271) (0.243) (0.320) (0.303) (0.192) (0.154) (0.124) (0.112)
# 11-100 books -0.156* -0.12 -0.123 -0.086 -0.271*** -0.256*** -0.163*** -0.140***
(0.085) (0.078) (0.131) (0.134) (0.065) (0.063) (0.045) (0.047)
# more than 500 books 0.264* 0.234 0.184 0.191 0.041 0.06 0.116*** 0.117***
(0.135) (0.149) (0.122) (0.122) (0.051) (0.055) (0.038) (0.039)
v) highest ISEI-level of parental jobs 0.007* 0.007 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.004*** 0.004***(0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
CONTROL: Family Characteristics (FC)
vi)
family structure [Base: No]
single parent household -0.024 0.058 0.242** 0.201* 0.031 0.043 0.092 0.091
(0.188) (0.176) (0.115) (0.110) (0.057) (0.053) (0.056) (0.058)
vii)
father: employment [Base: full-time (FT)]
# part-time (PT) -0.278 -0.238 -0.382* -0.421* -0.053 -0.024 -0.162*** -0.127**
(0.273) (0.278) (0.206) (0.215) (0.099) (0.090) (0.058) (0.060)
# unemployed (UE) 0.06 0.075 0.133 0.097 -0.283 -0.23 0.037 0.061
(0.361) (0.353) (0.411) (0.424) (0.178) (0.142) (0.148) (0.147)
#out-of-labor force (OLF) 0.011 -0.044 -0.134 -0.184 -0.067 -0.036 -0.028 -0.026
(0.332) (0.308) (0.155) (0.149) (0.157) (0.141) (0.121) (0.119)
mother: employment [Base: full-time (FT)]
# part-time (PT) 0.11 0.096 0.036 0.018 0.044 0.002 0.061 0.063
(0.096) (0.068) (0.124) (0.124) (0.068) (0.068) (0.049) (0.049)
# unemployed (UE) 0.126 0.212 0.167 0.132 -0.047 -0.019 0.267*** 0.271***
(0.197) (0.161) (0.577) (0.594) (0.080) (0.079) (0.101) (0.100)
# out-of-labor force (OLF) -0.04 -0.072 0.189* 0.197 0.06 -0.021 0.09 0.088
(0.167) (0.154) (0.109) (0.119) (0.083) (0.087) (0.078) (0.075)
Constant 1.156 1.824 4.585*** 5.001*** 3.658*** 3.650*** 3.527*** 3.859***
(1.436) (1.755) (1.058) (1.108) (0.964) (0.692) (0.540) (0.583)
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Federal States FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
School FE no yes no yes no yes no yes
Observations 346 346 608 608 2168 2168 3093 3093
R2 0.300*** 0.353*** 0.161*** 0.190*** 0.158*** 0.257*** 0.168*** 0.232***
(0.059) (0.060) (0.039) (0.039) (0.022) (0.032) (0.025) (0.028)
R2-adjusted 0.250*** 0.294*** 0.128*** 0.143*** 0.148*** 0.233*** 0.162*** 0.211***
(0.063) (0.065) (0.041) (0.041) (0.022) (0.033) (0.025) (0.029)
Notes: This table shows the first stage OLS regressions to derive the R2 as IEOp measure for conducting the DiD estimation approach, with the results shown in the second
sub-panel in Appendix A.4. The dependent variable is stdpvmath3, i.e. standardized PISA mathematics test scores for each test year with respect to students in
Gymnasium that are part of the representative grade-based German PISA test cohort across the respective Model Base-MT period (2003-2012) (Footnote 42).
Columns (1) to (4) showing the results for Control Group (C) provide first-step regressions for the Before-reform period (2003-2006) in columns (1-2) and After-reform period
(2009-2012) in columns (3-4). Columns (5) to (8) provide first-step regression results for Treatment Group (T) with Before-reform period (2003-2006) results in columns (5-6)
and After-reform period (2009-2012) results in columns (7-8). Even columns in addition to their odd predecessors additionally take into account school fixed effects (SFE).
Background variables used to derive R2 are explained in Section 3.3 and listed in four groups with a total of seven subgroups (compare Appendix A.3.2). Observations are
weighted according to the provided population weights. Standard errors are clustered at the federal state level, and inflated by the estimated measurement error in test scores
(compare Appendix A.3.1 on their computation) and provided in parentheses with ∗ ∗ ∗ denoting significance at the 1%, ∗∗ at the 5%, ∗ at the 10% and + at the 15% level.
Source: Author’s calculations base on PISA-I-data 2003, 2006, 2009, 2012.
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Table A.8: Main Results for Model Base-MT : 1st step to derive IEOp measure for science scores
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: Control Group (C) Treatment Group (T)
SCIENCES Test Scores in PISA Before (2003-2006) After (2009-2012) Before (2003-2006) After (2009-2012)
(STDPVSCIE3) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
CONTROL: Individual Characteristics (IC)
i)
female -0.592*** -0.509*** -0.373*** -0.337*** -0.402*** -0.354*** -0.318*** -0.297***
(0.123) (0.113) (0.067) (0.064) (0.039) (0.039) (0.042) (0.043)
age in years -0.046 -0.093 -0.213*** -0.252*** -0.178*** -0.154** -0.158*** -0.182***
(0.105) (0.118) (0.067) (0.078) (0.066) (0.066) (0.047) (0.052)
ii)
migration background -0.323* -0.297* -0.293*** -0.295*** -0.132 -0.075 -0.194*** -0.170***
(0.171) (0.163) (0.109) (0.097) (0.091) (0.086) (0.061) (0.059)
NO German spoken at home -0.464 -0.347 -0.152 -0.182 -0.217** -0.240** -0.160** -0.196***
(0.447) (0.403) (0.208) (0.214) (0.101) (0.097) (0.070) (0.068)
CONTROL: Parental Characteristics (PC)
iii)
Parental Education: [Base: ISCED-level (3-4)]
# at most lower sec. educ. (ISCED-level (1-2)) -0.594** -0.529** -0.014 0.069 -0.261*** -0.250*** -0.122 -0.036
(0.251) (0.243) (0.165) (0.175) (0.091) (0.093) (0.089) (0.063)
# tertiary educ. (ISCED-level (5-6)) -0.108 -0.153 0.077 0.119 0.041 0.032 0.021 0.025
(0.149) (0.123) (0.112) (0.123) (0.062) (0.062) (0.044) (0.043)
CONTROL: Socio-Economic Status (SES)
iv)
No. of books in household [Base: 101-500 ]
# max 10 books 0.099 0.101 -0.509 -0.425 -0.236 -0.272* -0.577*** -0.506***
(0.389) (0.413) (0.318) (0.292) (0.172) (0.153) (0.087) (0.073)
# 11-100 books -0.166 -0.122 -0.147 -0.12 -0.295*** -0.282*** -0.241*** -0.209***
(0.106) (0.106) (0.119) (0.115) (0.067) (0.068) (0.040) (0.040)
# more than 500 books 0.189 0.175 0.116 0.125 0.132** 0.142** 0.160*** 0.159***
(0.132) (0.147) (0.117) (0.112) (0.059) (0.057) (0.043) (0.041)
v) highest ISEI-level of parental jobs 0.009** 0.009** 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.004** 0.003*(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
CONTROL: Family Characteristics (FC)
vi)
family structure [Base: No]
single parent household -0.042 0.051 0.271*** 0.214*** 0.026 0.022 0.118* 0.1
(0.264) (0.241) (0.081) (0.082) (0.079) (0.080) (0.071) (0.069)
vii)
father: employment [Base: full-time (FT)]
# part-time (PT) -0.211 -0.162 -0.203 -0.23 -0.099 -0.065 -0.172** -0.151*
(0.198) (0.207) (0.170) (0.191) (0.130) (0.120) (0.074) (0.081)
# unemployed (UE) 0.183 0.192 0.215 0.16 -0.025 -0.032 0.058 0.064
(0.441) (0.426) (0.357) (0.370) (0.166) (0.149) (0.198) (0.192)
#out-of-labor force (OLF) 0.093 0.036 0.068 -0.031 0.012 0.013 0.064 0.072
(0.287) (0.290) (0.230) (0.244) (0.125) (0.127) (0.119) (0.110)
mother: employment [Base: full-time (FT)]
# part-time (PT) -0.08 -0.083 -0.029 -0.067 0.04 -0.002 0.025 0.031
(0.112) (0.097) (0.095) (0.097) (0.060) (0.064) (0.040) (0.040)
# unemployed (UE) 0.091 0.184 0.107 0.087 -0.042 -0.014 0.244** 0.217**
(0.152) (0.156) (0.294) (0.302) (0.106) (0.108) (0.101) (0.110)
# out-of-labor force (OLF) -0.189* -0.218 0.09 0.081 0.013 -0.052 0.019 0.016
(0.110) (0.139) (0.096) (0.108) (0.060) (0.067) (0.067) (0.064)
Constant 0.919 1.593 3.440*** 4.020*** 3.080*** 2.685** 2.607*** 2.986***
(1.770) (1.918) (1.053) (1.216) (1.078) (1.060) (0.701) (0.783)
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Federal States FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
School FE no yes no yes no yes no yes
Observations 346 346 608 608 2168 2168 3093 3093
R2 0.295*** 0.363*** 0.129*** 0.173*** 0.133*** 0.203*** 0.130*** 0.202***
(0.055) (0.052) (0.037) (0.047) (0.020) (0.024) (0.018) (0.024)
R2-adjusted 0.244*** 0.304*** 0.095** 0.126** 0.123*** 0.177*** 0.123*** 0.180***
(0.059) (0.057) (0.039) (0.050) (0.020) (0.025) (0.018) (0.025)
Notes: This table shows the first stage OLS regressions to derive the R2 as IEOp measure for conducting the DiD estimation approach, with the results shown in the third
sub-panel in Appendix A.4. The dependent variable is stdpvscie3, i.e. standardized PISA science test scores for each test year with respect to students in Gymnasium that
are part of the representative grade-based German PISA test cohort across the respective Model Base-MT period (2003-2012) (Footnote 42).
Columns (1) to (4) showing the results for Control Group (C) provide first-step regressions for the Before-reform period (2003-2006) in columns (1-2) and After-reform period
(2009-2012) in columns (3-4). Columns (5) to (8) provide first-step regression results for Treatment Group ( T) with Before-reform period (2003-2006) results in columns (5-6)
and After-reform period (2009-2012) results in columns (7-8). Even columns in addition to their odd predecessors additionally take into account school fixed effects (SFE).
Background variables used to derive R2 are explained in Section 3.3 and listed in four groups with a total of seven subgroups (compare Appendix A.3.2). Observations are
weighted according to the provided population weights. Standard errors are clustered at the federal state level, and inflated by the estimated measurement error in test scores
(compare Appendix A.3.1 on their computation) and provided in parentheses with ∗ ∗ ∗ denoting significance at the 1%, ∗∗ at the 5%, ∗ at the 10% and + at the 15% level.
Source: Author’s calculations base on PISA-I-data 2003, 2006, 2009, 2012.
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Table A.9: Results for Model Base-ST vs. -MT : 1st step to derive IEOp for mathematics scores
Model Base-ST (2003-2006 vs. 2009) Model Base-MT (2003-2006 vs. 2009-2012)
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: Control Group (C) Treatment Group ( T) Control Group (C) Treatment Group (T)
MATHEMATICS Test Scores in PISA Before After Before After Before After Before After
(STDPVMATH3) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
CONTROL: Individual Characteristics (IC)
i)
female -0.662*** -0.676*** -0.461*** -0.478*** -0.662*** -0.536*** -0.461*** -0.458***
(0.116) (0.118) (0.049) (0.059) (0.116) (0.065) (0.049) (0.050)
age in years -0.11 -0.358*** -0.210*** -0.264*** -0.11 -0.318*** -0.210*** -0.237***
(0.112) (0.113) (0.045) (0.070) (0.112) (0.071) (0.045) (0.037)
ii)
migration background -0.084 0.097 -0.114 -0.177** -0.084 -0.135 -0.114 -0.141**
(0.185) (0.204) (0.076) (0.089) (0.185) (0.135) (0.076) (0.058)
NO German spoken at home -0.373 -0.443 -0.091 -0.287** -0.373 -0.189 -0.091 -0.199**
(0.337) (0.321) (0.110) (0.140) (0.337) (0.171) (0.110) (0.082)
CONTROL: Parental Characteristics (PC)
iii)
Parental Education: [Base: ISCED-level (3-4)]
# max. lower sec. educ. (ISCED-level (1-2)) -0.454* 0.466 -0.170** -0.320** -0.454* 0.126 -0.170** -0.107
(0.275) (0.291) (0.078) (0.133) (0.275) (0.147) (0.078) (0.068)
# tertiary educ. (ISCED-level (5-6)) -0.023 0.049 0.014 0.008 -0.023 0.067 0.014 0.017
(0.101) (0.211) (0.047) (0.055) (0.101) (0.139) (0.047) (0.040)
CONTROL: Socio-Economic Status (SES)
iv)
No. of books in household [Base: 101-500 ]
# max 10 books 0.342 0.014 -0.387** -0.203 0.342 -0.435 -0.387** -0.295***
(0.243) (0.258) (0.154) (0.176) (0.243) (0.303) (0.154) (0.112)
# 11-100 books -0.12 0.055 -0.256*** -0.184*** -0.12 -0.086 -0.256*** -0.140***
(0.078) (0.179) (0.063) (0.059) (0.078) (0.134) (0.063) (0.047)
# more than 500 books 0.234 0.278 0.06 0.102 0.234 0.191 0.06 0.117***
(0.149) (0.216) (0.055) (0.075) (0.149) (0.122) (0.055) (0.039)
v) highest ISEI-level of parental jobs 0.007 0.005 0.001 0.004 0.007 0.001 0.001 0.004***(0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
CONTROL: Family Characteristics (FC)
vi)
family structure [Base: No]
single parent household 0.058 0.058 0.043 0.211*** 0.058 0.201* 0.043 0.091
(0.176) (0.156) (0.053) (0.078) (0.176) (0.110) (0.053) (0.058)
vii)
father: employment [Base: full-time (FT)]
# part-time (PT) -0.238 -0.519* -0.024 -0.037 -0.238 -0.421* -0.024 -0.127**
(0.278) (0.285) (0.090) (0.089) (0.278) (0.215) (0.090) (0.060)
# unemployed (UE) 0.075 -0.076 -0.23 0.023 0.075 0.097 -0.23 0.061
(0.353) (0.461) (0.142) (0.239) (0.353) (0.424) (0.142) (0.147)
#out-of-labor force (OLF) -0.044 -0.175 -0.036 -0.103 -0.044 -0.184 -0.036 -0.026
(0.308) (0.214) (0.141) (0.158) (0.308) (0.149) (0.141) (0.119)
mother: employment [Base: full-time (FT)]
# part-time (PT) 0.096 0.219 0.002 0.001 0.096 0.018 0.002 0.063
(0.068) (0.160) (0.068) (0.079) (0.068) (0.124) (0.068) (0.049)
# unemployed (UE) 0.212 -0.076 -0.019 0.308* 0.212 0.132 -0.019 0.271***
(0.161) (0.598) (0.079) (0.160) (0.161) (0.594) (0.079) (0.100)
# out-of-labor force (OLF) -0.072 0.247* -0.021 0.057 -0.072 0.197 -0.021 0.088
(0.154) (0.137) (0.087) (0.086) (0.154) (0.119) (0.087) (0.075)
Constant 1.824 5.357*** 3.650*** 4.380*** 1.824 5.001*** 3.650*** 3.859***
(1.755) (1.732) (0.692) (1.071) (1.755) (1.108) (0.692) (0.583)
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Federal States FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
School FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 346 308 2168 1467 346 608 2168 3093
R2 0.353*** 0.270*** 0.257*** 0.223*** 0.353*** 0.190*** 0.257*** 0.232***
(0.060) (0.073) (0.032) (0.041) (0.060) (0.039) (0.032) (0.028)
R2-adjusted 0.294*** 0.199** 0.233*** 0.196*** 0.294*** 0.143*** 0.233*** 0.211***
(0.065) (0.080) (0.033) (0.042) (0.065) (0.041) (0.033) (0.029)
Notes: This table shows the first stage OLS regressions to derive the R2 as IEOp measure for conducting the DiD estimation approach as shown in the second sub-panel of Table 4.
The dependent variable is stdpvmath3, i.e. standardized PISA mathematics test scores for each test year with respect to students in Gymnasium that are part of the
representative grade-based German PISA test cohort across the respective Model Base-ST (2003-2009) and -MT time period (2003-2012) (Footnote 42).
Columns (1-2) show the first-step regression results for Control Group (C), columns (3-4) for Treatment Group (T), both with respect to (ST) model (2003-2006 vs. 2009).
Columns (5-6) provide first-step regression results for C, columns (7-8) for T, both with respect to the (MT) model (2003-2006 vs. 2009-2012). All regressions take into account
year, federal state and school fixed effects. Even columns show results for the After-reform, odd ones for the Before-reform time period. Observations are weighted according to the
provided population weights. Standard errors are clustered at the federal state level, and inflated by the estimated measurement error in test scores (compare Appendix A.3.1
on their computation) and provided in parentheses with ∗ ∗ ∗ denoting significance at the 1%, ∗∗ at the 5%, ∗ at the 10% and + at the 15% level.
Source: Author’s calculations base on PISA-I-data 2003, 2006, 2009.
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Table A.10: Results for Model Base-ST - T vs. C1/C2: 1st step to derive IEOp for maths
Model Base-ST (2003-2006 vs. 2009) Model Base-ST (2003-2006 vs. 2009)
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: Control Group (C1) Treatment Group (T) Control Group (C2) Treatment Group (T)
MATHEMATICS Test Scores in PISA Before After Before After Before After Before After
(STDPVMATH3) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
CONTROL: Individual Characteristics (IC)
i)
female -0.469*** -0.507*** -0.461*** -0.478*** -0.439*** -0.521*** -0.461*** -0.478***
(0.050) (0.059) (0.049) (0.059) (0.044) (0.054) (0.049) (0.059)
age in years -0.216*** -0.317*** -0.210*** -0.264*** -0.227*** -0.298*** -0.210*** -0.264***
(0.052) (0.054) (0.045) (0.070) (0.048) (0.057) (0.045) (0.070)
ii)
migration background -0.049 -0.094 -0.114 -0.177** -0.019 -0.067 -0.114 -0.177**
(0.078) (0.074) (0.076) (0.089) (0.062) (0.052) (0.076) (0.089)
NO German spoken at home -0.215 -0.309*** -0.091 -0.287** -0.211* -0.285** -0.091 -0.287**
(0.136) (0.118) (0.110) (0.140) (0.115) (0.120) (0.110) (0.140)
CONTROL: Parental Characteristics (PC)
iii)
Parental Education: [Base: ISCED-level (3-4)]
# max. lower sec. educ. (ISCED-level (1-2)) -0.214* 0.176 -0.170** -0.320** -0.185 0.055 -0.170** -0.320**
(0.114) (0.189) (0.078) (0.133) (0.119) (0.182) (0.078) (0.133)
# tertiary educ. (ISCED-level (5-6)) 0.008 0.034 0.014 0.008 0.058 0.034 0.014 0.008
(0.042) (0.088) (0.047) (0.055) (0.045) (0.075) (0.047) (0.055)
CONTROL: Socio-Economic Status (SES)
iv)
No. of books in household [Base: 101-500 ]
# max 10 books -0.065 -0.582*** -0.387** -0.203 -0.038 -0.284 -0.387** -0.203
(0.134) (0.183) (0.154) (0.176) (0.111) (0.279) (0.154) (0.176)
# 11-100 books -0.220*** -0.164** -0.256*** -0.184*** -0.170*** -0.170*** -0.256*** -0.184***
(0.045) (0.077) (0.063) (0.059) (0.055) (0.062) (0.063) (0.059)
# more than 500 books 0.066 0.172 0.06 0.102 0.100** 0.119 0.06 0.102
(0.053) (0.107) (0.055) (0.075) (0.045) (0.076) (0.055) (0.075)
v) highest ISEI-level of parental jobs 0.003 0.003** 0.001 0.004 0.002 0.004** 0.001 0.004(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
CONTROL: Family Characteristics (FC)
vi)
family structure [Base: No]
single parent household -0.019 0.105 0.043 0.211*** -0.06 0.11 0.043 0.211***
(0.068) (0.097) (0.053) (0.078) (0.058) (0.075) (0.053) (0.078)
vii)
father: employment [Base: full-time (FT)]
# part-time (PT) -0.175 -0.183 -0.024 -0.037 -0.145 -0.208 -0.024 -0.037
(0.114) (0.169) (0.090) (0.089) (0.112) (0.132) (0.090) (0.089)
# unemployed (UE) -0.076 0.147 -0.23 0.023 -0.024 0.305 -0.23 0.023
(0.183) (0.214) (0.142) (0.239) (0.149) (0.241) (0.142) (0.239)
#out-of-labor force (OLF) -0.153 -0.052 -0.036 -0.103 -0.105 0.021 -0.036 -0.103
(0.142) (0.175) (0.141) (0.158) (0.131) (0.159) (0.141) (0.158)
mother: employment [Base: full-time (FT)]
# part-time (PT) 0.036 0.02 0.002 0.001 0.021 0.039 0.002 0.001
(0.043) (0.077) (0.068) (0.079) (0.040) (0.076) (0.068) (0.079)
# unemployed (UE) -0.03 0.013 -0.019 0.308* -0.039 -0.014 -0.019 0.308*
(0.140) (0.224) (0.079) (0.160) (0.116) (0.181) (0.079) (0.160)
# out-of-labor force (OLF) -0.006 0.054 -0.021 0.057 0.024 0.076 -0.021 0.057
(0.063) (0.087) (0.087) (0.086) (0.060) (0.090) (0.087) (0.086)
Constant 3.494*** 4.974*** 3.650*** 4.380*** 3.627*** 4.625*** 3.650*** 4.380***
(0.870) (0.818) (0.692) (1.071) (0.764) (0.863) (0.692) (1.071)
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Federal States FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
School FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 1854 1159 2168 1467 2326 1458 2168 1467
R2 0.216*** 0.233*** 0.257*** 0.223*** 0.243*** 0.222*** 0.257*** 0.223***
(0.029) (0.033) (0.032) (0.041) (0.031) (0.027) (0.032) (0.041)
R2-adjusted 0.191*** 0.203*** 0.233*** 0.196*** 0.220*** 0.195*** 0.233*** 0.196***
(0.030) (0.035) (0.033) (0.042) (0.032) (0.028) (0.033) (0.042)
Notes: This table shows the first stage OLS regressions to derive the R2 as IEOp measure for conducting the DiD estimation approach shown in the second sub-panel of Table 5
(Appendix A.5). The dependent variable is stdpvmath3, i.e. standardized PISA mathematics test scores for each test year with respect to students in Gymnasium that
are part of the representative grade-based German PISA test cohort across the respective Model Base-ST (2003-2009) (Footnote 42).
Columns (1-2) show the first-step regression results for Control Group (C1), columns (3-4) for Treatment Group (T), both with respect to (ST) model (2003-2006 vs. 2009).
Columns (5-6) provide first-step regression results for C2, columns (7-8) for T, both with respect to the (ST) model. All regressions take into account year, federal state
and school fixed effects. Even columns show results for the After-reform, odd ones for the Before-reform time period. Observations are weighted according to the provided
population weights. Standard errors are clustered at the federal state level, and inflated by the estimated measurement error in test scores (compare Appendix A.3.1 on their
computation) and provided in parentheses with ∗ ∗ ∗ denoting significance at the 1%, ∗∗ at the 5%, ∗ at the 10% and + at the 15% level. Source: Author’s calculations base on
PISA-I-data 2003, 2006, 2009.
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Table A.11: Robustness Check of Main Results: Testing potential Sorting across Schools
Subject
Model Base-MT (2003-2012) - T vs. C — (Figure A.4)
with Bundesland-FE with School-FE
Reading C T ∆ (T - C) C T ∆ (T - C)
Before (2003-2006) 0.180 0.113 -0.067 0.242 0.173 -0.068
(0.054) (0.025) (0.060) (0.057) (0.032) (0.065)
After (2009-2012) 0.131 0.129 -0.002 0.162 0.206 0.044
(0.033) (0.022) (0.040) (0.033) (0.023) (0.040)
Change in R2 -0.049 0.016 0.065 -0.079 0.033 0.112
(0.063) (0.033) (0.071) (0.066) (0.039) (0.077)
Mathematics C T ∆ (T - C) C T ∆ (T - C)
Before (2003-2006) 0.300 0.158 -0.142 0.353 0.257 -0.097
(0.059) (0.022) (0.063) (0.060) (0.032) (0.068)
After (2009-2012) 0.161 0.168 0.007 0.190 0.232 0.042
(0.039) (0.025) (0.046) (0.039) (0.028) (0.048)
Change in R2 -0.139 0.010 0.150 -0.163 -0.025 0.139
(0.071) (0.033) (0.078) (0.071) (0.043) (0.083)
Science C T ∆ (T - C) C T ∆ (T - C)
Before (2003-2006) 0.295 0.133 -0.161 0.363 0.203 -0.160
(0.055) (0.020) (0.058) (0.052) (0.024) (0.058)
After (2009-2012) 0.129 0.130 0.001 0.173 0.202 0.028
(0.037) (0.018) (0.041) (0.047) (0.024) (0.053)
Change in R2 -0.166 -0.003 0.162 -0.189 -0.001 0.188
(0.066) (0.027) (0.071) (0.071) (0.034) (0.078)
Notes: Table entries are R2 measures of IEOp (Equation (7)). Robust standard errors are in parentheses and were
calculated using replication weights following the method as explained in Appendix A.3.1, clustering at the federal state
level. DiD results are estimated according to Equation (9) taking into account population weights and the indicated
fixed effects. Positive changes in R2 indicate increasing IEOp/decreasing EEOp and vice versa for negative changes.
Background variables used to derive R2:
(i) individual characteristics (IC) I: age and gender
(ii) individual characteristics (IC)II: language spoken at home; migration background (based on birth place)
(iii) parental characteristics (PC): highest parents’ qualification (ISCED-level 1-2/ISCED-level 3-4/ISCED-level 5-6)
(iv) socio-economic status (SES) I: number of books in household (max. 11, 11-100, 101-500, more than 500)
(v) socio-economic status (SES) II : highest ISEI-level-index[0-90] of job in the family
(vi) family characteristics (FC) I: family structure - growing up in single parent household?
(vii) family characteristics (FC) II:
mother/father working part-time (PT) - mother/father unemployed (UE) - mother/father out of labor force (OLF)
Compare: Table A.6, Table A.7 and Table A.8 for details on first-step regression for T/C according to Equation (8).
Source: Author’s calculations based on PISA-I-data 2003, 2006, 2009, 2012.
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Table A.12: Robustness Checks: Placebo Tests (2003-2006) — Mathematics
Subject Model Base-MT with school FE (2003-2012) - T vs. C/C1/C2 — (Figure A.4)
with R2 measure with R2adjusted measure
Mathematics C T ∆ (T - C) C T ∆ (T - C)
Before (2003) 0.353 0.225 -0.128 0.249 0.189 -0.059
(0.109) (0.049) (0.119) (0.127) (0.051) (0.137)
After (2006) 0.362 0.278 -0.084 0.267 0.250 -0.017
(0.054) (0.048) (0.072) (0.062) (0.049) (0.079)
Change in R2 0.009 0.053 0.044 0.018 0.060 0.042
(0.122) (0.068) (0.139) (0.141) (0.071) (0.158)
Mathematics C1 T ∆ (T - C1) C1 T ∆ (T - C1)
Before (2003) 0.200 0.225 0.025 0.162 0.189 0.027
(0.050) (0.049) (0.070) (0.053) (0.051) (0.073)
After (2006) 0.245 0.278 0.034 0.214 0.250 0.036
(0.035) (0.048) (0.059) (0.037) (0.049) (0.062)
Change in R2 0.044 0.053 0.009 0.051 0.060 0.009
(0.061) (0.068) (0.092) (0.064) (0.071) (0.096)
Mathematics C2 T ∆ (T - C2) C2 T ∆ (T - C2)
Before (2003) 0.219 0.225 0.007 0.185 0.189 0.004
(0.042) (0.049) (0.064) (0.043) (0.051) (0.067)
After (2006) 0.268 0.278 0.010 0.241 0.250 0.009
(0.043) (0.048) (0.064) (0.045) (0.049) (0.067)
Change in R2 0.049 0.053 0.004 0.056 0.060 0.005
(0.060) (0.068) (0.091) (0.063) (0.071) (0.095)
Notes: Table entries are R2 measures of IEOp (Equation (7)). Due to space constraints, only Placebo Test results for
mathematics test scores are shown. However, as shown in the main results, these scores tend to be good proxies between the
reading and science scores. Robust standard errors are in parentheses and were calculated using replication weights following
the method as explained in Appendix A.3.1, clustering at the federal state level. DiD results are estimated according to
Equation (9) taking into account population weights and the indicated school fixed effects. Positive changes in R2 indicate
increasing IEOp/decreasing EEOp and vice versa for negative changes. Background variables used to derive R2:
(i) individual characteristics (IC) I: age and gender
(ii) individual characteristics (IC)II: language spoken at home; migration background (based on (parental) birth place)
(iii) parental characteristics (PC): highest parents’ qualification (ISCED-level 1-2/ISCED-level 3-4/ISCED-level 5-6)
(iv) socio-economic status (SES) I: number of books in household (max. 11, 11-100, 101-500, more than 500)
(v) socio-economic status (SES) II : highest ISEI-level-index[0-90] of job in the family
(vi) family characteristics (FC) I: family structure - growing up in single parent household?
(vii) family characteristics (FC) II:
mother/father working part-time (PT) - mother/father unemployed (UE) - mother/father out of labor force (OLF)
Compare: Due to space constraints first-step regressions for T vs. C/C1/C2 have been omitted, but they remain available
upon request from the author. The same applies to Placebo Test results for the other two testing domains, science and reading.
Source: Author’s calculations based on PISA-I-data 2003, 2006, 2009.
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Table A.13: Difference-in-Difference Results: Overview - Model Base-MT - Control Group C
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Outcome Treatment Control Model Control set R2-DD-BL R2adjusted-DD_BL R2-DD_SF R2adjusted-DD_SF
read T C Base-MT 1 0.0486019 0.0418389 0.1026374 0.0986496
read T C Base-MT 2 0.0508262 0.0413408 0.10818 0.1020977
read T C Base-MT 3 0.0492137 0.0362789 0.1089052 0.1000562
read T C Base-MT 4 0.0573307 0.0453275 0.116741 0.1091316
read T C Base-MT 5 0.0347353 0.0203472 0.1036062 0.0938706
read T C Base-MT 6 0.0734411 0.053641 0.1333018 0.1196875
read T1 C Base-MT 1 0.0552201 0.0485851 0.1045078 0.1004037
read T1 C Base-MT 2 0.053747 0.0443369 0.1076478 0.1013548
read T1 C Base-MT 3 0.0515521 0.0386309 0.1092806 0.1001985
read T1 C Base-MT 4 0.0594724 0.047456 0.1171495 0.1092804
read T1 C Base-MT 5 0.0391092 0.0246972 0.1052288 0.0952423
read T1 C Base-MT 6 0.0775819 0.0576589 0.134443 0.1204617
read T2 C Base-MT 1 0.0294624 0.0224113 0.075922 0.070706
read T2 C Base-MT 2 0.0205508 0.0105245 0.0749819 0.06732
read T2 C Base-MT 3 0.0195176 0.0057722 0.0762089 0.065553
read T2 C Base-MT 4 0.026705 0.0137465 0.0832847 0.0737119
read T2 C Base-MT 5 0.0044039 -0.011066 0.071847 0.0600673
read T2 C Base-MT 6 0.0440509 0.0226172 0.1031965 0.087029
math T C Base-MT 1 0.1374442 0.1326837 0.1173572 0.1150981
math T C Base-MT 2 0.1522048 0.1457725 0.1318355 0.1284723
math T C Base-MT 3 0.1525054 0.1440416 0.1334687 0.1284267
math T C Base-MT 4 0.1627268 0.155587 0.1438371 0.1403698
math T C Base-MT 5 0.1517936 0.1433778 0.1421455 0.1376176
math T C Base-MT 6 0.1613632 0.1488317 0.1465036 0.1384381
math T1 C Base-MT 1 0.1485623 0.1439196 0.126169 0.1239403
math T1 C Base-MT 2 0.1587099 0.1523483 0.1377001 0.1342778
math T1 C Base-MT 3 0.1573647 0.148909 0.1397943 0.1346712
math T1 C Base-MT 4 0.1678983 0.1607435 0.1502135 0.1466463
math T1 C Base-MT 5 0.1596974 0.1512595 0.1496798 0.1450618
math T1 C Base-MT 6 0.168932 0.1562866 0.1531902 0.1449399
math T2 C Base-MT 1 0.1225039 0.1174748 0.1161204 0.1132698
math T2 C Base-MT 2 0.1265655 0.1196356 0.1252417 0.1210203
math T2 C Base-MT 3 0.1239317 0.1146941 0.1247105 0.1185743
math T2 C Base-MT 4 0.1338416 0.1257928 0.1343879 0.1297064
math T2 C Base-MT 5 0.1232632 0.1138137 0.1334823 0.1276546
math T2 C Base-MT 6 0.1350299 0.1209538 0.1401597 0.1304406
science T C Base-MT 1 0.1478232 0.1432816 0.1925849 0.1923788
science T C Base-MT 2 0.1586137 0.1526844 0.1937428 0.1924779
science T C Base-MT 3 0.1603698 0.1524458 0.188899 0.1859919
science T C Base-MT 4 0.1743826 0.1680937 0.201756 0.2008021
science T C Base-MT 5 0.1563525 0.1485939 0.1925775 0.1904328
science T C Base-MT 6 0.1814693 0.1706351 0.2123226 0.2083999
science T1 C Base-MT 1 0.148146 0.1436911 0.1885749 0.1881179
science T1 C Base-MT 2 0.1568542 0.1509604 0.1887328 0.1871525
science T1 C Base-MT 3 0.156604 0.1486444 0.1836784 0.1803993
science T1 C Base-MT 4 0.1703102 0.1639529 0.1961935 0.1948287
science T1 C Base-MT 5 0.1541647 0.14632 0.1878349 0.1852712
science T1 C Base-MT 6 0.178593 0.1675509 0.2065061 0.2020138
science T2 C Base-MT 1 0.1289499 0.1241082 0.1688373 0.1674972
science T2 C Base-MT 2 0.1311111 0.1246503 0.1658215 0.1631425
science T2 C Base-MT 3 0.131187 0.122473 0.1598517 0.1552819
science T2 C Base-MT 4 0.1426166 0.1353887 0.1703004 0.167499
science T2 C Base-MT 5 0.1249573 0.1161332 0.1617619 0.1576607
science T2 C Base-MT 6 0.1522492 0.1398239 0.1838509 0.1775085
Notes: This table shows T/T1/T2 vs. C in Model Base-MT for all 3 test score domains and for each version adding all 6 control sets from 1 = [(i) + (ii)]
until 6 = [(i) + (ii) + (iii) + (iv) + (v) + (vi) + (vii)] (compare also Appendix A.4 and Section 4.1). Note that column (6) shows the DiD results with federal
states fixed effects, (7) shows the same but using adjusted R2 as IEOp measure. Column (8) shows the DiD results with school fixed effects and (9) using
additionally adjusted R2 IEOp measures.
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Table A.14: Difference-in-Difference Results: Overview - Model Base-ST - Control Group C
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Outcome Treatment Control Model Control set R2-DD-BL R2adjusted-DD_BL R2-DD_SF R2adjusted-DD_SF
read T C Base-ST 1 0.115189 0.114791 0.111681 0.111725
read T C Base-ST 2 0.121095 0.121916 0.118177 0.119875
read T C Base-ST 3 0.117737 0.12046 0.114672 0.11858
read T C Base-ST 4 0.121297 0.125021 0.119677 0.124813
read T C Base-ST 5 0.103633 0.10752 0.111402 0.117025
read T C Base-ST 6 0.13003 0.139194 0.131452 0.143227
read T1 C Base-ST 1 0.10786 0.107649 0.104675 0.104539
read T1 C Base-ST 2 0.1121 0.113107 0.110076 0.111575
read T1 C Base-ST 3 0.107721 0.110617 0.106849 0.110579
read T1 C Base-ST 4 0.11114 0.114999 0.11136 0.116273
read T1 C Base-ST 5 0.095784 0.099826 0.104421 0.109862
read T1 C Base-ST 6 0.121562 0.130887 0.123486 0.13507
read T2 C Base-ST 1 0.074232 0.073239 0.095674 0.094884
read T2 C Base-ST 2 0.073427 0.073553 0.097302 0.098033
read T2 C Base-ST 3 0.072164 0.074112 0.093102 0.096023
read T2 C Base-ST 4 0.075347 0.07814 0.097446 0.101448
read T2 C Base-ST 5 0.056112 0.059006 0.089524 0.094007
read T2 C Base-ST 6 0.082682 0.090642 0.110492 0.121088
math T C Base-ST 1 0.051357 0.050464 0.031523 0.030167
math T C Base-ST 2 0.073721 0.073815 0.053254 0.053582
math T C Base-ST 3 0.086096 0.087854 0.060405 0.062834
math T C Base-ST 4 0.085608 0.088037 0.063293 0.066655
math T C Base-ST 5 0.0792 0.082129 0.066116 0.070348
math T C Base-ST 6 0.067613 0.072198 0.050883 0.057212
math T1 C Base-ST 1 0.042805 0.042077 0.024931 0.023404
math T1 C Base-ST 2 0.062891 0.063151 0.04483 0.044959
math T1 C Base-ST 3 0.073168 0.075077 0.051544 0.053782
math T1 C Base-ST 4 0.072468 0.075007 0.053327 0.056438
math T1 C Base-ST 5 0.070316 0.073397 0.058665 0.062723
math T1 C Base-ST 6 0.059527 0.0643 0.043525 0.049722
math T2 C Base-ST 1 0.013281 0.011798 0.037425 0.035791
math T2 C Base-ST 2 0.02857 0.027986 0.053992 0.053944
math T2 C Base-ST 3 0.039033 0.040013 0.057108 0.0591
math T2 C Base-ST 4 0.038951 0.040461 0.058802 0.061596
math T2 C Base-ST 5 0.032046 0.034009 0.061858 0.065531
math T2 C Base-ST 6 0.023221 0.026675 0.048596 0.054453
science T C Base-ST 1 0.097082 0.096825 0.10027 0.100811
science T C Base-ST 2 0.101857 0.102772 0.102155 0.104122
science T C Base-ST 3 0.093722 0.096029 0.098357 0.102221
science T C Base-ST 4 0.098091 0.10139 0.106631 0.111915
science T C Base-ST 5 0.08564 0.089083 0.102506 0.108355
science T C Base-ST 6 0.098285 0.105394 0.113678 0.124412
science T1 C Base-ST 1 0.089691 0.089613 0.093076 0.093426
science T1 C Base-ST 2 0.094175 0.095279 0.095024 0.096815
science T1 C Base-ST 3 0.083815 0.086304 0.09062 0.094315
science T1 C Base-ST 4 0.087784 0.091224 0.098081 0.103143
science T1 C Base-ST 5 0.078259 0.081878 0.096034 0.101724
science T1 C Base-ST 6 0.091031 0.098355 0.106575 0.117172
science T2 C Base-ST 1 0.065456 0.064626 0.087105 0.086897
science T2 C Base-ST 2 0.063994 0.064257 0.085631 0.08676
science T2 C Base-ST 3 0.057436 0.059037 0.080508 0.083504
science T2 C Base-ST 4 0.059844 0.062283 0.086441 0.09068
science T2 C Base-ST 5 0.047085 0.04963 0.083111 0.087918
science T2 C Base-ST 6 0.061208 0.067272 0.095825 0.105506
Notes: This table shows T/T1/T2 vs. C in Model Base-ST for all 3 test score domains and for each version adding all 6 control sets from 1 = [(i) + (ii)]
until 6 = [(i) + (ii) + (iii) + (iv) + (v) + (vi) + (vii)] (compare also Table 4 and Section 4.1). Note that column (6) shows the DiD results with federal
states fixed effects, (7) shows the same but using adjusted R2 as IEOp measure. Column (8) shows the DiD results with school fixed effects and (9) using
additionally adjusted R2 IEOp measures.
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Table A.15: Difference-in-Difference Results: Overview - Model Base-ST - Control Group C1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Outcome Treatment Control Model Control set R2-DD-BL R2adjusted-DD_BL R2-DD_SF R2adjusted-DD_SF
read T C1 Base-ST 1 0.010973 0.011505 0.016437 0.018523
read T C1 Base-ST 2 0.01901 0.019878 0.024988 0.027575
read T C1 Base-ST 3 -0.00342 -0.00234 -0.0023 -5.1E-05
read T C1 Base-ST 4 -0.00295 -0.00186 -0.00091 0.001399
read T C1 Base-ST 5 -0.00433 -0.00303 0.002639 0.005235
read T C1 Base-ST 6 -0.00354 -0.00154 0.000885 0.004162
read T1 C1 Base-ST 1 0.003644 0.004363 0.009431 0.011337
read T1 C1 Base-ST 2 0.010015 0.011069 0.016887 0.019275
read T1 C1 Base-ST 3 -0.01344 -0.01218 -0.01012 -0.00805
read T1 C1 Base-ST 4 -0.01311 -0.01188 -0.00922 -0.00714
read T1 C1 Base-ST 5 -0.01218 -0.01073 -0.00434 -0.00193
read T1 C1 Base-ST 6 -0.01201 -0.00985 -0.00708 -0.004
read T2 C1 Base-ST 1 -0.02998 -0.03005 0.00043 0.001682
read T2 C1 Base-ST 2 -0.02866 -0.02848 0.004113 0.005734
read T2 C1 Base-ST 3 -0.04899 -0.04869 -0.02387 -0.02261
read T2 C1 Base-ST 4 -0.0489 -0.04874 -0.02314 -0.02197
read T2 C1 Base-ST 5 -0.05185 -0.05155 -0.01924 -0.01778
read T2 C1 Base-ST 6 -0.05089 -0.05009 -0.02008 -0.01798
math T C1 Base-ST 1 -0.01862 -0.01826 -0.06333 -0.06315
math T C1 Base-ST 2 -0.00817 -0.00754 -0.0525 -0.05193
math T C1 Base-ST 3 -0.01696 -0.01612 -0.06427 -0.06384
math T C1 Base-ST 4 -0.0187 -0.01789 -0.06419 -0.06381
math T C1 Base-ST 5 -0.02194 -0.021 -0.05933 -0.05871
math T C1 Base-ST 6 -0.02162 -0.02015 -0.05894 -0.05793
math T1 C1 Base-ST 1 -0.02717 -0.02665 -0.06992 -0.06991
math T1 C1 Base-ST 2 -0.019 -0.0182 -0.06092 -0.06055
math T1 C1 Base-ST 3 -0.02989 -0.0289 -0.07313 -0.07289
math T1 C1 Base-ST 4 -0.03184 -0.03092 -0.07416 -0.07402
math T1 C1 Base-ST 5 -0.03082 -0.02973 -0.06678 -0.06634
math T1 C1 Base-ST 6 -0.02971 -0.02805 -0.0663 -0.06542
math T2 C1 Base-ST 1 -0.0567 -0.05693 -0.05742 -0.05753
math T2 C1 Base-ST 2 -0.05332 -0.05337 -0.05176 -0.05157
math T2 C1 Base-ST 3 -0.06402 -0.06396 -0.06756 -0.06757
math T2 C1 Base-ST 4 -0.06536 -0.06546 -0.06868 -0.06887
math T2 C1 Base-ST 5 -0.06909 -0.06912 -0.06359 -0.06353
math T2 C1 Base-ST 6 -0.06601 -0.06568 -0.06123 -0.06069
science T C1 Base-ST 1 -0.00581 -0.00538 -0.00808 -0.00657
science T C1 Base-ST 2 0.003451 0.004171 0.000448 0.002385
science T C1 Base-ST 3 -0.02413 -0.02336 -0.03234 -0.03102
science T C1 Base-ST 4 -0.02222 -0.02144 -0.02975 -0.02836
science T C1 Base-ST 5 -0.02045 -0.01951 -0.02322 -0.02152
science T C1 Base-ST 6 -0.01694 -0.01543 -0.02213 -0.01987
science T1 C1 Base-ST 1 -0.0132 -0.01259 -0.01528 -0.01396
science T1 C1 Base-ST 2 -0.00423 -0.00332 -0.00668 -0.00492
science T1 C1 Base-ST 3 -0.03403 -0.03309 -0.04008 -0.03892
science T1 C1 Base-ST 4 -0.03253 -0.03161 -0.0383 -0.03713
science T1 C1 Base-ST 5 -0.02783 -0.02671 -0.02969 -0.02815
science T1 C1 Base-ST 6 -0.0242 -0.02247 -0.02924 -0.02711
science T2 C1 Base-ST 1 -0.03743 -0.03757 -0.02125 -0.02049
science T2 C1 Base-ST 2 -0.03441 -0.03434 -0.01608 -0.01498
science T2 C1 Base-ST 3 -0.06041 -0.06036 -0.05019 -0.04973
science T2 C1 Base-ST 4 -0.06047 -0.06055 -0.04994 -0.0496
science T2 C1 Base-ST 5 -0.059 -0.05896 -0.04262 -0.04196
science T2 C1 Base-ST 6 -0.05402 -0.05355 -0.03999 -0.03878
Notes: This table shows T/T1/T2 vs. C1 in Model Base-ST for all 3 test score domains and for each version adding all 6 control sets from 1 = [(i)+ (ii)]
until 6 = [(i) + (ii) + (iii) + (iv) + (v) + (vi) + (vii)] (compare also Table 5 and Section 4.1). Note that column (6) shows the DiD results with federal
states fixed effects, (7) shows the same but using adjusted R2 as IEOp measure. Column (8) shows the DiD results with school fixed effects and (9) using
additionally adjusted R2 IEOp measures.
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Table A.16: Difference-in-Difference Results: Overview - Model Base-ST - Control Group C2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Outcome Treatment Control Model Control set R2-DD-BL R2adjusted-DD_BL R2-DD_SF R2adjusted-DD_SF
read T C2 Base-ST 1 0.014695 0.015222 0.02057 0.022444
read T C2 Base-ST 2 0.034424 0.035185 0.039258 0.041688
read T C2 Base-ST 3 0.010918 0.01172 0.017893 0.019953
read T C2 Base-ST 4 0.011301 0.012165 0.018712 0.020863
read T C2 Base-ST 5 0.011957 0.01294 0.022806 0.02516
read T C2 Base-ST 6 0.011061 0.012372 0.019702 0.022318
read T1 C2 Base-ST 1 0.007366 0.008079 0.013564 0.015258
read T1 C2 Base-ST 2 0.025429 0.026377 0.031157 0.033388
read T1 C2 Base-ST 3 0.000903 0.001877 0.01007 0.011952
read T1 C2 Base-ST 4 0.001145 0.002144 0.010395 0.012323
read T1 C2 Base-ST 5 0.004108 0.005246 0.015825 0.017997
read T1 C2 Base-ST 6 0.002593 0.004064 0.011736 0.01416
read T2 C2 Base-ST 1 -0.02626 -0.02633 0.004563 0.005603
read T2 C2 Base-ST 2 -0.01324 -0.01318 0.018383 0.019846
read T2 C2 Base-ST 3 -0.03465 -0.03463 -0.00368 -0.0026
read T2 C2 Base-ST 4 -0.03465 -0.03472 -0.00352 -0.0025
read T2 C2 Base-ST 5 -0.03556 -0.03557 0.000928 0.002142
read T2 C2 Base-ST 6 -0.03629 -0.03618 -0.00126 0.000179
math T C2 Base-ST 1 -0.02231 -0.02197 -0.02839 -0.02774
math T C2 Base-ST 2 -0.00217 -0.00166 -0.01059 -0.00948
math T C2 Base-ST 3 -0.00737 -0.00679 -0.01748 -0.01648
math T C2 Base-ST 4 -0.00951 -0.0089 -0.01836 -0.01735
math T C2 Base-ST 5 -0.00795 -0.00727 -0.01207 -0.01085
math T C2 Base-ST 6 -0.01357 -0.01278 -0.01725 -0.01602
math T1 C2 Base-ST 1 -0.03086 -0.03035 -0.03499 -0.0345
math T1 C2 Base-ST 2 -0.013 -0.01233 -0.01901 -0.01811
math T1 C2 Base-ST 3 -0.0203 -0.01957 -0.02634 -0.02554
math T1 C2 Base-ST 4 -0.02265 -0.02193 -0.02832 -0.02757
math T1 C2 Base-ST 5 -0.01683 -0.016 -0.01952 -0.01848
math T1 C2 Base-ST 6 -0.02166 -0.02067 -0.0246 -0.02351
math T2 C2 Base-ST 1 -0.06038 -0.06063 -0.02249 -0.02211
math T2 C2 Base-ST 2 -0.04732 -0.04749 -0.00985 -0.00912
math T2 C2 Base-ST 3 -0.05443 -0.05463 -0.02078 -0.02022
math T2 C2 Base-ST 4 -0.05616 -0.05648 -0.02285 -0.02241
math T2 C2 Base-ST 5 -0.0551 -0.05539 -0.01633 -0.01567
math T2 C2 Base-ST 6 -0.05796 -0.0583 -0.01953 -0.01878
science T C2 Base-ST 1 -0.00145 -0.00101 0.00946 0.011064
science T C2 Base-ST 2 0.016339 0.016956 0.024027 0.026056
science T C2 Base-ST 3 -0.00047 0.000147 0.002207 0.003794
science T C2 Base-ST 4 0.001246 0.001935 0.003558 0.005233
science T C2 Base-ST 5 0.006424 0.007236 0.011134 0.013081
science T C2 Base-ST 6 0.00672 0.007789 0.010526 0.012724
science T1 C2 Base-ST 1 -0.00884 -0.00822 0.002266 0.003679
science T1 C2 Base-ST 2 0.008657 0.009463 0.016896 0.018749
science T1 C2 Base-ST 3 -0.01038 -0.00958 -0.00553 -0.00411
science T1 C2 Base-ST 4 -0.00906 -0.00823 -0.00499 -0.00354
science T1 C2 Base-ST 5 -0.00096 3.05E-05 0.004661 0.00645
science T1 C2 Base-ST 6 -0.00053 0.00075 0.003423 0.005484
science T2 C2 Base-ST 1 -0.03307 -0.03321 -0.0037 -0.00285
science T2 C2 Base-ST 2 -0.02152 -0.02156 0.007504 0.008694
science T2 C2 Base-ST 3 -0.03676 -0.03684 -0.01564 -0.01492
science T2 C2 Base-ST 4 -0.037 -0.03717 -0.01663 -0.016
science T2 C2 Base-ST 5 -0.03213 -0.03222 -0.00826 -0.00736
science T2 C2 Base-ST 6 -0.03036 -0.03033 -0.00733 -0.00618
Notes: This table shows T/T1/T2 vs. C2 in Model Base-ST for all 3 test score domains and for each version adding all 6 control sets from 1 = [(i)+ (ii)]
until 6 = [(i) + (ii) + (iii) + (iv) + (v) + (vi) + (vii)] (compare also Table 5 and Section 4.1). Note that column (6) shows the DiD results with federal
states fixed effects, (7) shows the same but using adjusted R2 as IEOp measure. Column (8) shows the DiD results with school fixed effects and (9) using
additionally adjusted R2 IEOp measures.
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Table A.17: Robustness Check: DiD Results - Model Base-MT - Control Group Ch
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Outcome Treatment Control Model Control set R2-DD-BL R2adjusted-DD_BL R2-DD_SF R2adjusted-DD_SF
read T Ch Base-MT 1 -0.0227491 -0.0146742 0.0601538 0.0706621
read T Ch Base-MT 2 -0.0279907 -0.0146276 0.0508613 0.0668377
read T Ch Base-MT 3 -0.0518645 -0.0325074 0.0147625 0.0365238
read T Ch Base-MT 4 -0.0508516 -0.0279142 0.0162766 0.0419544
read T Ch Base-MT 5 -0.0534799 -0.0268254 0.0251033 0.0552038
read T Ch Base-MT 6 -0.0708992 -0.0308939 0.0070143 0.0511753
read T1 Ch Base-MT 1 -0.0161309 -0.0079281 0.0620241 0.0724162
read T1 Ch Base-MT 2 -0.0250699 -0.0116315 0.0503291 0.0660949
read T1 Ch Base-MT 3 -0.0495261 -0.0301554 0.0151379 0.0366661
read T1 Ch Base-MT 4 -0.0487099 -0.0257857 0.0166851 0.0421032
read T1 Ch Base-MT 5 -0.0491059 -0.0224755 0.0267258 0.0565755
read T1 Ch Base-MT 6 -0.0667583 -0.026876 0.0081554 0.0519494
read T2 Ch Base-MT 1 -0.0418886 -0.0341019 0.0334383 0.0427186
read T2 Ch Base-MT 2 -0.0582661 -0.0454439 0.0176632 0.03206
read T2 Ch Base-MT 3 -0.0815606 -0.0630141 -0.0179337 0.0020206
read T2 Ch Base-MT 4 -0.0814772 -0.0594952 -0.0171796 0.0065348
read T2 Ch Base-MT 5 -0.0838113 -0.0582387 -0.006656 0.0214004
read T2 Ch Base-MT 6 -0.1002893 -0.0619177 -0.0230911 0.0185168
math T Ch Base-MT 1 -0.0383542 -0.030447 -0.113262 -0.1077581
math T Ch Base-MT 2 -0.0382803 -0.0250819 -0.1175293 -0.1073031
math T Ch Base-MT 3 -0.0630841 -0.0441709 -0.135462 -0.1199216
math T Ch Base-MT 4 -0.0569075 -0.0343625 -0.1259881 -0.1067127
math T Ch Base-MT 5 -0.0340091 -0.0070513 -0.0894577 -0.065028
math T Ch Base-MT 6 -0.040216 0.0008469 -0.0979307 -0.0605138
math T1 Ch Base-MT 1 -0.0272361 -0.0192111 -0.1044502 -0.098916
math T1 Ch Base-MT 2 -0.0317752 -0.0185061 -0.1116647 -0.1014976
math T1 Ch Base-MT 3 -0.0582248 -0.0393035 -0.1291364 -0.1136771
math T1 Ch Base-MT 4 -0.051736 -0.029206 -0.1196117 -0.1004362
math T1 Ch Base-MT 5 -0.0261053 0.0008304 -0.0819234 -0.0575838
math T1 Ch Base-MT 6 -0.0326471 0.0083018 -0.0912441 -0.054012
math T2 Ch Base-MT 1 -0.0532945 -0.0456559 -0.1144988 -0.1095864
math T2 Ch Base-MT 2 -0.0639195 -0.0512189 -0.124123 -0.1147551
math T2 Ch Base-MT 3 -0.0916578 -0.0735185 -0.1442201 -0.129774
math T2 Ch Base-MT 4 -0.0857927 -0.0641568 -0.1354374 -0.1173761
math T2 Ch Base-MT 5 -0.0625395 -0.0366154 -0.0981209 -0.074991
math T2 Ch Base-MT 6 -0.0665493 -0.027031 -0.1042747 -0.0685113
science T Ch Base-MT 1 -0.0503647 -0.0418693 -0.0230783 -0.014873
science T Ch Base-MT 2 -0.0663383 -0.0525347 -0.0438829 -0.0311266
science T Ch Base-MT 3 -0.0790938 -0.0596141 -0.0769183 -0.0596133
science T Ch Base-MT 4 -0.0766676 -0.0537081 -0.0709693 -0.0500218
science T Ch Base-MT 5 -0.0712979 -0.0444684 -0.0517354 -0.0264631
science T Ch Base-MT 6 -0.0730955 -0.0321738 -0.0509291 -0.011915
science T1 Ch Base-MT 1 -0.0500419 -0.0414598 -0.0270883 -0.0191339
science T1 Ch Base-MT 2 -0.0680978 -0.0542588 -0.0488929 -0.036452
science T1 Ch Base-MT 3 -0.0828596 -0.0634155 -0.0821389 -0.0652059
science T1 Ch Base-MT 4 -0.08074 -0.0578488 -0.0765318 -0.0559953
science T1 Ch Base-MT 5 -0.0734857 -0.0467423 -0.0564781 -0.0316247
science T1 Ch Base-MT 6 -0.0759718 -0.035258 -0.0567455 -0.0183011
science T2 Ch Base-MT 1 -0.069238 -0.0610427 -0.0468258 -0.0397547
science T2 Ch Base-MT 2 -0.0938409 -0.0805688 -0.0718042 -0.060462
science T2 Ch Base-MT 3 -0.1082766 -0.0895869 -0.1059656 -0.0903233
science T2 Ch Base-MT 4 -0.1084335 -0.086413 -0.1024249 -0.083325
science T2 Ch Base-MT 5 -0.1026931 -0.0769291 -0.082551 -0.0592352
science T2 Ch Base-MT 6 -0.1023156 -0.062985 -0.0794007 -0.0428064
Notes: This table shows T/T1/T2 vs. Ch in Model Base-MT for all 3 test score domains and for each version adding all 6 control sets from 1 = [(i) + (ii)]
until 6 = [(i) + (ii) + (iii) + (iv) + (v) + (vi) + (vii)] (compare also Section 4.1). Note that column (6) shows the DiD results with federal states fixed effects,
(7) shows the same but using adjusted R2 as IEOp measure. Column (8) shows the DiD results with school fixed effects and (9) using additionally adjusted
R2 IEOp measures.
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Table A.18: Robustness Check: DiD Results - Model Base-ST - Control Group Ch
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Outcome Treatment Control Model Control set R2-DD-BL R2adjusted-DD_BL R2-DD_SF R2adjusted-DD_SF
read T Ch Base-ST 1 -0.13167 -0.10788 -0.10471 -0.08823
read T Ch Base-ST 2 -0.1349 -0.09595 -0.101 -0.06869
read T Ch Base-ST 3 -0.18792 -0.13463 -0.16528 -0.11825
read T Ch Base-ST 4 -0.18752 -0.13006 -0.16377 -0.11234
read T Ch Base-ST 5 -0.1899 -0.12251 -0.15552 -0.09344
read T Ch Base-ST 6 -0.2207 -0.11429 -0.18673 -0.08511
read T1 Ch Base-ST 1 -0.139 -0.11502 -0.11172 -0.09541
read T1 Ch Base-ST 2 -0.1439 -0.10476 -0.1091 -0.07699
read T1 Ch Base-ST 3 -0.19793 -0.14447 -0.17311 -0.12625
read T1 Ch Base-ST 4 -0.19768 -0.14008 -0.17209 -0.12088
read T1 Ch Base-ST 5 -0.19775 -0.13021 -0.1625 -0.1006
read T1 Ch Base-ST 6 -0.22917 -0.12259 -0.19469 -0.09327
read T2 Ch Base-ST 1 -0.17263 -0.14943 -0.12072 -0.10507
read T2 Ch Base-ST 2 -0.18257 -0.14432 -0.12187 -0.09054
read T2 Ch Base-ST 3 -0.23349 -0.18098 -0.18685 -0.14081
read T2 Ch Base-ST 4 -0.23347 -0.17694 -0.186 -0.1357
read T2 Ch Base-ST 5 -0.23742 -0.17103 -0.1774 -0.11646
read T2 Ch Base-ST 6 -0.26805 -0.16284 -0.20769 -0.10725
math T Ch Base-ST 1 -0.04886 -0.02013 -0.12096 -0.10231
math T Ch Base-ST 2 -0.04189 0.005881 -0.11049 -0.07318
math T Ch Base-ST 3 -0.06617 0.003817 -0.1406 -0.0817
math T Ch Base-ST 4 -0.05855 0.017325 -0.13096 -0.06622
math T Ch Base-ST 5 -0.03955 0.050224 -0.09572 -0.01637
math T Ch Base-ST 6 -0.0551 0.090802 -0.11763 0.014335
math T1 Ch Base-ST 1 -0.05741 -0.02851 -0.12755 -0.10908
math T1 Ch Base-ST 2 -0.05272 -0.00478 -0.11891 -0.08181
math T1 Ch Base-ST 3 -0.0791 -0.00896 -0.14946 -0.09075
math T1 Ch Base-ST 4 -0.0717 0.004295 -0.14092 -0.07644
math T1 Ch Base-ST 5 -0.04843 0.041492 -0.10317 -0.024
math T1 Ch Base-ST 6 -0.06318 0.082904 -0.12499 0.006846
math T2 Ch Base-ST 1 -0.08693 -0.05879 -0.11506 -0.09669
math T2 Ch Base-ST 2 -0.08704 -0.03995 -0.10975 -0.07282
math T2 Ch Base-ST 3 -0.11324 -0.04402 -0.1439 -0.08543
math T2 Ch Base-ST 4 -0.10521 -0.03025 -0.13545 -0.07128
math T2 Ch Base-ST 5 -0.0867 0.002105 -0.09997 -0.02119
math T2 Ch Base-ST 6 -0.09949 0.045279 -0.11992 0.011576
science T Ch Base-ST 1 -0.0953 -0.06736 -0.0527 -0.03236
science T Ch Base-ST 2 -0.10149 -0.0555 -0.05884 -0.02053
science T Ch Base-ST 3 -0.15535 -0.09345 -0.12988 -0.07546
science T Ch Base-ST 4 -0.1455 -0.07842 -0.12239 -0.06264
science T Ch Base-ST 5 -0.1485 -0.07076 -0.10819 -0.0368
science T Ch Base-ST 6 -0.17429 -0.05204 -0.13762 -0.02242
science T1 Ch Base-ST 1 -0.10269 -0.07457 -0.0599 -0.03974
science T1 Ch Base-ST 2 -0.10918 -0.063 -0.06597 -0.02784
science T1 Ch Base-ST 3 -0.16526 -0.10317 -0.13762 -0.08336
science T1 Ch Base-ST 4 -0.15581 -0.08859 -0.13094 -0.07141
science T1 Ch Base-ST 5 -0.15588 -0.07797 -0.11466 -0.04343
science T1 Ch Base-ST 6 -0.18154 -0.05908 -0.14472 -0.02966
science T2 Ch Base-ST 1 -0.12693 -0.09956 -0.06587 -0.04627
science T2 Ch Base-ST 2 -0.13936 -0.09402 -0.07536 -0.0379
science T2 Ch Base-ST 3 -0.19163 -0.13044 -0.14773 -0.09418
science T2 Ch Base-ST 4 -0.18375 -0.11753 -0.14258 -0.08388
science T2 Ch Base-ST 5 -0.18705 -0.11021 -0.12758 -0.05724
science T2 Ch Base-ST 6 -0.21137 -0.09016 -0.15547 -0.04133
Notes: This table shows T/T1/T2 vs. Ch in Model Base-ST for all 3 test score domains and for each version adding all 6 control sets from 1 = [(i) + (ii)]
until 6 = [(i) + (ii) + (iii) + (iv) + (v) + (vi) + (vii)] (compare also Section 4.1). Note that column (6) shows the DiD results with federal states fixed effects,
(7) shows the same but using adjusted R2 as IEOp measure. Column (8) shows the DiD results with school fixed effects and (9) using additionally adjusted
R2 IEOp measures.
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Table A.19: Robustness Check: Overview of DiD Results - Model Full-MT - Control Group C
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Outcome Treatment Control Model Control set R2-DD-BL R2adjusted-DD_BL R2-DD_SF R2adjusted-DD_SF
read T C Full-MT 1 0.033046 0.036931 0.093264 0.091588
read T C Full-MT 2 0.032047 0.038399 0.09349 0.094568
read T C Full-MT 3 0.025697 0.035358 0.089567 0.094009
read T C Full-MT 4 0.031441 0.042861 0.093703 0.100081
read T C Full-MT 5 0.009385 0.022148 0.083888 0.091618
read T C Full-MT 6 0.029813 0.049689 0.097794 0.113363
read T1 C Full-MT 1 0.035779 0.039219 0.088497 0.088696
read T1 C Full-MT 2 0.031723 0.037524 0.086996 0.089778
read T1 C Full-MT 3 0.025085 0.034073 0.083867 0.089847
read T1 C Full-MT 4 0.030305 0.040983 0.088291 0.096144
read T1 C Full-MT 5 0.010393 0.022364 0.079617 0.088778
read T1 C Full-MT 6 0.030198 0.049014 0.092885 0.109591
read T2 C Full-MT 1 0.00766 0.010701 0.060214 0.05935
read T2 C Full-MT 2 -0.00179 0.003551 0.055756 0.057333
read T2 C Full-MT 3 -0.00762 0.000854 0.051719 0.056415
read T2 C Full-MT 4 -0.00316 0.006971 0.055108 0.061616
read T2 C Full-MT 5 -0.02463 -0.01324 0.046732 0.054531
read T2 C Full-MT 6 -0.003 0.015122 0.062835 0.078121
math T C Full-MT 1 0.051045 0.053245 0.060234 0.045001
math T C Full-MT 2 0.061606 0.06553 0.07126 0.05832
math T C Full-MT 3 0.050375 0.056285 0.063509 0.052661
math T C Full-MT 4 0.060182 0.067332 0.073002 0.06388
math T C Full-MT 5 0.049744 0.057805 0.071991 0.063996
math T C Full-MT 6 0.057976 0.070598 0.073331 0.070357
math T1 C Full-MT 1 0.061997 0.063882 0.06555 0.054744
math T1 C Full-MT 2 0.067896 0.071386 0.073521 0.0648
math T1 C Full-MT 3 0.055193 0.060522 0.066284 0.059448
math T1 C Full-MT 4 0.064788 0.071281 0.076159 0.070984
math T1 C Full-MT 5 0.056959 0.064306 0.076386 0.072303
math T1 C Full-MT 6 0.064858 0.076467 0.077088 0.077748
math T2 C Full-MT 1 0.030857 0.0323 0.04556 0.034304
math T2 C Full-MT 2 0.031603 0.034538 0.051558 0.042223
math T2 C Full-MT 3 0.019254 0.0239 0.043209 0.035603
math T2 C Full-MT 4 0.027894 0.033629 0.05175 0.045695
math T2 C Full-MT 5 0.017998 0.024511 0.051604 0.046557
math T2 C Full-MT 6 0.027428 0.037931 0.054375 0.053881
science T C Full-MT 1 0.055852 0.058481 0.112282 0.10136
science T C Full-MT 2 0.06769 0.072282 0.113213 0.104678
science T C Full-MT 3 0.071157 0.07811 0.112054 0.106061
science T C Full-MT 4 0.078049 0.086378 0.118382 0.114141
science T C Full-MT 5 0.064415 0.073681 0.112392 0.109258
science T C Full-MT 6 0.085998 0.100831 0.128497 0.131994
science T1 C Full-MT 1 0.057771 0.06004 0.107569 0.101061
science T1 C Full-MT 2 0.067756 0.071878 0.10737 0.103079
science T1 C Full-MT 3 0.069246 0.07559 0.105562 0.103533
science T1 C Full-MT 4 0.075568 0.083212 0.111904 0.111548
science T1 C Full-MT 5 0.063609 0.072126 0.106835 0.107539
science T1 C Full-MT 6 0.084183 0.09796 0.121978 0.128986
science T2 C Full-MT 1 0.032707 0.034542 0.08496 0.078063
science T2 C Full-MT 2 0.037865 0.041455 0.082288 0.077407
science T2 C Full-MT 3 0.037788 0.043486 0.077657 0.074821
science T2 C Full-MT 4 0.042629 0.049558 0.082498 0.081223
science T2 C Full-MT 5 0.029119 0.036853 0.076974 0.076686
science T2 C Full-MT 6 0.052592 0.065355 0.095818 0.101716
Notes: This table shows T/T1/T2 vs. C in Model Full-MT for all 3 test score domains and for each version adding all 6 control sets from 1 = [(i) + (ii)]
until 6 = [(i) + (ii) + (iii) + (iv) + (v) + (vi) + (vii)] (compare also Section 4.1). Note that column (6) shows the DiD results with federal states fixed effects,
(7) shows the same but using adjusted R2 as IEOp measure. Column (8) shows the DiD results with school fixed effects and (9) using additionally adjusted
R2 IEOp measures.
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A.5 Supplementary Figures
Figure A.1: Absolute educational mobility (2012)
Notes: This figure illustrates absolute educational mobility. It shows the percentage of 25-64 year-old non-students
whose educational attainment is higher (upward mobility) or lower (downward mobility) or the same as (status quo)
that of their parents as measured in 2012 by the OECD.
Source: Figure taken from OECD (2013b; PISA 2012 Results: Excellence Through Equity: Giving Every Student the
Chance to Succeed).
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Figure A.2: Structure of the German educational system
Notes: This figure illustrates the basic structure of the German education system. For more details on the German
educational system, see Standing Conference of Education Ministers (2016).
Source: Figure taken from Standing Conference of Education Ministers (2016): Basic Structure of the Education
System in the Federal Republic of Germany.
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Figure A.3: Overview of G-8-Reform across federal states for students tested in PISA (2003-2012)
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Notes: This figure illustrates whether 9th graders attending a Gymnasium tested in a PISA-test year (2003, 2006,
2009, 2012) were still taught in a G-9 model (light grey) or were already in a reformed G-8 model (dark grey).
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Figure A.4: Overview of the Treatment/Control Group setting
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Notes: The left-hand figures show the main Treatment/Control Group comparisons for the medium-term (2003-2012)
in the top and for the short-term (2003-2009) model in the bottom panel with main Control Groups C/C1/C2 and
main Treatment Groups T/T1/T2. The right-hand side shows the same settings including Control Group Ch.
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Figure A.5: DiD Graphs of IEOp measure for main Treatment/Control Groups
(a) IEOp measure based on mathematics (b) IEOP measure based on reading (c) IEOp measure based on science
Notes: This figure shows the DiD graphs for all three test domains confirming the parallel trend assumption to hold.
Treatment is the main treatment group T, Control is the main control group C, Control1 is the main additional
short-term model control group C1 and Control2 is an extended short-term model control group C2.
Source: Author’s own calculations based on PISA 2000, 2003, 2006, 2009 and 2012.
Figure A.6: Robustness - DiD Graphs of IEOp measure for enlarged Treatment/Control Groups
(a) IEOp measure based on mathematics (b) IEOp measure based on reading (c) IEOp measure based on science
Notes: This figure shows the DiD graphs for all three test domains confirming the parallel trend assumption to hold,
even when enlarging the treatment group to include instead of three federal states (main Treatment Group T), five
(Treatment T1 Extension Group) or seven federal states (Treatment T2 Extension Group) and when comparing it to
the never-changing control group (Control-Never-Taker (C-NT)) consisting of four federal states (cf. Section 4).
Source: Author’s own calculations based on PISA 2000, 2003, 2006, 2009 and 2012.
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Figure A.7: IEOp measure for main Treatment/Control Groups over time period (2000-2012)
Notes: This figure shows the IEOp measure (R2adjusted) with 95% confidence intervals over the whole time period.
Standard errors to construct confidence intervals are calculated according to Appendix A.3.1.
Source: Author’s own calculations based on PISA 2000, 2003, 2006, 2009 and 2012.
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Figure A.8: Graphical Illustration of Main Results
Notes: This figure shows the DiD estimates based on all three test domains and illustrates the main results as shown
in the main text in Section 5. The first row of graphs corresponds to Appendix A.4. It also confirms that the
Difference-in-Differences strategy works in terms of potential concerns of sorting on the school level, as the main
regression patterns remain unchanged whether controlling for school fixed effects or only federal states fixed effects.
The second row of graphs corresponds to Table 4. It shows that the medium-term results are statistically significant
and larger than the short-term results. Finally, the last row of results corresponds to Table 5. Note that control group
C3 corresponds to C1 in the main text and control group C4 to C2 in the main text. It confirms that the main results
also hold for enlarged control groups, lending some external validity to the results for the whole of Germany. The IEOp
measure was estimated as explained in Section 4.1 and standard errors were calculated according to Appendix A.3.1.
Source: Author’s own calculations based on PISA 2000, 2003, 2006, 2009 and 2012.
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Figure A.9: Potential Mechanism: Extra Tuition
Notes: This figure shows the percentage of tested students indicating that they took extra classes beyond official school
lessons. This mostly includes paid extra tuition. The black bars correspond to students growing up in non-academic
households, whereas the grey bars show results for students from academic households, i.e. growing up with at least
one parent who has a university diploma (ISCED-level is greater than 5 or 6). The first panel shows that there was an
upward trend in the demand for extra classes/tuition between 2003 and 2012 across all federal states. The second
panel shows that in treatment states, the increase in extra tuition has been stronger for students from academic
than non-academic households in the post-reform period from 2009 to 2012. This indicates that this differential
adjustment with respect to extra-tuition depending on a student’s parental educational background may explain the
observed patterns in the main results. As in control groups, no such differential response in years 2009 and 2012 can
be observed. Data are based on responses in both parental and student questionnaires.
Figure A.10: Potential Mechanism: Time Investment by Mothers
Notes: This figure shows the percentage of tested students whose mothers work part-time. The black bars correspond
to students growing up in households in which the mother only works part-time and has more time to help them with
school work, whereas the grey bars show results for students from households in which the mother is working full-time.
The first panel shows that there is an upward trend of mothers working part-time between 2003 and 2009 across all
federal states. Only afterwards do mothers increasingly work full-time. The second panel shows that in treatment
states, the increase in mothers working part-time remained constant in 2012 for students from academic rather than
non-academic households in the post-reform period from 2009 to 2012. This indicates that a differential adjustment
with respect to maternal time investment in their school-age children depending on their educational background
may explain the observed patterns in the main results. As in the control groups, no such differential response can be
observed. Data are based on responses from both parental and student questionnaires.
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